

084198

JPRS-EPS-85-005

10 January 1985

East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

20000124 029

Reproduced From
Best Available Copy

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 1

6
124
A06

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

10 January 1985

EAST EUROPE REPORT

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

CONTENTS

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Tension in Austrian-Czechoslovak Relations (NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, 17 Nov 84)	1
Austria 'Obscures' CSSR Protest Against Hainburg (Bedrich Zagar; PRAVDA, 8 Dec 84)	4
Czech Clergy Thank for Aid, Pledge Support (PRAVDA, 11 Dec 84)	6
Daily Commemorates Dubcek Predecessor Novotny (PRAVDA, 12 Dec 84)	7
Standards for University Education (Editorial; RUDE PRAVO, 23 Nov 84)	9
Briefs	
Youths in Nicaragua Harvest	12
Plenum Results Briefing	12
Cultural Program With Norway	12
Fire Figures	12
Petrochemistry Experts' Meeting	13
Sugar Beet Harvest	13
Scientific Conference	13
CEMA Experts Session	14
Phone Calls to Africa	14
International Cooperation Council Session	14
Electricity Consumption	14
Tourist Exchange With USSR	14
Cultural Relations With Finland	14
Farmers Union Elects Leadership	14
Propagandists' Consultation	15
1983 Soya Beans Import	15
PRC Planning Minister Visit	15

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Bishop Stolpe Urges Joint Inter-German Peace Effort (FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 14 Nov 84)	16
--	----

HUNGARY

Anthology on Hungarian Armed Forces Attitude in 1956 (MAGYAR NEMZET, 14 Dec 84)	20
Scientific Session on Social Development (MAGYAR HIRLAP, 11 Dec 84)	21

POLAND

Oscillating U.S.-Polish Relations Analyzed (Zdzislaw Lachowski; SPRAWY MIEDZYNARODOWE, No 7-8, Jul-Aug 84)	23
Gierek Testifies During Trial of Szczepanski (Edmund Zurek; PRASA POLSKA, No 10, Oct 84)	35
Riding on Church-State Roller Coaster (Szczepan Balicki; KIERUNKI, No 44, 28 Oct 84)	54
Looking for Ways To Combat 'Social Pathology' (Zygmunt Beczkiewicz Interview; GAZETA ROBOTNICZA, 22 Nov 84)	65
Bednarski Reports to Social Science Session (Henryk Bednarski; TRYBUNA LUDU, 10 Dec 84)	68
History of Support for National Liberation Movement Reported (Wladyslaw Goralski; RZECZYWISTOSC, No 46, 11 Nov 84) ...	74
Commander Discusses Air Force History, Own Career (SKRZYSLATA POLSKA, No 34, 19 Aug 84; GAZETA MOLODYCH, 24-27 Aug 84)	79
History, Mission, Tytus Krawczyc Interview Reminiscences, New Requirements, Tytus Krawczyc Interview	
Mig-23 Pilot Discusses Career, Duties (Wladyslaw Begieda Interview; ZOLNIERZ POLSKI, No 42, 14 Oct 84)	89
Progress on Creation of Inspection Teams Assessed (TRYBUNA LUDU, 3-4 Nov 84; RZECZPOSPOLITA, 3-4 Nov 84) ..	93
Experiment in Radom, by Malgorzata Kakiel Positive Contribution to Society, Jozef Oleksy Interview	

Ways To Reach Cooperation With Intellectuals Described (Mikolaj Kozakiewicz; PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY, No 48, 25 Nov 84)	102
Meeting of PZPR Central Auditing Commission Reported (Izabella Wajszczuk; TRYBUNA LUDU, 14 Dec 84)	110
Briefs	
Glomp's Christmas Letter	112
Party Social Science Program	112
PRC Friendship Society Anniversary Meeting	112
New Bishop in Wroclaw	112
Justice Minister Signs Prague Agreement	113

YUGOSLAVIA

Croatian LC Debates Stabilization Program's Ideological Aspects (Jelena Lovric; DANAS, 20 Nov 84)	114
--	-----

TENSION IN AUSTRIAN-CZECHOSLOVAK RELATIONS

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 17 Nov 84 p 4

[Article by R. St.: "The Delicate Relations Between Vienna and Prague"]

[Text] Vienna, 14 November--Following a session of the Foreign Relations Council, a body containing representatives from all parliamentary parties, Minister for Foreign Affairs Gratz expressed regret over the temporary recall of the Czechoslovak ambassador in Vienna, Venuta, as being another step in the escalation of tension. By taking this action, Prague intended to protest the Austrian version of the border incident near Gmuend, according to which a fleeing Czech citizen was shot and killed by Czech border guards on Austrian territory. As has been previously reported, Vienna has considerable evidence for what actually happened. At the moment Vienna does not intend to recall its chief of mission in Prague. But the Foreign Affairs Ministry on the Ballhausplatz insists that the crisis in bilateral relations was triggered unequivocally by the attitude of the Czechoslovak authorities. All three Austrian parliamentary parties agree with this judgment. Foreign Minister Gratz added that the creation of a truly peaceful border is an absolute prerequisite for good relations between the two states, and that his policies would continue to be devoted to that end.

Prague's Sensitivity

The pitiful case of Frantisek Faktor, who suffered for three days and finally died in a forest just inside Austrian territory after having been shot through a lung, has triggered reactions in Prague which can be understood only in the context of the extremely delicate Austrian-Czechoslovak relations. The leftovers of Czechoslovak ammunition found on Austrian territory by themselves constitute overwhelming evidence. Prague did not even attempt to deny this fact, but rather shifted to polemics against Austrian politicians and the Austrian press.

This points up two changes: first, the deep vulnerability of the Czech soul by anything the least bit censorious emanating from Vienna. The fact that Vienna comes out with any kind of criticism against Prague is all the more offensive to the official, somewhat insecure, Prague if Vienna is in the right--Vienna, which ruled Bohemia for 300 years, not always with the requisite sensitivity, and which occasionally ruled Prague with a crude lack of understanding for its singularity. It is quite characteristic for the state

of mind prevailing in Hradcin Castle that political decisions are criticized there which are entirely matters of Austrian sovereignty. The official Prague press for instance raged against the procurement of interceptors for the Austrian federal armed forces at the same time that the CSSR itself was installing new Soviet missiles in various areas of the country--perish the thought that Austria had raised any objections to that.

In the opinion of the Czechs, the delicate psychic balance between the two Central European neighbors is disturbed also by the fact that millions of Czechs and Slovaks listen to and watch the Austrian radio and television every day. The Austrian programs provide whatever information is missing from state-controlled broadcasts from Prague and Bratislava. Thus, if the Hradcin, through Deputy Foreign Minister Johanes, talks about an anti-Czechoslovak hate campaign, this is not directed against the Vienna newspapers, which are not freely available in the CSSR anyway, but against radio and TV reportages. They called the attention of the population to Faktor's attempted escape; they provided a much more credible version of the incident, which made the Czech authorities look bad.

The role of the Austrian electronic media in keeping the population informed cannot be underestimated. News reports broadcast by radio and especially by the Eastern TV service are a constant source of irritation to the Prague communists; not that the broadcasts disseminate false or hate-filled information--this would provide the regime with an opportunity to counteract them--but because they report facts and contexts which are ignored in their own broadcasts. Several broadcasters of the Eastern TV Service who are respected in other Eastern European countries are forbidden to visit the CSSR. It would be a gross mistake to think that they judge the CSSR by more severe standards than they do other countries. Apart from all this, some of the regional radio stations broadcast joint music programs, which are a manifestation of the philosophy of coexistence, of an official attitude of neighborliness.

Taken from another viewpoint, one might note that from a feeling of weakness and inferiority Prague managed to draw some strength. During the past 5 years the Hradcin has engaged in a fairly successful cat-and-mouse game with Austria, which indicated unequivocally who was calling the tune in their inter-state relations. The Ballhausplatz people might be concerned about the fact that whenever things appear to be running smoothly, the delicate flower of neighborliness is trampled upon once more. Austrian observers feel that the abrupt cancellation of the Czechoslovak Culture Week in Vienna would have reflected an appropriate attitude, rather than a mere hint that this primarily social event might possibly be postponed. Two generations after the end of the monarchy neither Prague nor Vienna have found a new style of dealing with the successor state located between the Bohemian Forest and the Erz Mountains, between the Danube and the Tatra, which is not tainted by history.

It might be some consolation for Chancellor Sinowatz that Austria's part has been accorded praise by Poland, Hungary and the GDR during the last few weeks. Less friendly noises are coming from Moscow, which should be of some concern 8 days prior to a state visit.

During the latter part of last summer, Austria was accused of maintaining overly close economic ties to the FRG in an IZVESTIYA article. Recently, PRAVDA rallied behind the USSR ally in the dispute between Prague and Vienna by not only reprinting the CTK rantings about the "anti-Czech hate campaign" but ignoring the Faktor case, even wrote about attempted border violations by Austrian subversion centers. This could result in a new dimension of the dispute between Prague and Vienna.

Only when Vienna gets rid of the remaining guilt complexes stemming from the reign of the Hapsburgs will there be any change in its relationship with Prague.

9273

CSO: 2300/130

AUSTRIA 'OBSCURES' CSSR PROTEST AGAINST HAINBURG

AU101126 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 8 Dec 84 p 5

[Bedrich Zagar commentary: "Without ObscuringMatters"]

[Text] Guenter Haiden, Austrian minister of agriculture and forestry, has given the go-ahead to the construction of the Hainburg water project and power plant. It is to be built on the Danube, near the Czechoslovak-Austrian border, which will have a great impact on the Czechoslovak water economy. Czechoslovakia has raised its objections to the project, which have not been considered. Although Minister Haiden announced that more than 300 conditions would have to be fulfilled prior to the construction start in 1987, these do not concern the Czechoslovak objections. On the basis of an analysis of all available materials, Czechoslovak experts have ascertained that the water project would negatively affect the borders sections of the Danube and Morava rivers. A Czechoslovak delegation notified an Austrian delegation about this at talks in Bratislava. At that time Minister Haiden, who headed the Austrian delegation, conceded that the Czechoslovak objections were justified. Nevertheless, now he has given the green light to the construction of the water project.

And not only that. The Austrian side has even reproached Czechoslovakia for having gone public with its objections, instead of making use of "tested channels." Yet the truth is that Czechoslovakia did make use of all channels and the result is still zero.

Documents from the beginning of November about the results of talks between delegations of the CSSR and Austria note that the construction of the Hainburg water project is a one-sided solution on the Austrian side that violates the established concept of a comprehensive utilization of the hydroelectric potential of the Danube and harms Czechoslovak interests.

Our delegation notified the Austrian side that, in the event of the construction of the Hainburg water project, it would demand compensation for the damage caused.

Our delegation is also demanding access to basic technical data on the water project that are necessary to assess and more accurately ascertain

the negative repercussions on the CSSR territory. At the same time, agreement was reached at the talks in Bratislava about setting up a group of experts to study the entire complex of problems pertaining to Danube water projects.

We believe that matters concerning this undeniably grave problem should not be obscured and distorted, but discussed openly and with all due seriousness.

CSO: 2400/165

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CZECH CLERGY THANK FOR AID, PLEDGE SUPPORT

AU121638 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 11 Dec 84 p 8

[CTK report: "Support for the Efforts for Peace"]

[Text] Prague (CTK)--Josef Korcak, premier of the Czech Socialist Republic (CSR), yesterday [10 December] received in Prague, in the presence of CSR Minister of Culture Milan Klusak, the newly elected representative of the PACEMIN TERRIS Association of Catholic Clergy in the CSR, Vaclav Javurek, dean of the Kralove Hradec Chapter and the association's chairman, and the association's secretary, Josef Stastny, administrator at St Anna's in Prague.

The dignitaries, acting on behalf of the association's Third Congress, which was held on 12-13 November 1984 in Brno, presented the CSR premier with a letter in which they express appreciation of the assistance granted to the association by the CSR Government and by other bodies of the state administration. The letter contains an assurance of support for the Czechoslovak Government's efforts to consolidate and strengthen peace in the world.

Further on, the letter recalls the great feat of renewal and development achieved during the 40 years of peaceful and free life. It expresses the standpoint that Czechoslovakia has become an internationally respected socialist state--the fatherland and home of all honest citizens, regardless of their religious convictions. "Our daily clerical service," the letter states, "will not forget to encourage believers to acquire civic virtues and honesty and devotion in work, so that the socialist society, developed in every aspect, would strengthen and constantly develop also through the contribution of believers."

On this occasion CSP Premier Josef Korcak appraised the positive attitudes and activity of the association in deepening the relations between the Roman Catholic Church and our socialist state; and he emphasized their informal involvement in the fight for preserving peace in the world.

CSO: 2400/165

DAILY COMMEMORATES DUBCEK PREDECESSOR NOVOTNY

SU131455 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 12 Dec 84 p 2

["RP"--signed article: "On the 80th Anniversary of the Birth of A. Novotny"]

[Text] It is 80 years since the birth of Antonin Novotny, who was CPCZ Central Committee first secretary in the years 1953-68, and president of the republic in the years 1957-68.

His life's path was closely linked with the revolutionary workers movement. He joined the CPCZ in 1921. At first A. Novotny was active in the proletarian physical education movement. At the beginning of the thirties he held several party posts in Prague; and in 1937 he was elected secretary of the party's Prague City Committee. After that he briefly worked as secretary of the party's Regional Committee in Hodonin. From the beginning of the occupation he was involved in the antifascist resistance. In September 1941 he was arrested, and was imprisoned up to the end of the war in Mauthausen concentration camp. In May 1945 he became leading secretary of the party's Regional Committee in Prague. In that function, too, he actively participated in the work of the party's Prague organization in the days of the Czechoslovak people's February Victory of 1948 [communist takeover]. In 1951 he became CPCZ Central Committee Presidium member and secretary. He left political life in the critical year 1968, as a consequence of the mistakes he had made in the most responsible positions. At that time his party membership was suspended; it was returned to him in 1971. He died in 1975.

The party's history is the history of none-too-easy struggles. The successes we achieved in the fight for socialism and in building it are the result of the immense collective effort of the party and the people. They were decided on, above all, by the consolidation and cohesion of the party, by its ability to fulfill the duties of the revolutionary vanguard of the workers class, by its ability to creatively apply Marxism-Leninism under our conditions, to work out a scientifically substantiated program of revolutionary social transformations, and to unite the people's masses in order to realize this program. It is clear that a significant role was played by those personalities who devotedly serve the cause of the working people, who decided and acted in a principled way, in the awareness of their high responsibility to the party and the people.

Life shows us that even an experienced and mature individual is not protected against mistakes and errors. But the point is to recognize them, and to draw conclusions from them. That is also why it is so important always to consistently implement the Leninist style of work, to view the exerted efforts and practical results critically, to resolve problems creatively, and to approach them politically and not bureaucratically. It cannot be denied that A. Novotny's intentions and his attitude to the party and workers class were honorable. But his main shortcoming--which showed up extremely detrimentally in the complicated period of the critical development toward the end of the sixties--was, that he violated the Leninist norms, and particularly the principle of the collective nature of leadership; that he succumbed to subjectivism; and that he raised the administrative methods of management above political and ideological work, which he obviously underrated. His pragmatic approach was adversely manifested also in the insensitive attitude toward the nationality issue, the final solution of which he ignored.

As shown in the Lesson From the Critical Development in the Party and Society After the 13th CPCZ Congress--a document, in which the CPCZ Central Committee comprehensively evaluated the period in which the onslaught of the counterrevolution took place and in which socialism was endangered in our country--A. Novotny failed to cope with his tasks when faced by this approaching threat. "The healthy Marxist-Leninist stream in the party realized the seriousness of the situation," the lesson stresses. "Instead of taking his place at the head of the Marxist-Leninist stream, he (A. Novotny) objectively hampered the party's onslaught for creatively implementing the resolutions of the 13th party congress, for the ideological and action unity, and for the consolidation of the party's leading role." His underrating of the danger of revisionism led to the ideological disarmament of the party. The mistakes he was guilty of were abused by rightwing opportunists in order to attack the party, the principles of its policy, and socialism itself.

We recall the 80th anniversary of his birth, which A. Novotny did not live to see, in the awareness of the complicated nature of our party's historical path. The greatness of this path in no way lessens our duty to appraise the past in an objective and truthful way, to recognize the successes, but also not to close our eyes to the failures. We learn from, them, too, for the present. The purpose of the party's work is to serve the people, to fight for their happiness and satisfaction, for the prosperity of our socialist fatherland. For this we need a principled policy which is based on Marxism-Leninism. This policy combines a sober, realistic, and creative approach to resolving problems and a clearcut vision of socialism and communism. Its basic method is the party's daily contact with the people and a method of political leadership which consolidates these ties and thus also the authority of the party and of socialism among the masses.

CSO: 2400/165

STANDARDS FOR UNIVERSITY EDUCATION

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 23 Nov 84 p 1

[Editorial: "The Responsibility of the University Student"]

[Excerpts] At present our highest party, government and economic agencies are considering and formulating proposals for the main directions of the economic and social development of Czechoslovakia in the next 10 to 15 years. Their aim is the consolidation of our socialist system and the growth of collective wealth, material as well as intellectual. They are concerned with increasing the standard of living and strengthening the defense capability of our country. It is necessary to accelerate the increase of labor productivity and its quality, and to bring about a faster growth of the national income. It has been said many times already that measures we have tried so far to improve the effectiveness of the national economy are not enough to do the job. Actual experience has shown over and over again that we will have to be much more venturesome.

It is inconceivable to imagine that we could achieve all this without gifted, highly educated professionals who are well versed in innovative, most advanced methods of work and management, who are willing to take risks, and able to inspire others to be fearless, to struggle against indolence, to reach out for more daring goals.

The overall development of society is ever more contingent on the expertise and capability of the intelligentsia. In the 36 institutions of higher learning and their 110 departments, 180,000 young people are being educated each year. Almost 40,000 of them leave the lecture halls every year and enter their first place of work. It is expected of these institutions that they will more aggressively instill all that is most advanced in their students, and thereby in effect in the life of socialist society, to create basic preconditions for a consistent realization of the socioeconomic program of the party.

Law is implemented by people. Besides examples of outstanding work we also know of many shortcomings, inadequate results, and areas of weakness. Weakness is evidenced especially in the attitude of students toward their chosen field, their educational preparation for it and its overall development. They do not always show the kind of responsibility that befits adults, which in fact they are.

We find quite often that prior to entering an institution of higher learning, it is the parents and relatives rather than the students who worry the most during the admission proceedings. They look for favoritism, they make out the applications. And the grown children in many cases act as if it did not concern them. Such "solicitude" often continues during the course of their studies. The parents breathe a sign of relief when their progeny manages to reach graduation. Then the newly minted "expert" leaves school only to circumvent problems, to search for the golden, happy medium, to make use of all advantages and categorically refuse all obvious responsibilities which are incumbent on him as a university graduate--to repay what society has invested in him, to give society what it expects of him.

The schools must, therefore, take strict action against loafers, criticize their behavior and unmask their antisocial drift. They must give preferential treatment to outstanding students by making use of the new system of stipends and student housing, and by other means support those who engage themselves in behalf of the policies of the communist party.

A school can educate a person to be an able, self-assured professional who is confident that his expertise will be put to use by society. Much depends, however, on the milieu in which he finds himself, whether his place of work is governed by a creative or an inert, conservative spirit. It has been proved over and over again that man and his ability grow with his task.

We still come across managers who show reluctance to entrust younger, able people with work of some responsibility. That is entirely wrong. On the contrary, it always needs to be carefully judged whether the new university graduate has enough expert knowledge and basic ideopolitical qualifications for the task with which he is to be entrusted.

A college teacher of Marxism-Leninism must be aware of the fact that he stands before the students not only as a person lecturing on theory, which provides clear directions for conduct, but also as a communist, as a person who influences by his own example, able to apply the teaching of Marxism-Leninism to the practical questions of building socialism. Such an attitude cannot be replaced by increasing the number of various, often ostentatious campaigns or even the best formulated plans of communist education.

In the process of molding the consciousness of a young person, his responsibility toward himself as well as toward society, nothing can replace the role played by the personality of the teacher, his high degree of expertise, thinking and behavior, his attitude toward work and people, his personal example. Students themselves confirm that such a teacher has a stronger influence on them during their college years than parents. They judge with particular sensitivity teacher-communists, but they are also influenced one way or another by the personal example of young communist members of the Youth Federation and federation functionaries. It is expected of the latter in particular that they will show greater responsibility in selecting their own place of employment and in influencing other students in the choice of their work placement. It often happens that rather than work as production

organizers in Northern Bohemia or the border regions, they prefer to accept an inferior position. This is true not only of engineers, but also of physicians and teachers.

In the past, the system of allocations served well in this respect. Many people found in places where they would not have ever chosen to go on their own a new home and work which involved them for the rest of their life. We do not wish to go back to such a practice. We have made strides not only in the material development of society but also in the awareness of people. The young people have the great advantage of being able to make use, as a matter of course, of those things for which the preceding generation had to work hard. And that they do. They entertain more ambitious ideas, they are more energetic, they are capable of enthusiasm for a cause, for modern technology, for advanced methods of thinking and working. They take initiative in applying these. To this positive image of young, gifted people, but also to their faults and shortcomings, the older generation--parents, educators, teachers--have contributed their share. The final proof of our university graduates will come in practice, in their ability and determination to develop their acquired knowledge further and, most of all, to put it to use where our society needs it the most--in the economy, education, health care and cultural life.

12605

CSO: 2400/128

BRIEFS

YOUTHS IN NICARAGUA HARVEST--Havana, 10 Dec (CTK correspondent)--A team of eleven members of the Czechoslovak Socialist Union of Youth has started work in Managalpa Province helping with the picking of coffee, the chief export commodity of Nicaragua. The team is the first from socialist countries and is part of a 300-strong group of young people from socialist states, West European countries and Latin America who are to come to Nicaragua to help with the coffee picking by January in a campaign organized by the World Federation of Democratic Youth. Nicaragua gains 140 million dollars from coffee exports annually. [Text] [Prague CTK in English 1050 GMT 10 Dec 84 LD]

PLENUM RESULTS BRIEFING--Prague (CTK)--A statewide conference of the leading staff of mass information media on the results of the 12th CPCZ Central Committee Session was yesterday [10 December] held in Prague with Jan Fojtik, CPCZ Central Committee Presidium candidate member and secretary, in the chair. Milos Jakes, CPCZ Central Committee Presidium member and secretary, briefed the participants on the deliberations and conclusions of the party's Central Committee concerning the tasks of the state plan of the CSSR's economic and social development in 1985. [Text] [Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 11 Dec 84 p 8]

CULTURAL PROGRAM WITH NORWAY--Talks about a program of cultural, educational, and scientific cooperation between the CSSR and the Norwegian governments for the 1985-87 period were held in Prague on 20-21 November. The talks ended with the signing of a program which creates a sufficiently broad basis for the development of relations in the field of science, exchange of scholarship receivers, bilateral cultural activity, as well as for cooperation in the sphere of film, radio, television, and between the new agencies and youth organizations of the two countries. [Summary] [Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 22 Nov 84 p 2 AU]

FIRE FIGURES--Almost 6,000 fires have been reported in the Czech lands this year thus far, with direct damages estimated at Kcs190 million. A total of 119 persons lost their lives as the results of the fires. [Summary] [Prague PRACE in Czech 23 Nov 84 p 1 AU]

PETROCHEMISTRY EXPERTS' MEETING--A session of experts for standardization with the section for petrochemistry, basic organic syntheses, surface-active [povrchovo aktivne] substances, and technical carbon of the CEMA Permanent Commission for Chemical Industry began in Prievidza on 26 November. The 5-day event is being attended by more than 30 persons from Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia. The purpose of the deliberations is approving 20 norms pertaining to the quality and the methods of testing chemical products, mandatory for all participating countries. [Text] [Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 27 Nov 84 p 2 AU]

SUGAR BEET HARVEST--According to Eng Milan Kottes, department head at the general directorate of the Sugar and Sweets economic production unit, Slovak sugar refineries have procured 1,952,865 metric tons of sugar beets, or 93.3 percent of the planned amount, since the beginning of the campaign on 3 October. Because some sugar beets, although harvested, are still on field dumps, total procurement in Slovakia "will probably fall less than 4 percent short of the planned amount." The sugar beet production plan could have been fulfilled this year, for the first time in years, were it not for the excessive harvest losses, "the highest in the last 10 years," which ranged between 18 and 30 percent. Per-hectare yields were highest in West Slovakia, 35.3 metric tons, followed by East Slovakia, 34.6 metric tons, and Central Slovakia, 29.4 metric tons. Sugar content at the time of procurement average 14.12 percent and at the time of processing 13.69 percent, about 1.1 percent below last year's average. However, the beets' "technological quality" and, hence, storability is better than last year. This is important in view of this year's exceptionally long campaign, which is expected to last until 20 January. So far, Slovak sugar refineries have produced 101,000 metric tons of sugar and "everything suggests that, by the end of the campaign, they will have produced at least twice that amount." This amount, although falling short of the plan, would be "singular in the history of the Slovak sugar industry." [Summary] [Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 28 Nov 84 p 2 AU]

SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE--A 4-day conference of the Section for Data Processing of the INTERKOSMOS program's Work Group for Space Physics opened in Smolenice yesterday. It is attended by scientists from Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, the Soviet Union, and the CSSR. The aim of the conference is to present and assess the latest results of the socialist countries in processing data acquired from measurements on earth satellites sent into orbit within the framework of the INTERKOSMOS program. The scientists will also propose topics of new studies that will have to be carried out in preparing the processing of measurements acquired during new space experiments. The scientists' attention will further concentrate on the problem of the digital processing of pictorial information and on the transmission of data by means of telephone and satellite communication. [Text] [Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 28 Nov 84 p 2 AU]

CEMA EXPERTS SESSION--A 4-day session of experts from CEMA countries, which opened in Ostrava yesterday, deals with the problems of the research into the methods and the development of equipment for nondestructive testing of materials and products, including automated diagnostic equipment for the continuous control of industrial production. The session is attended by 42 participants from Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, the Soviet Union and the CSSR. [Text] [Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 28 Nov 84 p 2 AU]

PHONE CALLS TO AFRICA--As of 1 December, telephone subscribers in Prague can dial directly Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. [Summary] [Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 30 Nov 84 p 2 AU]

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION COUNCIL SESSION--The council for International Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation, presided over by CSSR Deputy Premier Rudolf Rohlicek, held a meeting in Prague on 28 November. The meeting assessed a system of indicators characterizing the position of the CSSR in the process of socialist economic integration, some questions concerning the possibility of processing magnesite in the CSSR on a compensatory basis, and a draft of a new agreement on CEMA's legal competences [zpusobilosti], privileges, and immunities. [Text] [Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 29 Nov 84 p 2 AU]

ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION--For 1985, the Federal Ministry of Fuel and Power has set the limit of electricity consumption for small consumers among the socialist organizations at 96 percent of their actual consumption in 1984, and of heating gas at 100 percent. [Summary] [Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 29 Nov 84 p 2 AU]

TOURIST EXCHANGE WITH USSR--The tourist exchange between the CSSR and the USSR will rise by 25 percent in the next 5-year plan. This is envisaged in an intergovernmental agreement between the two countries, signed in Moscow on 28 November. [Text] [Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 29 Nov 84 p 7 AU]

CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH FINLAND--A mixed Czechoslovak-Finnish commission discussed in Prague on 27-30 November the further expansion of cultural, educational, and scientific relations between the two countries. In conclusion, a program of cooperation between the CSSR and Finland in science, education, culture, and other spheres for the 1985-1987 period was signed. [Excerpt] [Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 1 Dec 84 p 2 AU]

FARMERS UNION ELECTS LEADERSHIP--The 10th statewide congress of Unified Agricultural Cooperatives, which ended in Prague on 1 December, reelected Pavol Jonas as chairman of the Central Committee of the Cooperative Farmers Union [SDR]; Bretislav Varecka and Cyril Moravcik as deputy chairmen; Zdenek Ostry as secretary; and Josef Louc as chairman of the SDR's Central Control and Audit Commission. Bretislav Varecka has become chairman of the SDR's Czech Committee; Cyril Moravcik was elected chairman of the SDR's Slovak Committee; Jan Blachac deputy chairman; Mikulas Sidik secretary; and Miroslav Krchlik chairman of the Control and Audit Commission of the SDR's Slovak Committee. [Summary] [Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 3 Dec 84 p 1 AU]

PROPAGANDISTS' CONSULTATION--An international seminar devoted to the present day ideological diversion and to the methods of combatting it ended in Katowice on 30 November. It was attended by workers of the ideological and propaganda front from Poland, the GDR, the USSR, and the CSSR. [Text] [Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 3 Dec 84 p 4 AU]

1983 SOYA BEANS IMPORT--In 1983, the CSSR imported almost 480,000 metric tons of soya beans, costing Kcs2.07 billion. [Excerpt] [Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 29 Nov 84 p 4 AU]

PRC PLANNING MINISTER VISIT--Prague, 12 Dec (CTK)--Member of China's State Council and Minister-Chairman of the State Planning Commission Song Ping arrived here today. He will discuss ways of further expanding economic and trade relations between the two countries with Czechoslovak Deputy Premier and Chairman of the State Planning Commission Svatopluk Potac, as well as with Czechoslovak industry representatives. [Text] [Prague CTK in English 1328 GMT 12 Dec 84 LD]

CSO: 2400/165

BISHOP STOLPE URGES JOINT INTER-GERMAN PEACE EFFORT

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 14 Nov 84 p 8

["Peace--Controversy Between the Churches in East and West"]

[Text] In Travemuende, consistorial president Stolpe, who in practice if not by title, is carrying on the churchwide responsibilities of retired bishop Schuenherr for the Protestant alliance of churches in the GDR, has invited the Protestant churches of East and West Germany to a frank dialogue about their differing positions on the issue of peace. That is the theme on which the Protestant churches of the FRG and the GDR disagree. Stolpe's invitation at the synod of Protestant churches in Germany was certainly expressed with the backing of the East German churches. It would amount to a change in the dealings between the two churches if they attempted to discuss what divides them, rather than limiting themselves to declarations of what both churches unanimously consider to be advisable. We are printing Stolpe's address verbatim.

National youth vicar Kurt Strauss, who is enjoying his very first trip to the West, and I bring you heartfelt greetings and blessings from the alliance of Protestant churches in the GDR for this synodal session.

This is the final session in a synodal term, and you will be considering what you were able to contribute to your society in terms of witness and service to your church in these 6 years.

Let me present for your reflection a small contribution from our experiences of recent years and develop it in three themes:

1. God imposes a burden on us, but he also helps us. For the witness and service of the Protestant churches in the GDR, the last 6 years have been a vivid experience of these words from the Psalms. We have experienced, in the challenge of a socialistic society, burdens and resignation, but also, time and again, help and encouragement.

We have had to endure a further reduction in the percentage of church members in the population, and today fewer than 40% of the inhabitants of the entire country are Protestant.

We also were able to have the exciting experience that God's word apparently is relevant and of interest to many more people than we think. We have seen anew how the Bible is cherished and used by literary scholars and writers, since it is the most significant work of world literature; how the Bible is recommended for study by Marxist philosophers, since it contains profound human wisdom; how God's word and truth have become a resource to many people who think deeply about the meaning and goal of life, although we no longer have a state church.

Our faith offers no perfect system. It does not seek to improve the world through new power structures or different economic orders. But it does offer the only possible perspective: a turning away from destructive egoism to consideration for others; a turning away from restless materialism to the simpler life; a turning away from peace-destroying thoughts of security to the risk of trust.

The number of thinking and searching people is increasing. In my homeland the church is asked what truth it has to offer. The church is prized as a partner capable of listening in dialogue and sought out as a trustworthy helper in time of need. The number of unbaptized participants in church services is frequently greater than that of the baptized. The percentage of young people is growing. Our modest financial means are increasing, slowly but steadily.

God has taken us down roads we did not wish to travel, but we believe he has remained true to us.

2. Life Against Death

The joint statement of the chairman of the council of the Protestant church in Germany and the chairman of the conference of Protestant church leaders in the GDR of 1 September 1979 was a significant indication of the common responsibility for peace of the German Protestant churches.

We are thankful for the agreement on joint responsibility for the preservation of life, for the peace policy educational association in which we stand united. The joint work report on August 1982 on our churches' responsibility for peace covered that, and our dialogues are continuing. Thankfully we can report that the Christian church has arrived at the same basic experiences and new insights into its joint responsibility for world peace, even in differing social orders, such as the rejection of the spirit and logic of deterrence and the needed example of a partnership for security.

For Christians, responsibility for peace is becoming the major task of their work in society. Because of that, Christians should not engage in the evil game of the arms race. For it is a question of mass extermination and genocide, of scorched and poisoned earth, of the destruction of creation. Deterrence preserves peace right on the deadly brink of the final catastrophe. And for how long?

Christians believe that life is possible and peace is achievable. Christians believe in the future of a human race which will beat its swords into plowshares.

The road there is long, but there is no other direction which we can go in obedience, and there is no other possibility for preserving the human race. The road begins everywhere that a Christian clearly realizes that war must never happen for God's sake and for humanity's sake and draws conclusions from that. There are many possibilities, ranging from prayers for peace to personal symbolic gestures.

This insight has found a broad base in our parishes and is thoroughly understood as responsibility for life. From 11 to 21 November, in nearly all parishes, the observation of 10 days for peace is being carried out by many thousands of Christians; proposed by the youth division, it has developed into a churchwide effort. This year the 10 days for peace have as their motto "Life Against Death," and we have brought you, as a greeting from the Protestant Christians of the GDR, for our joint task a small book of devotions, throughout which the colors of the rainbow run as a symbol of hope.

The German Protestant churches will have to prove their special sense of community, even in lifethreatening situations. For years, since their organizational separation, the Protestant churches of the FRG and West Berlin and those of the GDR have deliberately avoided debate of controversial issues. But joint responsibility for peace forces us into a dialogue. We will gain new experiences through it.

We are afraid, as you certainly also are because of your position in society, and we admit that we are. We foresee what opportunities may lie ahead if churches, which assume duties in their respective social orders and also agree upon fundamental principles, tackle controversial questions in the interest of peace and the human race. The Protestant church in Germany and the alliance of Protestant churches in the GDR must be honest opponents in their respective countries, as credible witnesses to their gospel, stewards of peace on earth and justice among men. Our special sense of community could take on a new dimension. For we are called upon to help the German people to understand the problems of the present as the result of former sin and to help in the search for the roads toward the future. Perhaps the 40th anniversary of the end of the war on 8 May 1985 will give impetus to reflection.

3. Special German Responsibility

Christians in the German states have discovered in the peace efforts their inter-German uniqueness, for Germans are obligated to peace. They became guilty through collaboration, failure to act and silence. The people that trampled world peace and justice and committed infinite crimes, especially against Jews, Poles and Soviet citizens, has the obligation today to do everything it possibly can to achieve world peace and justice. That is, above all other contemporary German national organizations and commitments to allies, the special and enduring responsibility of Germans.

Whenever responsible policy makers in both German nations have recognized this and made the guarantee of peace their goal, wherever they seek to have a dialogue among reasonable people in order to find ways to reverse threatening developments and to reduce tension, they will be able to count on the support of the churches and Christians.

Wherever responsible policy makers in both German nations have recognized this and made the guarantee of peace their goal, wherever they seek to have a dialogue among reasonable people in order to find ways to reverse threatening developments and to reduce tension, they will be able to count on the support of the churches and Christians.

The German nations bear a great responsibility for the preservation of world peace as the price of their own survival. Even as they stand within their commitments to their allies, they must do everything possible to prevent further strains on the explosive borders of highly armed military alliances. The Germans on both sides, in their respective camps, have a responsibility not for the solution to a nuclear catastrophe but rather a responsibility for the atmosphere. Uniquely German problems could increase tensions. On the other hand, neighborly relations between the two German nations stabilize peace. Therefore the normalization of relations between the two German nations is an important peace measure. After all this time, it still has not been accomplished. Normalization began with the recognition, free of illusions of the reality of two independent and separate German nations. For the sake of peace and humanity, much is still necessary and possible above and beyond what has been accomplished between the two German nations. It will however require patience and consideration, trustworthiness and also delicacy in dealing with concepts which might be considered highly emotional by the other side.

Our common experience of recent years shows that churches and Christians can help to develop a peacekeeping and humane modus vivendi for two German neighbor nations, sovereign, true to their allies, yet bound by a special responsibility.

Dear sisters and brothers, it has come again to the point of "meddling." But wouldn't everything between us come to an end if we didn't always feel mutually awkward?

So as you help us so wonderfully with your encouraging visits, your extensive material assistance and your hospitality, as we have been privileged to enjoy it here. Allow me to express my thanks for all of this and also for your patience with some verses from Joachim Ringelnatz: Ringelnatz, a Saxon who lived in Hamburg, Frankfurt and Munich and died 50 years ago in November 1934, wrote:

I love you so much:
I would without hesitation
Give you a tile from my hearth.
Past--ancient history--
Yet never forgotten.
I travel.
Everything, long hoped for,
Is faint.
Time disfigures
All living things.
A dog barks.
He knows not how to read.
He knows not how to write.
We cannot remain.
I laugh.
The holes are the most important part
Of a sieve.
I love you so much.

HUNGARY

ANTHOLOGY ON HUNGARIAN ARMED FORCES ATTITUDE IN 1956

AU171743 [Editorial Report] Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian on 14 December 1984 on page 6 carries a 700-word "K.E." review: "It Was Not the Army That Had Failed; the Armed Forces in the Autumn of 1956," which deals with an anthology recently published by the Zrinyi Publishing House, entitled "In the Defense of the People's Power," which has "undertaken to provide a realistic picture about why the Hungarian armed forces were unable to prevent the bloody events, and what paralyzed their activity in those critical days."

The author of the review quotes Janos Berecz as saying in his "introductory study" that "owing to preventive steps by senior communist officers, there had not been any significant clashes between Soviet troops and Hungarian military units anywhere except in the outskirts of Dunaujvaros. In most large cities, Hungarian military units participated in restoring order." Berecz also noted: "Coming to one's senses was delayed by the sectarian trends of rigidity and bankruptcy, which were tantamount to a betrayal, and the fact that time was needed to realize the open betrayal of the revisionists."

An essay by Laszlo I. Ujvari is reported to be devoted to the "combat value" of troops. According to Ujvari, they "awaited the order to be deployed in a disciplined and homogeneous militant spirit."

A Jozsef Szabo analysis on the border guards is quoted as showing that, "Even though there was uncertainty and hesitation in some places, politically firm bases had rapidly developed around which soldiers and officers fearing the fate of socialism had been able to rally."

Jozsef Solyom's contribution is reported as dealing with the activity of the complement of armed bodies of the Ministry of the Interior. He is reported as saying: "In those days many of those, too, were paralyzed by the hatred and suspicion that had been whipped up," as well as by pronouncements that the police must be rendered exempt from politics." Solyom notes a rapid recovery: "Police precincts and guard rooms already functioned everywhere on 26 November."

The author sums up his review by saying that "the documents and recollections unequivocally testify that 'on that autumn, it was not the complement of the officers and the rank and file of the army and police that failed, but the leaders...'"

No further processing planned.

SCIENTIFIC SESSION ON SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

AU171041 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 11 Dec 84 pp 1, 6

[Text] On 10 December, under the title "The Social Development of the Last 40 Years," a 3-day scientific session began at the main center of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The series of conferences, which are staged by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, the MSZMP's party history institute, social sciences institute and political academy, the Lorand Eotvos university, and the Karl Marx University of Economic Sciences, was opened by Janos Szentagothai, president of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

In his preamble, Janos Szentagothai, noted that the efforts of the organizers of the conference were aimed at providing an opportunity to appraise the development of our society in all its most diverse aspects with scientific profundity and exactitude and to draw lessons from this appraisal for the present and, above all, for the future. He then spoke of the most important junctures in the development of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in the past 4 decades.

Then Valeria Benke, member of the MSZMP Politburo and chairman of the Editorial Committee of TARSADALMI SZEMLE, rose to make a speech. She said, to begin with, that it is to be hoped that this session will be a valuable contribution to the intellectual stocktaking made on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the liberation. Lectures will in all certainty convincingly show that in the last 4 decades we have witnessed an economic, social, and cultural development that cannot be compared with any other era of our history.

It has been one of the experiences of these 40 years--Valeria Benke pointed out--that, in contrast with our previous expectations, we have not succeeded in changing quickly and in every respect the difficult legacy of past Hungarian social conditions. It is an extremely complex, conflict-laden, long social-historical task to develop the conditions of socialism. Of course, we cannot search for the influence of the past in every negative phenomena of these 40 years. We ourselves have not always found the right path and suitable methods in everything, either; the errors, mistakes, and failures hindered and sometimes retarded our development. The party put an end to the severe political distortion, to unlawfulness, and its renewal opened up many different possibilities of social development. After some sudden standstills in the last more than 2 decades--no matter whether the result of external causes or causes for which we were responsible--the party was again able to open up scope for activity.

Analyzing the current phenomena of our ideological life, she spoke about the strengthening of middle-class propaganda directed against socialism, about the need for timely analysis of new questions emerging at home and for working out answers, and about the importance of arguing with erroneous views. She stressed: the Hungarian historical science has made good use of the research and creative possibilities in the last quarter of a century. It has done a lot to help us to see our national past more clearly than ever. She said she considered it important that science should help in securing the acceptance of a realistic historical and social conception free of simplifications and justification of prejudices concerning the issues of national awareness and social self-knowledge.

Valeria Benke also spoke about the fact that, with the analyses of the recent and remote past, other social sciences also enabled a better understanding of the operating mechanisms of the socialist society. With their valuable results, the economic science and sociology have contributed to a better foundation of political decisions, to the society's self-knowledge, and to the improvement of readiness to adopt new things.

The outstanding function of the Marxist social science is to endeavor to find out how the assertion of socialist principles and ideals can be better attained under the changing circumstances, and how we can more successfully serve the conscious and spiritual needs of developing a collective, humane, and solidary society, she stressed. Among the most important tasks of the coming years she pointed out the comprehensive further development of the economy and the management system, the new program of settlement development, and the steady development of the system of political institutions and the socialist democracy, tasks in the implementation of which--following the decisions to be taken at the party's coming congress can considerably contribute also the social scientists--she said in conclusion.

Then, Ivan T. Berend, academician, lectured on the characteristics of the past 4 decades of Hungarian history, and Janos Berecz, member of the MSZMP Central Committee and chief editor of NEPSZABADSAG, lectured on the changes in Hungary's international situation. Istvan Huszar, member of the MSZMP Central Committee and general director of the Institute of Social Sciences, lectured on the development of the structure of Hungarian society. Zsigmond Pach, academician, deputy chairman of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, gave a lecture entitled: "Socialism and National Awareness in the Hungarian Development After Liberation." The reports connected with a certain sphere of subjects dealt, among other things, with the development of the statehood of people's democracy and the trends of its development, and with the international and domestic conditions of people's democratic development.

CSO: 2500/125

OSCILLATING U.S.-POLISH RELATIONS ANALYZED

Warsaw SPRAWY MIEDZYNARODOWE in Polish No 7-8, Jul-Aug 84 pp 111-120

[Article by Zdzislaw Lachowski: "United States Policy Toward Poland and the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] Process" under the rubric "Materials, Reviews"]

[Text] In the years 1972-1975 the United States showed little interest in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and held aloof from most of the technical issues raised at that forum. These negotiations were of interest to it only insofar as they might become a bargaining factor in restructuring the relations between the two great powers and the international system. During that period the American administration did not expect this plane of the dialogue to develop into an important process for building European cooperation and security. /1/ The passive involvement of the United States in the Geneva negotiations during 1973-1975 enabled the West European countries to seize the initiative in talks with the East. From the vantage point of time, it can be stated that the signing of the Final Act in Helsinki by President G. Ford concluded the stage of a relatively constructive approach of that great power to the CSCE process.

In the second half of the 1970s the United States became an active participant in the Helsinki process, but on the negative side. This was reflected in the instrumental treatment of the Helsinki accords and avoidance of implementing the principles adopted in the Final Act. The United States persistently tended to constrict and reinterpret the meaning of this document, which essentially violated its balanced nature. In practice, the reports prepared by the American governmental and nongovernmental institutions on the implementation of the principles and provisions of the Final Act and their peculiar critiques of that implementation by the socialist countries were intended to exert pressure on these countries in the direction of the internal changes desired by the United States, usurp the right to control the behavior of these countries and switch the CSCE process onto specific tracks. Washington also thereby imposed on its Atlantic bloc partners its position toward the socialist countries. On the other hand, matters concerning European security were ignored in these reports, which were confined exclusively to evaluating the domestic policies of the socialist countries on human rights, activities

of the opposition, contacts, emigration and other "third basket" matters./2/ In reply to the accusation that the United States acts like an arbiter who is critical everyone except himself, in November 1979 the Fascell Commission published a report on the implementation of the Helsinki principles and agreements by the United States. That report was basically a glorification of the American system and, in its conclusion, the authors stated that, although the contributions of the United States are not ideal, they are generally very good and moreover "demonstrate a consistent striving for improvement." /3/

The Belgrade Meeting

Already the second report of the president for the Fascell Commission, prepared in mid-1977, began to stress the differences in the extent of the implementation of the Helsinki decisions by the socialist countries. This reflected the new approach of the United States to CSCE meetings. In the spring of 1977, shortly after J. Carter began his presidency, relations in the West were discussed within his administration. The questions of whether to limit or expand cooperation with the socialist countries and the conditions for such cooperation were considered. The national security adviser to the president, Zbigniew Brzezinski, writes in his memoirs:

During the Carter Administration I was strongly convinced that, in order to respond more effectively to opportunities for supporting changes in East Europe, the United States should treat the Soviet bloc as neither a monolithic foe nor a group of uniformly friendly neighbors. A more differentiated approach toward East Europe was clearly desirable.... The Carter Administration tended to adopt cautious decisions while moving in the direction of a greater goal--the gradual transformation of the Soviet bloc into a more pluralist and differentiated entity. /4/

The criteria for the policy of differentiating relations with the East became the degree of "independence from Moscow" and the "relative domestic liberalization" of the individual countries of East Europe. In this connection, analysis of the materialization of these criteria by the socialist countries was undertaken.

An opportunity for practicing and testing the new line of action was provided by the follow-up CSCE meeting in Belgrade. To be sure, the State Department preferred a more constructive approach to the negotiations, but the confrontational "review" tactic represented by Brzezinski had prevailed. The main, and in practice sole, yardstick for American assessments was the questions of human rights and particular domains of the "third basket." At the Belgrade meeting the Americans criticized chiefly the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Their evaluations of the other countries were milder.

At that time Poland was included by the Americans among the more "independent" socialist countries. Z. Brzezinski states that J. Carter chose Poland as the first objective of the travels he was planning to various countries toward the end of 1977, thus desiring to emphasize her special place in American

policy on East Europe. It was thought that the visit to Poland would "hasten the process of liberalization, which is dynamically growing there." During his stay in Warsaw Carter repeatedly stressed the support of the United States for Poland's independence and her growing ties with the West./5/

During the Belgrade Meeting the American delegation perceived some progress in Poland's implementation of certain provisions of the agreements (amnesty following the June 1976 events in this country, a "relatively" tolerant attitude toward the opposition, settlement of the cases of marriages with citizens of other countries, a liberal policy on trips abroad, tourism, emigration policy). But the policy on family reunions and the handling of requests for family visits to this country and abroad were criticized. Nevertheless, the United States stressed that the difficulties regarding family reunions were partially due to the large number of cases and that, at Belgrade, the Polish Government demonstrated significant readiness to resolve questions of this kind raised by the American Embassy./6/ These appraisals remained basically unaltered until the end of the 1970s; the American reports pointed to the goodwill and flexibility of the Polish authorities in the fields of special interest to the United States (e.g., concerning the working conditions of journalists).

The Madrid Meeting (November 1980-December 1981)

The end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s were a time of changes in both the West and the East. In the United States power was assumed by a new Republican team proclaiming the necessity of rearming the West and conducting the dialogue with the East from the position of strength. The growing ideological confrontation aggravated still further the search for planes of accord in the solution of problems between the East and the West. In addition to the elimination of the climate of detente and the curtailment of East-West Relations, the implementation of NATO-planned deployment of new nuclear missiles on the European continent became another menace hanging over the process of security in Europe, including the CSCE meeting in Madrid.

In East Europe attention was attracted to Poland's efforts to promote the stabilization of the social, political and economic situation following the unrest of August 1980.

The new American administration maintained and developed the Belgrade line of the United States policy on the CSCE process--its desire to achieve to have sanctioned the monitoring of the implementation of the Final Act and thus to justify the right to interfere into the domestic affairs of the socialist countries./7/

Both at the meeting and outside it, the United States adhered to its official position that the events in Poland be considered its domestic affair. At the same time, the communique adopted at a special session of NATO in December 1980 in actual fact served to internationalize the development of events in Poland. NATO members declared that they would continuously review the situation in this country and categorically demand that Poland have the freedom of choice in deciding on its own future in the absence of foreign intervention, on threatening a response commensurate to the gravity of the situation.

During the first year of the Madrid forum Polish questions were not directly reflected in the speeches of the American delegates, for at that time the principle of abstaining from criticism of Poland was scrupulously followed. What is more, during a review of the implementation of the Final Act by the socialist countries the United States pointed to positive Polish accomplishments, assessing them as "encouraging" (family reunions, dialogue with the church).^{/8/} At the same time, though, the United States delegates from the very beginning presented detailed lists of instances in which the other socialist countries failed to adhere to the obligations accepted in Helsinki. Compared with the preceding (Belgrade) meeting, this represented an escalation of criticism of the Warsaw Treaty countries in selected fields (chiefly VII--humanitarian principles and questions). In this way, the United States pursued even more explicitly the policy of differentiating its appraisals of the behavior of particular East European countries and opposing them to each other and thus striving to weaken their position in the negotiations.

The meeting was a convenient place for the American political ploy of weakening the bonds of alliance between Poland and the USSR and limiting the possibilities for the influence of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries on the direction of events in Poland. The principal line of action was the persistent insinuation that the Soviet Union was preparing plans for a military intervention in a country allied with it. Of course, in accordance with their instructions, the American delegates did not raise this issue directly in their speeches. On the other hand, they made transparent allusions to the ending of the detente in the event that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of any country whatsoever were to be violated. They also left no doubt as to what country they meant, when they demanded greater openness and transparency as regards the means of building up trust.

Assuming and imputing the inevitability of Soviet intervention in Poland, the United States intended to discredit socialism, isolate the socialist countries on the international arena and curtail their influence on the development of the world situation.^{/9/} At the same time, [in its desire to] curtail the freedom of [action of] the USSR and other of Poland's allies by threatening the consequences of such an intervention, it strove to magnify the influence of the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the course of events in Poland, clearly encouraging the acceleration and expansion of the scope of the changes in this country's sociopolitical system (political pluralism, freedom of action for the opposition, etc.).

Max Kampelman, the head of the American delegation, continually stressed in his speeches that the Soviet Union was supposedly practicing military-political blackmail. The delegates of the United States magnified and exploited for propaganda purposes the military activities of the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty during the years 1980-1981. They repeatedly raised the issue of military maneuvers, the mobilization of reservists in the western regions of the USSR and troop movements in and around Poland. In March 1981 Ambassador Kampelman declared in a speech in Madrid that the Soviet Union was contravening the principles of the Final Act and international law and

resurrecting a doctrine that "codifies and legitimizes intervention into the domestic affairs of other countries."/10/

Machinations of this kind were principally intended to undermine the credibility of the peaceful Soviet intentions and the attendant disarmament proposals and steps intended to strengthen trust between NATO and Warsaw Treaty. In the context of Madrid, the United States intended to torpedo the proposal to convene a conference on military detente and disarmament, which might be an obstacle to materializing the plans for the deployment of American missiles on the European continent./11/

Summing up the first stage of the Madrid CSCE negotiations (until 13 December 1981 [date of martial law imposition in Poland]), attention should be drawn to the arbitrary attitude of the United States toward the socialist countries. While it itself openly violated the principles and recommendations of the Final Act (e.g., the principles of nonintervention, cooperation among countries, implementation in good faith of obligations having the power of international law), the United States strived to turn this forum into a kind of tribunal at which the NATO countries would act as accusers and arbiters, particularly as regards the Afghanistan question, human rights domestic oppositionist activities in Poland, and other "third basket" domains. The "umbrella" with which Poland had been shielded during that time was intended to promote differences and antagonisms among Warsaw Treaty countries.

Martial Law in Poland

On 15 December 1981 Poland's representative informed in his speech the representatives of the participating countries of the temporarily taken extraordinary measures in Poland. The imposition of martial law in Poland did not at once meet with a definite American response. The critical speech of the head of the United States delegation on 18 December 1981, that is, just before the holiday break in the work of the Madrid Meeting, was not bereft of optimistic overtones. Directly after 13 December the group of NATO delegates in Madrid considered the eventual possibility of transforming the Madrid forum into a permanent session and, when this did not prove feasible, it decided to exploit the form for the needs of the policy of confrontation.

In the inner recesses of the American administration opinion on continuing the CSCE negotiations was divided. Some were in favor of not returning to the Madrid Meeting. Ultimately, the decision was made to resume talks, but on different terms by then. Proclaiming the "death of Helsinki" was thought to be premature, since that plane of contacts with the East provided a convenient arena for criticism and assessment of the other participating countries./12/ The extraordinary session of NATO countries convened on 11 January 1982 did not fully share the attitude of the United States. Emphasis was placed on commencing as soon as possible the next round of the Madrid Meeting, to which NATO countries resolved to dispatch delegations at the ministerial level.

As early as in December 1981 the United States decisively abandoned the thesis that the events in Poland were a domestic Polish affair. Since then, it took

the course of directly interfering into Poland's domestic affairs and subjecting the events in our country to international judgment.

By the same token, all appearances were dropped: Poland ceased to be to the world "a proof of the viability of the process initiated in Helsinki."/13/ Now the unfolding of events in Poland was openly treated as a pretext for exacerbating the political confrontation with the Soviet Union. In this connection, the thesis followed was a convenient one that gained currency in the West, namely, that in imposing martial law in this country the Polish authorities acted "on the instigation and under the pressure of the Soviet Union."/14/ The speeches of the United States Secretary of State A. Haig and M. Kampelman in Madrid openly negated Poland's sovereignty and imputed the cooperation of the USSR and the authorities of the PRL in "declaring war" against the Polish nation. The United States wanted to impose the image of the Polish state as a "submissive Soviet satellite" and plaything of the great powers. To this end, the American representatives at the Madrid conference presented catalogues of violations of the Declaration of Principles of the Final Act that were supposedly perpetrated when imposing martial law in Poland, and offered suitably interpreted chronologies of political and military events prior to 13 December 1981./15/ Here they ignored the objective Polish arguments presented in the aide-memoire of the Government of the PRL, handed at the end of January 1982 to the representatives of all the countries participating in the CSCE./16/

The Americans' introduction of the concept of "indirect Soviet intervention" was intended to: a) obscure the fact of the mistaken assessment of the situation in Poland and conceal the fiasco of the scenario prepared by the United States of its allies, which envisaged a Soviet military invasion /17/ (or change in the country's system of society); b) produce the impression that the new course is a continuation of the previous strategy of the United States and the Western countries; c) justify the sanctions imposed even earlier, in 1980, on the USSR.

In the context of Poland, the American delegation also attempted to undermine the political status quo in Europe. In connection with the supposed responsibility of the USSR for the proclamation of martial law in the country of its ally, on 12 March 1982 Ambassador M. Kampelman raised the issue of the division of the European continent into "spheres of influence." He attacked the "myth of Yalta" and branded the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine as a danger to peace. He questioned the implementation of the freedom of self-determination of the nations and governments of East Europe envisaged in the Yalta agreement./18/ The thesis of the "artificially imposed division of Europe" was also subsequently reflected in the comments of Secretary Shultz during the final session of the Madrid meeting as well as at the Stockholm conference held as part of the CSCE./19/

The American speeches relating to Polish affairs repeatedly included claims that the socialist system and ideology were compromised and "continue to omit from their purview the human dimension," that the Polish society rejected the existing system of values and institutions and that the authorities were, in response to this situation, imposing a "compulsory socialist

indoctrination."/20/ The head of the American delegation in Madrid even warned against... "Bonapartism" as an alternative solution of political and ideological problems in the socialist countries. The supposed collapse of ideological attitudes was to be followed by an alliance between the USSR and "the police cadre, the military elite and the overgrown bureaucracy, at the expense of the just worker movement in Poland."/21/

During the "Polish session" at the Madrid Meeting (9 February to 12 March 1982) the United States took the position that the prospects for the growth of detente hinged on the course of events in Poland. At the same time, it attempted to shift onto Poland and the other socialist countries the blame for the lack of progress at the meeting, although in mid-December 1981 the neutral and uncommitted countries had presented another version of the draft final document summing up the agreements so far and formulating a compromise on the remaining matters./22/ The Polish pretext was to justify, at a favorable moment, breaking off or suspending the meeting for an indefinite period of time or simply discontinuing the CSCE process completely. Such was the attitude with which the American delegation, headed by Secretary of State A. Haig, as well as the other ministers of NATO countries, had arrived in Madrid. In face of the resolute position of the socialist countries, the resistance of the neutral and uncommitted countries, and the absence of unity on the issue among its own allies, the United States decided to adopt the tactic of boycotting any substantive discussion ("no business as usual") until the following terms posed by NATO would be met: abolition of martial law, release of interned persons and resumption of talks among the authorities, the church and Solidarity. This attitude was a preamble to the next stage, taking shape since the mid-1970s, of the deformation of the Europe-wide process by the United States by imposing on the CSCE deliberations a purely judgmental context. In this way, during further steps in the direction of the CSCE, the meetings would be turned into a kind of special tribunal judging the domestic policies of the socialist countries, and interference in the domestic affairs of these countries would be sanctioned./23/

The third function of the "Polish question" in American policy (in addition to anti-Sovietism and anticommunism) would be to tighten discipline within the Western alliance in its confrontation with the East.

In the 1970s East-West detente did not operate uniformly in the cooperation between NATO countries and the socialist countries. The United States was less committed than West Europe to the process of detente, and this also applied to constructive dialogue within the CSCE, which greatly influenced dissonances within the Western alliance itself. The changes occurring in Poland, and particularly the imposition of martial law, enabled the United States to strengthen its role as the coordinator of the West's actions. It was highly successful in imposing on its allies its own appreciation of the situation in Poland and its own general political line on relations with the socialist countries. The joint ideological-political appreciation of the development of events in Poland became in 1982 an important element in binding NATO together. As a result, a dangerous impasse arose in the Madrid talks. The February-March round of the Meeting ended fruitlessly, and was followed by an 8-month hiatus in the deliberations.

As time passed, the West European countries began to modify their assessment of the situation in Poland, particularly in view of the growing stabilization in this country and, as a consequence, there was a shift of emphasis in their approach to the blocked dialogue with the East. As a result, in the fall of 1982 the United States was unable to bring about a second "special session" on the topic of Poland. The consultations lasting several weeks in various NATO capitals prior to the reopening of the Madrid forum (October-November 1982) resulted in formulating the so-called Danish amendments to the draft final document of the Meeting. Against the background of the situation in Poland, NATO countries championed revisions strengthening the West's interpretation of human rights and humanitarian issues: the "Danish amendments" renewed the postulate of legalizing the opposition movement in the form of "groups for monitoring" the implementation of the Helsinki Act. The new elements were the attempts to incorporate in the CSCE document the Western conception of trade-union freedoms, convene meetings of experts on humanitarian topics, and sanction the activities of diversionary radio stations that would provide the "foundations" for interfering into the domestic affairs of the socialist countries. These concepts were not reflected in the Final Document adopted in Madrid.

The process of stabilization in Poland, with the successive stages of the suspension and subsequently termination of martial law, was not reflected in American policy. Contrary to the provisions of the Final Act and the already agreed-upon draft of the "second basket" of the final Madrid document, the United States continued its policy of restrictions on Poland in many fields. At the Madrid Meeting the American delegation persistently presented the same theses and the same terms for the normalization of relations, confining itself to drily taking note of the successive steps taken by the Polish authorities to regularize the situation in this country. At the same time, on various occasions, the representatives of the United States publicized the incidents and activities of the opposition in Poland, thus reviving hopes for a return to the situation before 13 December 1981./24/

This line of action did not produce the effects expected by the American delegation.

A Polish participant in the Madrid talks noted:

In many of its speeches and at press conferences the Polish delegation presented the proper picture of the situation and explained the circumstances surrounding the imposition of martial law. To be sure, Madrid then became a veritable tribune for polemics on Polish affairs, but it also was our tribune, from which public opinion in the West learned many truths about the difficult Polish matters... In sum, the meeting ended in genuine accomplishments as seen from our Polish point of view too. The activities of the Polish delegation in Madrid were a significant factor in counter-acting Poland's isolation on the international forum. They also promoted maintaining our position as an ally among the Warsaw Treaty countries./25/

This summary review of American policy toward Poland, as conducted within the framework of the many-sided CSCE process, warrants formulating several conclusions:

The instrumental approach of the United States to the process initiated in Helsinki is also demonstrated by its policy toward our country in this plane of negotiations between the East and the West. This policy assigned to Poland different roles during different periods, but it hardly took into account the interests of the Polish partners, and in recent years it has been ignoring them completely.

In the second half of the 1970s Poland was to play a main role in the American plans for a gradual, evolutionary separation of the socialist countries from their Soviet ally and their linkage with the West by means of an expanded network of economic, trade, financial, cultural and political relations. The forum of CSCE meetings also was to play a definite role in accomplishing this American policy of differentiation.

The imposition of martial law in Poland opened in United States policy the chapter of open interference into Polish domestic affairs. The internationalization of the "Polish question," pursued at, among other places, the Madrid Meeting, was to accomplish three fundamental goals: intensifying the confrontation with the Soviet Union, intensifying the ideological confrontation with the socialist system, and tightening up and consolidating the Atlantic alliance.

In sum, the policy of the United States toward our country proved ineffective. A fiasco was suffered by the American aims linked to using the "Polish card":

--Poland was not "made independent" of its allies by means of various kinds of incentives and machinations;

--the plans and hopes for the collapse of the sociopolitical system in this country failed and were misplaced;

--the opportunities for the United States to influence the political situation in Poland declined drastically. Its policy, as Gen W. Jaruzelski stated, resulted in its gradual "self-evacuation" from the Polish political scene;
/26/

--[the attempts to] exploit the unfolding situation in Poland in order to weaken the alliance of Warsaw Treaty countries produced effects opposite to those intended: the consolidation of the community of the socialist countries and a closer integration of Poland with its allies.

FOOTNOTES

1. G. A. Flynn, "The Content of European Detente," ORBIS, Summer 1976, p 403.
2. For more on this topic see A. D. Rotfeld, "Control and Implementation of CSCE Resolutions in the Policy of the Western Countries," SPRAWY MIEDZYNARODOWE, No 11, 1978, pp 41-56.
3. "Fulfilling Our Promise: The United States and the Helsinki Final Act. A Status Report. Compiled and Edited by the Staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe," Washington, 1979.
4. Z. Brzezinski, "Power and Principle. Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981," New York, 1983, p 300.
5. Ibid., pp 297-299.
6. "The Belgrade Follow-Up Meeting to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: A Report and Appraisal." Transmitted to the Committee on International Relations, U. S. House of Representatives, by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 17 May 1978; "Fourth Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe," 1 December 1977-1 June 1978.
7. For more concerning the United States approach to this forum see M. Kasprzyk, "The United States and the CSCE Meeting," SPRAWY MIEDZYNARODOWE, No 7, 1982, pp 75-84.
8. See the collected speeches of M. Kampelman and other American representatives at the Madrid Meeting in the special issue of WORLD AFFAIRS, Spring 1982, pp 314, 358.
9. In November 1980 Z. Brzezinski transmitted to the Secretary of State E. Muskie and the Secretary of Defense H. Brown a memo in which he predicted the following in the event of a Soviet intervention: a) collapse of East-West detente; b) collapse of East-West economic cooperation; c) increase in the military budgets of NATO countries; d) increase in tension between the communist parties in the West and the USSR; e) growing distance between the noncommitment movement and the socialist countries; f) growing unrest in the Soviet bloc; g) commencement of open military cooperation between the United States and the Chinese People's Republic. Z. Brzezinski, op. cit., p 465.
10. WORLD AFFAIRS, Spring 1982, pp 401-402; Ibid., pp 370, 390, 399, 427, 440-441.
11. It is characteristic that the American side regarded this proposal as a Soviet initiative although Poland--in cooperation with its allies--presented the proposal to the KOMiR [expansion unknown].

12. See the declaration of Ambassador Kampelman presented to the Fascell Commission on 28 December 1981: "Basket III: Implementation of the Helsinki Accords. Hearings Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Ninety-Seventh Congress. First Session. The Crisis in Poland and Its Effects on the Helsinki Process," 28 December 1981.
13. See M. Kampelman's speech of 18 December 1981, WORLD AFFAIRS, Spring 1982, p 465.
14. See A. Haig's speech of 9 February 1982, Ibid., p 468.
15. Ibid., pp 467-472, 502-505.
16. "Polityka Stanow Zjednoczonych Ameryki wobec Polski w swietle faktow i dokumentow (1980-1983)" [Policy of the United States Toward Poland in the Light of Facts and Documents (1980-1983)], Warsaw, 1984, pp 71-73.
17. In his memoirs, "Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy," A. Haig states: "We had known for many months what we would do in the event of a direct Soviet intervention--and indeed many speculated publicly on the subject of various sanctions--but there was no definite plan of action in the more equivocal event of internal intervention." Quoted in TIME of 9 April 1984.
18. WORLD AFFAIRS, Spring 1982, p 509.
19. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, Vol 83, No 2079, 1983, pp 50-52, and the report, "CSCE/SC/R.2, CSCE. Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. Record of the Opening Statements, 17-20 January 1984," Stockholm, 1984. On 21 September 1983 Vice President Bush declared during his visit to Austria that the United States firmly rejects the European status quo and considers the essence of the Helsinki process to be "openness and the rights of man." DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, Vol 83, No 2080, 1983, pp 19-23.
20. WORLD AFFAIRS, Spring 1982, pp 498-501.
21. Ibid., pp 484-485.
22. This was pointed out by Poland's representative W. Konarski at the Madrid Meeting in the fall of 1982. See "Polityka Stanow Zjednoczonych Ameryki..," op. cit., p 77.
23. Cf. interview given by Deputy PRL Minister of Foreign Affairs J. Wiejacz to TRYBUNA LUDU of 9 February 1982.
24. The speech of the Secretary of State G. Shultz at the final session of the meeting also did not lack elements of interference into Polish domestic affairs: the support of the thesis that the martial law was imposed from outside and the disregard of the major changes that occurred in Poland between December 1981 and September 1983. In this connection, the Polish

delegation had to respond to that speech by making a declaration distributed in Madrid on 9 September 1983. See "Polityka Stanow Zjednoczonych Ameryki...", op. cit., p 85.

25. W. Konarski, "After the CSCE Meeting in Madrid," NOWE DROGI, No 10, 1983, pp 40, 41.

26. TRYBUNA LUDU of 5 December 1983.

1386

CSO: 2600/268

GIEREK TESTIFIES DURING TRIAL OF SZCZEPANSKI

Warsaw PRASA POLSKA in Polish No 10, Oct 84 pp 6-13

[Article by Edmund Zurek, from the contest "40 Years of People's Poland," Organized by the Presidium of the Main Board of the Democratic Party, PRL, and the Government Press Office: "I'll Keep Fighting..."]

[Text] The trial lasted 2 years. From 5 January 1982 to 13 January 1984.

On Friday 13 January the verdict at the trial of Maciej Szczepanski was pronounced. The Province Court in Warsaw sentenced the former chairman of the Radio Committee [i.e., Committee for Radio and Television] to the combined penalty of 8 years of deprivation of freedom, a fine of 300,000 zlotys, 5 years of deprivation of civil rights, and a 5-year prohibition against holding any executive post in state and social institutions. In addition, partial confiscation of property: a Scirocco passenger car and savings kept in special accounts toward the purchase of housing.

As for the other defendants, Eugeniusz Patyk, former vice chairman of the Radio Committee, was sentenced to 7 years of deprivation of freedom, 5 years of deprivation of civil rights and a 5-year prohibition against holding any executive post in state and social institutions. Partial confiscation of property: a vacation home in Chyleniec near Lowicz. And Zbigniew Liszyk, former general secretary of the Radio Committee, was sentenced to 1 year and 8 months of deprivation of freedom, 2 years of deprivation of civil rights and a 3-year prohibition against holding any executive post in state and social institutions.

After the verdict was pronounced, I approached Szczepanski. He looked stunned. He said in an undertone: "I don't understand it at all! What about you? How do you like this verdict?"

The cameras stopped whirring. Technicians were turning off the spotlights. The courtroom grew empty. Only the defense attorneys stayed with their clients. Outside the door the families of the defendants were waiting with canapes and

tea. The tension was gone from all. I too felt fatigued, and gave the banal answer:

"You have a chance for the verdict to be revised by the Supreme Court."

That was not the answer he expected.

"I lost," Szczepanski said.

We moved toward the center of the room, near the witness stand.

"Mr Editor, during one of your visits while I was in detention, you asked what I expected to happen at the trial. At the time, I didn't answer your question. Now I can. I had expected an answer to the most important question of whether it was worthwhile to have striven at personal risk, to have acted contrary to regulations, contrary to persons who had followed them, in order to accomplish material, technical and organizational progress within the [Radio] Committee."

*

In 1981 I spent half a year of my life at the Supreme Chamber of Control [NIK]. I talked with some 15 or so inspectors. I familiarized myself thoroughly with the findings of their audits of the Radio Committee: the dossiers filled an entire cabinet. I made an agreement with them that I would not publicize these findings until after the bill of indictment would be brought before the court. I kept my word. On 15 October 1981 the Office of the Prosecutor General submitted to the 4th Penal Department of the Province Court in Warsaw a two-volume act of indictment along with the dossiers on the case: 123 protocols of investigation plus 27 volumes of supplementary documents.

Below is an excerpt from the oral summation and verdict, pronounced on 13 January 1984 by Presiding Judge Michal Kulczycki:

"On listening to the testimonies of the defendants the impression may have been produced--an impression which of course was disproved by this trial explicitly and beyond a shadow of doubt--that the reason for all the irregularities which resulted in the criminal responsibility of the defendants did not inhere in the [Radio] Committee or in the methods and attitudes of its then management; that, rather, it was because of the fact that the NIK had audited the Committee and that its findings were processed for the trial by the Prosecutor's Office. Nothing more mistaken and distorted could be said about this case. As for the purpose of this trial, at whose sources lay the aforementioned irregularities--to which it was the duty of the Supreme Chamber of Control and the Prosecutor's Office to react--it was precisely the examination by an independent court, operating on the principle of freedom of assessment of the evidence, of the material collected during the investigation."

The prosecutors accused the defendants of misappropriation of property, mismanagement, waste and bribe-taking.

In addition to Szczepanski, Patyk and Liszyk, the prosecutors named in the bill of indictment Jerzy Hanbowski, former general director of Polish Radio, and Jadwiga Talachowa, former director of the Employee Benefits Department on Woronicza [probably Woronicza Street in Warsaw, and probably the seat of the Committee on Radio and Television--translator's note]. The cases of Hanbowski and Talachowa were transferred during the trial for separate proceedings (owing to the illness of these defendants).

Prior to the trial I had obtained a permanent pass, No 273/81, from the Committee for Radio and Television, and thus was able to gather freely information from that institution. Hanbowski was said to be devoted to radio, brilliant but unstable, and vacillating in his views. His contacts with the brothers Adam and Wawrzyniec Ehrlich, living in Austria, were disturbing. As for Jadwiga Talachowa, let me cite here a comment by Zbigniew Zychowicz, former director of the Administrative Office: "I've never seen a person as devoted to her superior. Talachowa believed in Patyk. She was deeply convinced that he was devoted body and soul to the Committee and Szczepanski."

I began to observe her carefully when at one time I heard her say "Comrade Andrzej" to a storeroom clerk while assigning to him some ordinary task. I made cautious inquiries about her past, and others also spoke about her. She comes from an intelligentsia family. She was the first in her family to join the PPR [Polish Worker Party]. Her relatives hinted that they had not been pleased by her decision. She has good memories of her days with the ZMP [Union of Polish Youth]. The party gave her the most difficult assignments involving work with the cadre. She headed the personnel department in a major institution in Bialystok, and she brought that institution into order at a time when the activities of diversionary agents were particularly intensive. The Medical Academy was established. She took the post of personnel director there. In 1952 she worked at the Szczecin Radio Station. Her husband was transferred in line of duty to a post in Warsaw. Talachowa began work for the Radio Committee, where she stayed for nearly 30 years. She was simply carrying out party instructions. [Even] after a heart attack and though she nearly reached retirement age. She helped bring up and feed two grandchildren. Such people obey and serve faithfully.

*

Once again I visited Maciej Szczepanski at the place of his detention.

The former chairman of the Radio Committee asked: "What are people saying about my case?"

I had expected this question. This is how he always would begin his conversation with me, before court sessions, during the intermissions, and following the sessions. I passed on to him the opinions I happened to hear.

"What's new in politics?" That was another question for which I was always prepared.

This time he was evaluating the application of the economic reform. I interrupted him with the question:

"While you were the chairman, did you often watch television programs?"

"Rarely. I turned the set on but did not watch it. I had so much to do. Coproduction and companies.... I did watch some programs before they were to be broadcast. Sometimes I had to intervene [in their content]."

Szczepanski leafed through the books which I placed on the table: "Gra" [The Game] by Jerzy Ambroziewicz and "Dygnitarz" [The Dignitary] by Janusz Andrzej Laniewski.

"Do you want me to admit publicly that these novels are about me and television?"

He read the caveat prefacing Laniewski's book: "Any coincidence between the situations and characters in this novel and real events and characters is fortuitous." I had waded only through one-half of this novel. I could not continue because it bored me. Its protagonist drinks often and has a great sexual appetite. This may be the kind of novel that female cooks read. Laniewski portrays shady characters and one pure character, a reporter. But I detest pure characters. As for Ambroziewicz's "Gra," it is a well-plotted political novel. Its protagonist Szymek utters the following sentence: "I prefer reining in racehorses to prodding mules with a stick." I could subscribe my name to such a sentence.

"Whom of the journalists who used to work with you did you prize most highly?"

"Were I to name them, I could only harm them wherever they may be working now. But if you insist, I will name Jerzy Ambroziewicz, Mariusz Walter and Janusz Rolicki. These three names should suffice you.... I see that you also have 'Express Reporterow' [The Reporters' Express] by Skudro and Wiegner. I recall these rather overeager ladies. They practiced a subjective journalistic technique: they focused on persons not well disposed toward me, those with whom I had clashes, and taped their grievances. It contains not a single positive comment. They permitted the inclusion of several generalized reflections coming from me. However, I could not comment on many accusations, because these ladies did not ask me about them. They surely must feel content since they have preserved the appearances of objectivity. Anyone's character can be assassinated in this way. I have no special pretensions toward them about it. As known, the journalistic profession is practiced somewhat tendentiously. I have always said: 'Gentlemen, an autopsy may be an objective procedure unless there are reasons for falsifying its findings....' Mrs Ewa Skudro has even maliciously praised my book, 'Czas Wierzgajacy' [A Time of Neighing], published by the MON [Ministry of National Defense]. She assured me that I could write for MUZYKA I AKTUALNOSCI [a periodical]. It is good that you brought along this collection of journalistic reports in book form. I recall that it was published in 1973, that is, before I was appointed the head on Woronicza, when as a journalist and parliamentary deputy I had traveled throughout nearly the entire world. I visited the GDR, Hungary, the

USSR, Denmark, Holland, France, Spain; in Africa--Tanzania, Cameroon and Kenya; in Asia--India, Japan, Vietnam; in Latin America--Bolivia, Chile, Brazil, Cuba and Venezuela."

"On Woronicza your transfer there was probably attributed to your close contacts with Edward Gierek."

"I had first met Edward Gierek in 1956, when I transferred from a newspaper post in Rzeszow to the Katowice Radio Station in Silesia. At Katowice I was in charge of [broadcasts] on coal industry problems. Gierek at the time had been working at the Central Committee as the director of the heavy industry department, and he often came to Katowice. My first contacts with him were due to my journalistic expertise on mining problems. I attracted Gierek's attention. After 1956 he assumed the office of first secretary of the province PZPR committee. Every politician has at his disposal a journalist or writer who expands on his theses. I gained his recognition. On Gierek's decision, I was appointed head of the propaganda department of the Province Committee. I worked for 6 years in the party apparatus. Afterward I was editor-in-chief of TRYBUNA ROBOTNICZA. I was in a way looked upon as Gierek's third son."

"How do you view Edward Gierek nowadays?"

"I respected that man. Can you guess what I particularly valued Gierek for? He broke through, to some extent, the barrier of mediocrity. After the war we had several important periods. I distinguish two: after 1945, the period of reconstruction, of urban construction and elimination, in the social sphere, of 19th century backwardness. The second period, 1970-1975, was the period of economic acceleration, of opening to the world. After 1975 we began to slacken our pace of development (not without Gierek's fault, but was it his fault alone?). An objective evaluation of the past decade still does not exist, and hence our opinions of individuals are flipflopping. What other merit of Gierek do I perceive? He had a good feeling for trends and proposals which conduced to the country's development, but he did not feel that changes in the [development] model were necessary...."

"Did you often have misunderstandings with Piotr Jaroszewicz?"

"What fights I had with the ex-premier! I must admit that we didn't like each other, that is a fact, but he had character. If only he had a better grounding in economics.... If only he had a better feel for the economy.... If only he understood how much hinged on the new methods of management, construed not as wishful thinking but an imperative ensuing from the attainment of a high level.... He would then have been one of the most outstanding [politicians]...."

"When I began to work for television, or rather somewhat earlier, I realized that I would be unable to accomplish anything at the Radio Committee without carrying out personnel changes (fundamental changes). I had been warned that I would find an Augean stable there. During the years 1973-1974 we discharged about 1,000 people who lacked appropriate professional and political

qualifications. I replaced the management at the top. Of course, I bore the brunt of the odium for having taken these steps in radio and television.

"I set up a system for monitoring the cash flow. We performed quarterly, monthly and 10-day audits. In 1973 Henryk Kisiel, the minister of finance, certified that a high budgetary discipline existed at our Committee. We did not exceed the itemized budget limits."

"What was your concept of the development of radio and television?"

"I've to say something about my work at the Interparliamentary Union. It influenced the style and methods of my management of the Radio Committee.

"I began my work at the Union in 1970. I represented the Polish group at the Union's Executive Committee. At one session I and the Canadian Congressman Reid were placed under the obligation of drafting a memorandum on "Cultural and Political Consequences of Satellite Television." While gathering the material and exchanging it with my Canadian partner, I gained considerable knowledge of the subject. At the Union's session in Caracas the commission in whose work I had been taking part prepared the final draft of that memorandum, which was approved at the following session. It expressed thanks to me and Reid for investing a great deal of work in that draft. My achievement was to incorporate in the memorandum the provision that the governments of the countries broadcasting programs via satellite television are responsible for these programs. I had realized that the spread of satellite television would create a new and unprecedented situation in the international dissemination of information on various domains of life, and that it would create a new situation as regards the ideological confrontation between the two systems as well.

On taking the office of the chairman, I attempted to bear in mind not only the actual political-program tasks but also the preparation of radio and television for operation geared to satellite television. I considered this to be of far-reaching interest to my country."

"Your co-defendant, Hanbowski, the former general director of Polish Radio, gave me proofs, during intermissions in the trial, that you treated radio like hole-in-the-wall store, that you disdained it."

"I didn't disdain good experts on radio, but the possibilities of radio have shrunk greatly in the period of the total domination of television. We listen to the radio in the morning when shaving.... The monitoring and effective screening of the contents and nature of television programs have become one of the basic tasks of the ruling administration in every country. I realized that a confrontation between Polish TV programs and those of the other countries, especially the Western ones, would be likely (with the broadcasts being picked up by individual users through the mediation of a satellite, bypassing ground stations). This would not be prevented by any form of monitoring the television broadcasts transmitted by the satellite system. I realized that the interests of our country, as well as those of the socialist community, dictated the rapidest possible development of radio and television."

"What hampered the growth of the institution?"

"Lack of funds as well as obsolete regulations (which once may have been useful). Already after a few months I realized that neither radio nor television received from the state treasury sufficient funds for a program that would satisfy the authorities, the party and the society. Production cost rose inevitably. Following the introduction of color TV broadcasts, production cost had tripled. Technical progress was unlocking new creative and programming vistas, and the failure to exploit this opportunity would be tantamount to stepping backward: the demand for basic technical equipment, videotape recorders and tapes grew. These were being manufactured by the monopolies, chiefly the American ones, which dictated the prices to everyone who stood in the queue.

"My initiatives preceded the now introduced economic reform. To me it was the bottom line that always counted, and I evaluated people by this criterion. If the balance sheet was positive, I could continue to work with them."

*

The duration of the trial was without precedent: 282 days. The testimonies of Maciej Szczepanski, Eugeniusz Patyk and Zbigniew Liszyk took 64 days and the cross-examination of witnesses 157 days. Nearly 200 witnesses for the prosecution and 80 witnesses for the defense had testified. Experts also testified.

The following passage is taken from Judge Michal Kulczycki's summation of verdict:

"Contrary to certain press comments, the duration of this trial was neither deliberate nor intended but ensued from the Court's desire to bring into open the complete material truth within the confines of the possible and with the object of enabling the defense to present its rationale in full and, lastly, to enable the defendants to avail themselves maximally of their rights as defendants."

Behind the witness stand high officials of the Committee succeeded each other: a former vice chairman, general directors, editors-in-chief, department directors, officials, waiters, artisans, drivers and blue-collar workers. And among the associates: literati, scientists and actors.

The conduct of the defendants was evaluated, as were the activities of the Committee for Radio and Television in the last 10 years. Nearly every time he testified, Maciej Szczepanski stressed that this was a political trial and that the accusations directed against him would be rebutted by the examination of the evidence.

He had been expecting acquittal. He asserted that only such a verdict and no other would bring him satisfaction.

The following passage is taken from Judge Michal Kulczycki's oral summation and verdict:

"In practice, nothing in the functioning of the state is of apolitical significance, and in this context the trial does, of course, have certain political aspects. But on the other hand, it should be also emphasized that the defendants had been performing administrative functions of a political nature, and that in implementing their administrative or official tasks they had also been implementing particular political functions. Thus, if the matter is viewed broadly, here political aspects, too, can be perceived. It must be emphatically stressed, however, that the nature of this trial was determined by the fact that the defendants were responsible not for the fact itself of performing particular functions, that they were not penally responsible for the political line they followed as well as for their personal views. No, what matters in this trial is that they are responsible for the specific deeds of which they are accused--deeds specified in the penal law code, in its chapters concerning the so-called ordinary crimes such as appropriation of public property, bribe-taking and mismanagement. On considering this question, it must be stated that from the standpoint of legal proceedings this trial is in the nature of a criminal trial."

For hundreds of hours we listened to the explanations of the defendants and the testimonies of the witnesses concerning: the Danish furniture purchased and installed in the dwelling of the former chairman; the sauna and alarm system manufactured by the Cerberus Company (installed in the chairman's villa in Szczyrek); the foreign companies; Patyk's summer house in Chyleniec.

Penetrating questions were asked by the attorneys for the defense: numerous questions were asked by the attorneys for the prosecution: Ryszard Rychlik and Andrzej Korzeniowski of the Office of the Prosecutor General.

But it was the presents that excited the greatest emotions. State funds were used at the Radio Committee to purchase presents which people gave each other. The higher-ranking the official, the more valuable the present. Monies of the Committee were squandered. Such presents were also given to outsiders, to the big and little VIP's of those times.

Eugeniusz Patyk explained:

"I realized that the Secretary General Zbigniew Liszyk had his own policy of purchasing valuable gifts with Committee funds. He bought articles of fine Meissen china, various glass articles, various valuable dining plates and blade weapons.

"Shortly before some family celebration of Edward Gierek, I happened to be in Szczepanski's office. Liszyk entered and said: 'Mr Chairman, I'm ready. Please look these things over.' We walked, preceded by Liszyk, to the reception room, where about 20 exhibits were placed on tables. I noticed sets of fine china, including one Chinese service as well as many antique glass objects. There was also a combined glass-metal service. The articles were clearly antique. In my presence and that of Liszyk and Krystyna Kryst, the

chairman pointed to a china service consisting of two cups and a jug and asked Liszyk: 'How much is it?'

"The secretary general was reluctant to state the amount. Finally, he answered: 'High enough.' That present was received by Gierek. Also: expensive Japanese equipment, a radio set, a small television set. I witnessed their handing over."

*

Maciej Szczepanski was crestfallen twice. Once on days when the VIP's designated as witnesses failed to appear in the courtroom, and the other time when Prosecutor Ryszard Rychlik demanded that he be sentenced to 12 years of deprivation of freedom.

In the company of his son Adam, a professor, Edward Gierek appeared before the court.

He took his place on the witness stand. Tall, somewhat pale, but looking rested and healthy, wearing, as in the past, an impeccably tailored suit.

The Presiding Judge Michal Kulczycki asked him:

"How old is the witness?"

"Seventy."

"Profession of the witness?"

"Miner. Eighteen years of work under the ground."

"Considering your health, would you like to sit down, sir?"

"When the need arises, I will say so."

Gierek was answering calmly and concisely.

Place of residence: Katowice. Not related to the defendants. No perjury record.

Judge Kulczycki: "The Court instructs the witness of the duty of telling the truth, since a penalty of up to 5 years of imprisonment is prescribed for perjury or concealment of truth. In addition, the Court instructs the witness that he has the right not to answer questions which might incriminate him."

The crowded courtroom is silent, with only the whirring of the cameras being heard. Every eye is trained on Gierek's silhouette.

Judge Kulczycki: "Has the witness a previous record of penal proceedings? Has the witness been in the past interrogated in the capacity of a suspect?"

Edward Gierek: "I can't remember."

"Has the prosecutor's office made any accusation?"

"Do you mean this case?"

"In general...."

"There was an accusation concerning another case.... But the case is now over."

"Were the proceedings quashed?"

"Yes, rather, yes...."

"Would the witness specify the period during which he had been performing the duties of first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee?"

"From December 1970 till 4 August 1980."

"Under what circumstances had the witness first met the defendant Maciej Szczepanski?"

"In Katowice, when I assumed the office of first secretary of the Province Committee; at that time I had also been a member of the Politburo. Szczepanski worked for radio. I met him--as I recall well--when he was editor-in-chief of TRYBUNA ROBOTNICZA (and thus was empowered to participate in the work of the executive board of the Province Committee)."

"Did the initiative in appointing the defendant to the post of chairman of the Radio Committee originate from the witness?"

"The initiative was taken by the collective. I was informed of its decision."

"Were there other than official contacts between the family of the witness and Szczepanski's family while the defendant had held the office of chairman?"

"No. We didn't visit each other's homes."

"How did the witness address Szczepanski?"

"Variously. As 'comrade,' and in some situations by name."

The tension in the courtroom grew.

We were aware that these questions were merely the preliminaries. The most important questions were yet to come.

Judge Michal Kulczycki: "During the period when the witness held the post of first secretary and Szczepanski the post of chairman of the Radio Committee,

did the witness receive any gifts or keepsakes from Szczepanski or from the Committee for Radio and Television?"

Edward Gierek: "I've already made a deposition on this matter to the prosecutor during an investigation a year ago. I wish to confirm my previous declaration: I've not received any presents from Comrade Szczepanski."

"But did you receive any from the Radio Committee?"

"No."

"Did the witness possess what the bill of indictment terms a Meissen service (two Meissen china cups)?"

"I didn't and don't."

"Did the witness possess the book 'Historia Swiata' [World History]?"

"I didn't possess it and I don't have it."

"Is the witness aware of the initiative taken to transmit these articles to the witness?"

"I'm not aware of it. This question should be asked of my associates, the head of the secretariat, or at least my aide Zdzislaw Chelminski, who is present in this courtroom."

"Did the witness receive a plaque or a souvenir medal from the Radio Committee?"

"I didn't!"

"Does the witness admit the possibility that certain items were purveyed to his seat at Klarysew and destined for the witness, but were not transmitted to him by his secretary or bodyguard?"

"It's difficult to comment on this matter. I don't preclude this possibility, but chances are that I would have been notified."

"But would there have been a likelihood that Aide Chelminski received the gift and did not tell the witness of it?"

"No! Chelminski always kept me informed of everything."

"Was there a custom such that the witness received, on the occasion of personal festivities, delegations from various institutions in Klarysew?"

"There were attempts to find me at my residence in the Hotel of the Office of the Council of Ministers in Klarysew. I wish to declare categorically that I didn't approve of them and that no one had visited me at home. By way of an

exception, persons from certain institutions visited me to convey good wishes."

"In this Courtroom the notorious practice of presenting all sorts of gifts to high state and political functionaries has been repeatedly mentioned. To what extent do opinions of this kind find confirmation in the personal experience of the witness?"

"I personally consider this to be offensive. I'm incapable of suspecting those who had together with me held offices in the Politburo or Secretariat, or those who currently are holding them, of tolerating a practice of this kind."

*

The foreign companies of the Radio Committee were yet another topic which the Judge explored in his questions.

Michal Kulczycki: "Did the witness express an opinion on the initiative of the Committee for Radio and Television Affairs in organizing the foreign companies 'Poltex' and 'Cinetex'?"

Edward Gierek: "No one has discussed this topic with me."

"Did Maciej Szczepanski, in a private or official conversation, transmit information on the plans to establish the foreign companies?"

"No!"

Judge Kulczycki: "Did the witness receive any information, or did he have any views, on the relationship--if that is the proper word--between Ex-Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz and Maciej Szczepanski as chairman of the Radio Committee?"

Edward Gierek: "The contacts between them may have sometimes been of a more drastic nature. There may have been clashes between them, but neither Premier Jaroszewski nor Chairman Szczepanski informed me of them."

"Has any information reached the witness concerning the audit conducted by the NIK at the Radio Committee and its repercussions?"

"In May 1980 I was visited by the then Chairman of the NIK, Mieczyslaw Moczar, but he made no mention of the matter whatsoever. What is more, in June 1980 I received a report on the performance the NIK which did not mention anything alerting to the irregularities happening at the Radio Committee."

"Did the witness receive any positive or negative signals on the performance of the Radio Committee?"

"That performance was rather mentioned positively."

"Is the witness familiar with Premier Jaroszewicz's opinion on the situation at the Radio Committee?"

"No!"

"The witness has testified on this topic at the Prosecutor's Office."

"May I ask for a glass of water? It's very hot here and I've a heart and lung ailment."

The usher, Kazimierz Magierski, placed a glass of mineral water on the railing of the witness stand.

The judge reminded the crew of the Polish Film Chronicle of the need to turn on the spotlights only while filming.

Judge Kulczycki: "All the attorneys for the defense have asked to examine the witness. The questions are invited."

The attorneys for the defense again ask questions about the custom of giving and receiving presents as well as receiving delegations at Klarysew.

*

To clarify this custom, I have to suspend my narrative of the trial and give the floor to the aide to the first secretary, Zdzislaw Chelminski.

He testified during the pretrial investigation:

"My duties as aide included an exact execution of the instructions of Edward Gierek. I alone carried out these instructions! I enjoyed the confidence of not only the person I protected but also all the persons in contact with Gierek.... All the gifts transmitted for the first secretary first came into my hands. I recorded in a notebook all the presents transmitted during the years 1974-1980, but in March 1981, after preparing a receipt, I destroyed that notebook. Local gifts and presents were not accepted by Gierek. He ordered that they be displayed publicly. At the Central Committee gifts--statuettes, paintings, vases, epergnes--were handed to the first secretary by domestic and foreign delegations, whereupon they were and still are displayed on the premises of the Central Committee and various institutions. I deposited some of these gifts in a storeroom in Klarysew. I always recorded each of these items in the notebook.

"The instances in which gifts were presented at Klarysewo had been of a sporadic nature and occurred only on Edward Gierek's birthdays. This was the situation I had encountered when I began my duties, and I was not satisfied with it. A certain group of individuals had been reaching Klarysew with good wishes and presents. I was aware of these visits and often specified the times at which they were to take place. This was an uncomfortable situation to not only myself but also the first secretary."

*

Edward Gierek was asked by Szczepanski's attorney: "Did you or your associates receive occasional presents during the visits of foreign delegations arriving in Poland?"

The witness answered: "Such situations did happen. Your Honor, I wish to emphasize that these gifts were of a rather symbolic nature or of value to the country. Let me say something that may be not known to everyone. One of the rooms in the Royal Castle, the Gothic Room if I recall correctly, was furnished with paintings and furniture donated by Secretary Erich Honecker. President Valery Giscard d'Estaing offered to the Castle 17th century furniture and an 18th century clock. Schmidt also donated several paintings commemorating Queen Bona, Zygmunt the Old and their daughter and son-in-law. The Soviet delegation donated insurgent banners dating from the year 1863 as well as 19th century paintings."

The same attorney asked: "During sojourns abroad by Polish delegations, were the delegation members and you personally given any presents?"

Edward Gierek answered: "I decline to answer this question. To return to the subject: the presents were deposited in the storeroom at Klarysew. On leaving the hotel of the Office of the Council of Ministers--I repeat, a hotel and not some official residence as has been insinuated--I asked that the paintings hanging in that building be transferred to the museum, without any agreement being made between any member of my family and the museum staff, and my request was met. These paintings included some that were on various occasions presented to Chelminski. They too were surrendered."

The attorney for the defense asked: "During the interrogation at the prosecutor's office, were you asked to return any article in your possession?"

Edward Gierek: "I don't remember if I was asked this. But were I to be asked this, I would have to answer negatively. I'm keeping no presents."

Maciej Szczepanski: "Being guided by the need to save time, I relinquish my questions."

Prosecutor Andrzej Rychlik: "Did the witness receive from Szczepanski a 19th century jug?"

Edward Gierek: "I don't have anything like that."

"Did the witness receive from Szczepanski a Polaroid camera?"

"No!"

"Did the witness receive from Szczepanski a minitelevision set?"

"I don't have it."

Prosecutor Rychlik turned to Maciej Szczepanski: "Did you hand to Edward Gierek a present in the form of a gold plaque?"

Defendant Szczepanski: "I confirm what I've testified on this matter while in prison and in the Courtroom."

Prosecutor Rychlik asked His Honor to read an excerpt from the deposition of Maciej Szczepanski during the pretrial investigation.

Judge Michal Kulczycki read the deposition of 26 August 1981. We listened: "I commissioned the designing and minting of gold [gilded] medals of silver and brass, which we used as presents for important people.... I presented to Gierek in his office a gilded medal with a gilded plaque.... All the other gifts, namely, the Meissen service, the 19th century jug, the Polaroid camera, the Phillips set, the minitelevision set, and the book 'Historia swiata,' were handed to Gierek on the occasion of his birthdays or namedays...."

Judge Kulczycki turned to Maciej Szczepanski: "Does the defendant confirm this deposition?"

Szczepanski: "I do."

Prosecutor Rychlik to witness Edward Gierek: "What do you say to the passage just recited from the defendant's deposition, please?"

Maciej Szczepanski: "I request that this question be waived."

Judge Kulczycki: "Why?"

Maciej Szczepanski: "Edward Gierek.... Let me draw attention to certain moral aspects of this matter. Here, in the majesty of a Court of the Republic, we are facing a man, a man who had for 10 years been the leader of the state. I know, Your Honor...."

Judge Michal Kulczycki: "I must interrupt your speech, as it is superfluous. This Court is aware of who witness Edward Gierek used to be, and it is aware of who witness Edward Gierek is. This reminder is unnecessary. It is a procedural requirement that, inasmuch as you had made your deposition in the absence of the witness, now that the witness is present in the Courtroom, he should be given the opportunity to comment..."

Edward Gierek: "I declare that I had received no presents at the Central Committee; there was no such practice. I wish to mention one other matter.... The medal.... I don't recall having received anything like that. But please consider that this possible event may have taken place several years ago. I don't totally preclude the possibility of something like that having happened. But I personally don't have any such thing."

Attorney for the defense: "Did you present a watch to Szczepanski in 1978, on the occasion of his 50th birthday?"

Edward Gierek: "The watch, yes, I did. That was a common practice: we gave watches to political activists as rewards for distinguished performance."

Attorney for the defense: "Was this the legal situation you had encountered [on first taking office]?"

Edward Gierek: "Yes, it was."

*

The aide to the first secretary, Edward Chelminski, testified during the pretrial examination: "Knowing Szczepanski only officially, I can state that he had very rarely visited Secretary Edward Gierek at the Central Committee. My observations indicate that their contacts were purely official. Edward Gierek's mode of life has been such as to create a warm atmosphere as reflected in, among other things, his custom of addressing his associates by name.

"I remember that, during my service under Edward Gierek, a delegation from the Radio Committee, mostly headed by Chairman Szczepanski, always arrived on the occasion of the first secretary's birthday.

"Having taken part in the reception of many presents, I'm unable to specify the identities of the givers and the nature of their presents, but on that occasion and under those circumstances I recall that some one member of the Radio Committee delegation had presented a gift in the form of a characteristic jug or amphora.

"I received that gift. On leaving Klarysew in March 1981, Gierek did not take along anything....

"I remember that during one of Gierek's visits to the Committee for Radio and Television Affairs, in connection with the taping of a new year's speech, a high-quality miniaturized radio set and tape recorder of Western manufacture were presented to the first secretary. I deny that Edward Gierek received a Polaroid camera. He did not receive a minitelevision set. He received no present in the form of a Phillips radio-television set."

Judge Kulczycki asked Szczepanski, Liszyk and Patyk:

"Do the defendants wish to provide additional explanations relating to the testimony of the witness?"

Maciej Szczepanski: "I do."

Judge to Edward Gierek: "Please, take a rest."

Gierek sat down on a bench among the spectators.

Maciej Szczepanski: "It is unfortunate that my superiors were not thoroughly conversant with the nature of Polish Radio and Television. That they were unaware of the difficult conditions in which the staff accomplished tasks. I have repeatedly explained in this Courtroom my attitude toward the law. I

stated that the law in a law-abiding state treats all equally. Not for a moment do I lose the hope that Poland in 1983 is a law-abiding state."

While depositions were being made by the witnesses Adam Gierek and Zdzislaw Chelminski, Edward Gierek sat on the bench among the public. The tension declined. Gierek listened to his son's testimony and kept his gaze riveted on defendant Maciej Szczepanski.

*

In his place of detention on Rakowiecka Street I listened to Maciej Szczepanski:

"From the outset I had realized that television must be self-supporting, that it couldn't survive on the minimal monthly subscriber fees, and neither could it survive on advertising revenues. Who would want to pay for advertising goods that are scarce on store shelves? In my travels around the world I gained a growing conviction that television must earn funds through activities outside the program, that it can provide the zlotys and dollars for replenishing and shoring up the health of the budget."

"What was that budget like?"

"The budget could be compared to a large commode with drawers filled with money up to the limits specified by the Planning Commission, whose decisions are approved by the Minister of Finance. This means that the money put in one drawer couldn't be transferred to another. If some of the many drawers were not emptied by the end of the fiscal year, the money they contained was forfeited. We were thus unable to utilize the funds saved. I decided that we would draw upon the funds not utilized for the purposes intended or for a particular purpose. In this way, I had performed an economic minimanuever. Under the then mandatory budget decree and mandatory methods of management, my intentions couldn't have been accomplished legally. It is only now, after the introduction of the economic reform, that my earlier bottom-line approach has become universally mandatory."

"How did you intend to replenish the Committee's coffers?"

"I began to wheel and deal. Neither the statute nor the financing rules provided for the possibility of financial dealings."

"It's the task of television to produce programs rather than to speculate with funds."

"When television is underinvested, programs are produced by superannuated methods. Then everyone suffers: the personnel and the viewers. For several years I had been attempting to obtain the permission to sell tickets (videotapings attended by the public), without success. The earnings from the sales of tickets at the Opole Festival were appropriated by the Ministry of Culture and Art. The greater part of the revenues from the Sopot Festival was collected by the Gdansk Stage Show."

"Our first accomplishment was setting up an 'impresariat' at the Committee. We earned US\$1,200,000. We hired prominent artists such as Andrzej Kulka and Piotr Paleczny, as well as well-known music conductors, as part of our regular radio and television broadcasting staff, and we thus also tried to recruit famous personalities. Previously, artists used to render certain services without being bound by the links of regular salaried positions. We were able to break PAGART's monopoly and send artists abroad. We sent abroad the Great Symphony Orchestra from Katowice and the Krakow Symphony Orchestra. Through the mediation of the impresariat we concluded an agreement with an American record company, one of the largest of its kind in the world, for cooperation in producing records of the works of Chopin, Lutoslawski, Penderecki and Karol Szymanowski. And the record of the Opera 'Boris Godunov' by Modest Moussorgski in its quadriphonic version won the title of the record of the year. The impresariat's activities were the first step in overcoming formal barriers that prevented earning funds, as well as the first step toward co-production. We handled the final processing of cassettes which we purchased in Gorzow or in the West. In 3 years our productivity climbed from 30,000 units to 1 million and yielded extremely high revenues. We expanded the variety of our publications. We used various forms for publishing works: we published combined book-cassette sets. AGPOL, the radio-television agency, produced commercials for private individuals and industry.

"Through activities of this kind we contributed 200 million zlotys in unanticipated revenues to the State Treasury in 1979. These millions were our bargaining card in the struggle for more funds for the needs of the Radio Committee. I had attempted to undertake what is now [under the economic reform] termed enterprise self-financing.

"That's not all. I discussed with the Minister of Machinery Industry Aleksander Kopiec the possibility of commencing the manufacture of picture phones. The manufacture of video discs would accomplish a revolution in visual aids at schools, particularly in small towns and villages, as well as in the postgraduate training of engineers and physicians."

"What actions did you undertake to alter what you term lifeless regulations?"

"I spoke publicly of what was hamstringing the development of our country. My proposals were invariably treated by Premier Jaroszewicz as deviations from the principles of socialism."

Below is a passage from the summation and verdict of 13 January:

Judge Michal Kulczycki: "The principle of the equality of all before the law is a principle that also applies to holders of high offices. This is a Constitutional, fundamental principle, and it ensues primarily from the socialist nature of our state and at the same time constitutes its foundation. This principle must be honored, but on the other hand, seen from the legal, moral, political and social standpoints, it is obvious that an exalted function, a high rank in the social hierarchy, provides the foundation and creates the premises for posing higher-than-average requirements of an ethical and political-social nature.

"Finally, it must be said that this Court categorically rejects, categorically opposes the thesis, presented in the Courtroom, that what used to be a legal action prior to August 1980 has become a crime following August 1980. Such a thesis has no basis in the legal system nor in facts. There is a deep meaning to the maxim, 'The laws were established so that the stronger would not prevail everywhere.'"

*

I asked Maciej Szczepanski while he was under investigative detention on Rakowiecka Street: "You were arrested on 15 October 1980. You have now been under detention for nearly 4 years. You've endured a lengthy investigation and a 2 years long trial, followed by a verdict. How do you view your situation at present?"

"Being in jail is the ultimate situation. I've already become aware of it, and I've learned how to maintain my detachment."

"You must often be thinking about yourself, and about your past. How do you evaluate yourself?"

"When judging others I've been trying to be just and understanding toward them."

"I tried to leave permanent traces after myself: an expanded material-technical base of radio and television, and expansion of the institutions which enabled us to reach foreign markets."

"I succeeded in forming and shaping a cadre of highly qualified experts and specialists having the proper ideological and artistic views."

"And what personal shortcomings have you detected in yourself?"

"I've not always been consistent in carrying out my intentions. Sometimes I had believed that certain facts that I had accomplished would suffice for the situation to develop as I anticipated."

*

On 17 May the Supreme Court rejected the application of Maciej Szczepanski for a conditional release owing to illness (spinal degeneration, diabetes). He commented as follows to his attorney Andrzej Sandomierski, when the latter conveyed the bad news on to him:

"I'll soon be free anyhow. I'll keep fighting...."

On 26 July the Supreme Court considered yet another request by the attorneys for the defense and suspended the prison stay of Maciej Szczepanski so that he would obtain the needed medical treatment, not available under prison conditions.

On 29 October the Supreme Court will consider revising the verdict of the court of the first instance.

1386

CSO: 2600/335

RIDING ON CHURCH-STATE ROLLER COASTER

Warsaw KIERUNKI in Polish No 44, 28 Oct 84 pp 1,4,5

[Article by Szczepan Balicki: "Church-State Relations in Poland, 1944-1984"]

[Text] Church-state relations in People's Poland are perhaps the least known aspect of the history of its 40 years of existence. Many of the related facts, some of them being of fundamental importance, have not yet been made public; this may be exemplified by the direct contacts between the Episcopate and the Government (especially the sessions of the Joint Commission), whose proceedings are completely unknown to public opinion, and whose end-results are at best summarized in laconic and official communiques. The scientific publications on the related topics can be literally counted on the fingers of one's hand, while the fairly numerous popular publications display a glaringly selective treatment of facts as well as a definitely onesided approach. This is thus a domain that yet awaits a thorough and comprehensive scientific exploration. However, the 40th anniversary of the new shape of our statehood requires looking backward at various aspects of societal life in the Republic. The sketch below represents an attempt at outlining at least the principal problems of church-state relations in our country; it is dynamically integrated as the resultant of extremely diverse (and often opposed) factors. It is absolutely not intended to provide apodictic answers to the numerous question marks hanging over this domain of history; rather, it is intended to constitute a proposal for the discussion and exploration of such answers.

The acute antagonism that had arisen in the 19th century between the Catholic Church--and the entire Christianity besides--and Marxism still persisted and was as current as ever in the year 1944. Nevertheless, the assumption of power on the liberated Polish territories by a political camp in which the Marxist party played the leading role did not at all result in a conflict between the

new authorities and the Church. It appears that the principal reason was simply the common enemy--Hitlerite Germany. The Catholic clergy and activists were also persecuted along with communists (and other political groupings as well, besides), and the need to liberate the Fatherland existed as an absolute priority relegating all mutual animosities to a secondary plane. Moreover, the Church's patriotic attitude had gained for it a tremendous and universal authority among the society. The Church decisively toned down anticommunist accents in its teachings, while the program of the Polish Worker Party, established in 1942, lacked any antireligious or even anticlerical overtones whatsoever. The same thing can be said about the documents published in 1944 by the People's Council in Poland (KRN) and about the Manifesto of the Polish Committee for National Liberation (PKWN).

The old animosities and prejudices against communism, on the one hand, and against the Church on the other, could not overshadow the clear eloquence of the facts relating to the liberation. The entry of the Red Army and its allied Polish Army into Poland signified simply the recovery of the freedom of pastoral action by the Church, which had until then been an object of frightful Hitlerite terror. This may be symbolized by the Primate's Basilica in Gniezno, which the occupier had transformed into a concert auditorium but which after the liberation regained its role as a metropolitan cathedral. This also applied to hundreds of churches, particularly in Poznan Province and in Pomerania. The Catholic University of Lublin began to operate as the first of the higher Polish educational institutions as early as in the fall of 1944, and religion became a subject of instruction in all elementary and secondary schools. Public worship (including processions and pilgrimages) was not obstructed, not even in regions close to the frontline. Military chaplaincy was extremely active, and all government festivities were combined with the celebrations of the Holy Mass, attended by military and civilian authorities. Such a state of relations resulted in that even /the differences in opinion arising on some issues between the Episcopate and the Government did not grow into any deeper conflicts/ [emphasized] involving broader masses of the citizenry.

This situation was not even changed by the Resolution of 12 September 1945 of the Government of National Unity, which declared that, inasmuch as the Concordat of 10 February 1925 between the Apostolic See and the Polish Republic had ceased to be binding, the Government refused to acknowledge officially the nomination of Apostolic administrators performed on 15 August 1945 (by Cardinal A. Hlond, as empowered by the Apostolic See) for Wroclaw, Opole, Gorzow, Gdansk and Olsztyn. However, the Government stressed that this resolution in no way infringed on the Church's rights in Poland, and this statement proved to be completely in accord with the reality in the subsequent 3 years. The touchy question of religious instruction was settled by the circular of 15 September 1945 of the Minister of Education, which specified that "Pupils whose parents (legal guardians) declare that they do not wish them to receive religious instruction, because it does not meet their religious convictions, are exempt from such instruction." In practice, an insignificant number of people availed themselves of this provision and religion was taught universally.

The question of the legal status of Apostolic administrators on the Recovered Territories was settled very characteristically. To be sure, Circular of 17 September 1945 of the Minister of Public Administration to the District Plenipotentiaries of the Republic stated that these administrators can neither act in an official capacity nor refer to their special powers, but it also recommended that, "considering that a rapid organization of the Polish hierarchy on these territories is also desirable from the standpoint of interests of the State, I recommend to Citizens Plenipotentiaries that they do not obstruct the Apostolic Administrators in their activities and, on the contrary, provide them aid and facilitate their activities insofar as possible." The manner in which these recommendations were fulfilled is universally known: the facilities transferred to the Church included approximately 2,900 churches, 350 chapels, hundreds of residential and farm buildings and thousands of hectares of cropland. In addition, the Church was given substantial aid in rebuilding destroyed temples, while on its part the ecclesiastical organization became an important factor in integrating the Recovered Territories with the remainder of the country.

Despite the wartime devastation of printing facilities and the huge difficulties with paper supplies, the Catholic press and publications flourished vigorously. The pilgrimage movement, linked to ancient traditions and at the same time representing an expression of gratitude for the salvation and rebirth of the State and Nation, reached a scale transcending all prewar levels. The act of the consecration of Poland to the Immaculate Heart of Mary in 1946 attracted some 800,000 faithful to the foothills of Jasna Gora, which was undoubtedly helped by the favorable attitude of the state agencies, which facilitated the use of means of transportation. Honor guards of the Polish Army were assigned to the Holy Sepulchers in garrison towns, honor companies took part in Corpus Christi processions, holy masses were celebrated on Polish Radio, and religious symbols were displayed in many public institutions, principally schools. State agencies provided valuable assistance in rebuilding ecclesiastical property, as particularly demonstrated in the allocations of building materials. It is noteworthy that such a state of church-state relations did not in the least impede a heated discussion between Catholics and Marxists that not infrequently reached the level of sharp polemics. However, controversies on ideological or world-outlook affairs generally did not influence the quotidian reality of cooperation among all citizens in reconstructing the country and resolving diverse postwar problems. Let us recall moreover that at the time the 3-Year Plan was fulfilled very efficiently!

/The August 1948 Plenum Was a Watershed in the History of Religious Relations in Poland/ [emphasized]

Although the resolutions of that plenum did not explicitly refer to the topic, soon afterward the comment by Minister H. Swiatkowski and the subsequent comments of other members of state and party leadership provided increasingly broader hints of a change in the religious policy, and finally the PPR [Polish Worker Party] and PPS [Polish Socialist Party] Merger Congress in December 1948 unequivocally presaged the separation of church and state in Poland. Now events took a rapid turn: an extremely broadly conceived secularization was

combined with growing curtailment of the activities of the Catholic Church, and even with interference into its purely internal affairs. Here it should be considered that that period was subsequently termed "the period of mistakes and distortions," when violations of the principles of legality extended to all spheres of political, social and economic life, and the sphere of religious policy was no exception. To compound the problem, at that time international relations became greatly exacerbated to the level of the "cold war." Parallel to the sectarian distortions in the camp of the socialist countries, an anticommunist hysteria developed in the West and its influence could not be resisted even by certain circles linked to the Apostolic See, as reflected in, among other things, the famous declaration of July 1949 of the Congregation of the Sacred Office, which threatened ecclesiastical sanctions for a vaguely defined "cooperation with the communist party." That declaration, which in practice was hardly enforced (particularly outside Italy) and was not at all formally announced in Poland, did nevertheless produce an explicitly adverse effect on church-state relations in the socialist countries. Under these circumstances, even measures which nowadays we, from the vantage point of history, adjudge to be justified on their own merit became causes of conflicts owing to the improper form of their implementation and the reigning atmosphere of tension and mutual slights....

Within a relatively short period of time ecclesiastical institutions were deprived of hospitals, nearly all schools, preschools and orphan homes, arable and forested land (so-called immovable property), parish houses, etc. Most of the Catholic periodicals and publishing houses, as well as bookstores, were shut down, and the books printed by the officially tolerated publishing houses (chiefly the Publishing Institute of the PAX [Association of Catholic Laymen]) were not distributed by the bookstores of "Dom Ksiazki" [House of the Book]. Ecclesiastical construction was sharply curtailed, as was military, hospital and prison chaplaincy. In August 1949 revisions of the degree on public assemblies introduced the requirement of applying for permits for any processions outside church territory as well as for pilgrimages, and in practice such permits were issued very rarely.

Personal contacts between the Church in Poland and foreign Catholic centers had ceased almost entirely. One of the painful consequences of this was the difficulties encountered in counteracting the anti-Polish propaganda conducted by these centers, and particularly at the Vatican, by revisionist German clergy.

The direct interference in the internal affairs of the Church manifested itself in various pressures exerted on the clergy with the object of channeling diocese and parish activities in a particular direction. These pressures sometimes became quite acute, including even an unfounded deprivation of freedom. It should be stressed that this does not concern instances--quite rare, besides--of actual lawbreaking by the clergy; rather, this concerns solely and exclusively judicial verdicts which, following [worker protests of] October 1956, were formally voided and legally deemed unfounded by the Supreme Court. The scope of this article prevents a more detailed analysis of the problems of that sad period, for this would require a

broader and more comprehensive research. However, emphasis should be placed on a kind of "feedback" that was particularly notable during that period: the violations of legality prompted natural responses of protest and outrage, and these responses in their turn were treated as antistate activities. The tension grew; many bishops could not exercise their offices; and the most dramatic event of those years was the internment of the primate of Poland, Cardinal S. Wyszynski, in September of that year.

It would be a major mistake though to evaluate the years 1948-1956 solely in negative terms. At the time, despite everything, the Church in Poland had retained a scope of freedom which enabled its extensive internal development. A great upsurge of applicants for priestly and monastic vocations, unprecedented in Europe, was accommodated by seminaries and monasteries which exercised properly their formative functions despite the numerous difficulties. The elimination of illiteracy and the rise in the general educational background of the society also contributed to the growth of interest in Catholic culture: the published--chiefly by the Publishing Institute of the PAX--books by Catholic authors were sold out and passed from hand to hand. During those 8 years the New Testament was published in a greater number of copies than during the entire 20-year interbellum period. A relatively substantial number of young writers debuted in the few but widely read periodicals published by Catholics. Catholic education also developed--for it was exactly in those times that the Rev Karol Wojtyla earned his academic decrees at Jagiellonian University (doctorate in 1948, habilitation in 1953), before he took along his knowledge to St Peter's See. The number of temples grew slowly but steadily, of which a spectacular example may be the consecration of the monumental Cathedral of Christ the King dominating downtown Katowice. The rebuilding of the churches destroyed during the war also continued, and the reconsecration of the Piast Cathedral, resurrected from ruins in Wroclaw, produced a resounding echo not only in Poland but outside its borders.

An event which can be termed epochal without indulging in a pompous exaggeration was the /conclusion of the "Accord Between Representatives of the Government of the Polish Republic and Representatives of the Episcopate"/ [emphasized] on 14 April 1950. The preliminary work in itself was of a pioneering nature: for the first time in history, representatives of the Catholic Church and a socialist state sat down together to negotiate, forming the Joint Commission, and, after arduous efforts, they signed a document specifying mutual obligations. The contents of this document may seem modest nowadays, but at the time it was definitely pioneering. Thus, the formulation, "The Church's mission may be exercised in different socioeconomic systems," is now obvious in the light of the resolutions of the Second Vatican Council, but in the spring of 1950, 12 and $\frac{1}{2}$ years before the inauguration of that conclave, it was simply traumatic to many groups on the right and left (paradoxically, for different reasons on each side....). The agreement of the state authorities to maintaining the subordination of the Church in Poland to the pontiff as regards faith, morality and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, at the time prompted major disputes among the leftists. Generally speaking, in those times, the tendencies toward a "short-term" treatment of church-state problems had still been strong: on the one hand, the socialist system was considered

transitional and, on the other, it was expected that religion would wither away rapidly. The Polish Accord of 1950 was, by contrast, based on the conviction that these problems are of a historically long-range nature.

Unfortunately fate was unkind to the Accord. Barely two months after its conclusion the Korean War began, and the resulting escalation of international tension also affected internal relations in nearly every country. The implementation of the Accord's provisions began to become extremely difficult, and a number of them remained, practically speaking, on paper during the subsequent 6 years, while various deplorable events outlined above took place in church-state relations. The Polish Accord of 1950 was simply "ahead of the times" and, like any other precursor, it was whirled about by the wind of history. But once it was launched, the idea that the country's future requires of both Catholics and Marxists that they explore a common language as regards affairs of concern to the entire nation, ripened within the society despite the seemingly insuperable obstacles.

In the mid-1950s there appeared symptoms of a detente on the international arena, and the socialist countries commenced the difficult task of overcoming the mistakes of the Stalinist period. This process became markedly accelerated following the 20th CPSU Congress in February 1956, and in Poland the 8th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee in October of that year became a turning point in the country's entire sociopolitical life. As soon as a few days later, the primate of Poland, Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski, was released and had regained freedom of action. At the same time, previously removed bishops began to return to their diocesan seats, and proceedings were initiated to uncover miscarriages of justice associated with judicial verdicts pronounced on Catholic clergymen and activists. The Administration of Wladyslaw Gomulka had at that time made an honest effort to win the society's trust and work out methods for effective cooperation among citizens of differing world outlook. The Joint Episcopate-Government Commission commenced its activities, and the agreements it reached provided religious life in Poland with a relatively broad scope for proper development. Teaching of religion was introduced on a totally voluntary basis in elementary and secondary schools; the state's supervision over pilgrimages and processions was restricted to the indispensable order and sanitation requirements; the censorship of Catholic publications was lightened; and various provisions of the religious law were revised; for example, the decree of 31 December 1956 on the organization and staffing of ecclesiastical posts (DZIENNIK USTAW No 1, 1957, Item 6) introduced principles close to the prewar provisions of the Concordat. In addition, conditions were provided for a moderate expansion of ecclesiastical construction.

On their part, the primate cardinal, the Episcopate and a substantial part of the Catholic clergy issued appeals to the faithful for preserving inner peace and moderation in making demands, and above all for constructive work for the common good. They opposed the tendentious propaganda of the anticommunist centers in the West which obstinately adhered to the outmoded theory of the "Church of Silence" in Poland, and, during his visit to the Vatican in May 1957, the primate cardinal obtained complete approval of the Pope Pius XII for his line of behavior, surmounting the resistance of the intrasingent centers.

Soon afterward, however, storm clouds began to gather over church-state relations in Poland. The first symptom of the changed situation was the press campaign against the supposed "Catholic intolerance." The post-October [1956] changes led to a fundamental turnabout in the attitude of an overwhelming majority of Poles, but it was obvious that this could not have been a total turnabout, considering that within the multimillion society still persisted small groups with a fanatical-sectarian mentality, both among the Catholics and among the materialists. Thus, there was no way of avoiding manifestations of intrasingence on the part of the former and attempts at administrative pressure on the part of the latter, although the number of such incidents was only marginal compared with the social processes in the country as a whole and did not justify the publicity it received. Such occurrences, while essentially of minor importance, did nevertheless cause an unpleasant atmosphere in the contacts between Catholics and Marxists.

/However, already in 1958 church-state relations entered upon a distinct stage of conflict/ [emphasized].

The activities of the Joint Commission ceased, publications on religious themes were curtailed, ecclesiastical construction encountered growing obstacles, the activities of theological seminaries were hindered and the practice of conscripting their alumni for military service was introduced, and an unusually burdensome taxation system began to be applied to the clergy and religious institutions...

But it was the atmosphere of that period in church-state relations, replete with mutual recriminations and pretensions, that was particularly heavy and difficult to explain even in the historical perspective. Even the Grand Novena and especially the so-called pilgrimage of the Jasna Gora Icon in connection with the Millenium of the Introduction of Christianity in Poland were treated as a form of political clericalism. The issue of church property in the Western and Northern Territories was a continuing source of tension.

The conflict reached its apogee in 1966, i.e., during the period of millennial festivities, with the Message of Polish Bishops to German Bishops at the end of 1965 serving as the casus belli.

It remains a sad paradox that precisely during the years of the renewal initiated by the [Second] Vatican Council, at a time when the Vatican began to conceive its "eastern policy" and a Catholic-Marxist dialogue began to bear fruit in many socialist countries, Poland, which had previously provided the model and inspiration for the beginnings of this dialogue, became in the 1960s the arena of a continuing exacerbation of church-state relations. Here it should be stressed, and emphatically at that, that during that period religious life in this country had flourished, seminaries and monasteries were full, and Poland remained in the European lead as regards indicators of religious practices. It was then also that Catholics had been publishing many literary and scientific works (including the now universally known works of Karol Wojtyla). Fortunately, the pressure of reality proved stronger than petty prejudices and toward the end of the 1960s some stabilization set in in

the contacts between the Church and the PRL authorities, although its level was satisfactory to neither party.

/The December 1970 events [worker demonstrations] became a new watershed in the history of both the country and the Church/ [emphasized].

The new administration did not announce any special concessions to the Church, but it did discontinue attacks against it and appealed for constructive cooperation of all the forces of the Polish nation. This in itself sufficed, however, to markedly accelerate the process of the normalization of church-state relations. Above all, numerous religious spectacles, such as the aforementioned pilgrimage of copies of the Jasna Gora Icon of the Virgin Mary, previously treated as antistate manifestations, were now simply treated as normal intraecclesiastical forms of worship, lacking political repercussions, and thus a major source of irritation automatically disappeared. A series of laws settled a number of controversial problems of religious legislation. Thus, the decree of 23 June 1971 acknowledged the ownership by the Catholic Church and other religious associations of the real estate they used in the Western Territories, while the ordinance of 10 February 1972 of the Minister of Finance relieved ecclesiastical institutions of the duty of keeping detailed detailed inventory records and certain other accounts. In addition, many tax arrears were forgiven, particularly those owed by the Catholic University of Lublin, and the rules for issuing permits for the construction of religious facilities were alleviated.

An entirely new road was entered by the contacts between the PRL authorities and the Apostolic See, previously only loose and occasional. At the end of April 1971 official negotiations took place at the Vatican between a delegation headed by the Director of the Office for Religious Denominations, Deputy Minister Aleksander Skarzynski, and the delegation of the Apostolic See headed by the then Secretary of the Council for Public Affairs of the Church, Archbishop Agostino Casaroli. The second round of the talks took place in Warsaw in November 1971 and, according to Archbishop Casaroli, "Undoubtedly yet another step forward has been taken on the road toward the normalization of Polish-Vatican relations." Half a year later, on 28 June 1972, the papal bull of Paul VI, "Episcoporum Poloniae," crowned years of Polish efforts and, satisfying historical justice, introduced a permanent ecclesiastical administration in the Western and Northern Territories. This significant act was at the same time a major factor in the stabilization of Europe as a whole, and it was received by world public opinion as a contribution of the Apostolic See to consolidating international peace and security in our geographical region. This also fundamentally facilitated subsequent Polish-Vatican contacts, including those taking place at Helsinki during a stage in the process of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. These contacts prepared the soil for the "exchange" of the official visits of Minister Stefan Olszowski to the Vatican on 12 November 1973 and Archbishop A. Casaroli to Warsaw on 4 February 1974 and, as a consequence of Polish-Vatican negotiations in July of the same year, the introduction of permanent working contacts and the appointment of teams for handling these contacts (with the chairmen of these teams having subsequently been elevated to ambassadorial

rank.) Poland's representative resides permanently in Rome, while the "Apostolic Nuncio for Special Affairs," this being the title of the head of the Apostolic See's team (who has from the outset been Archbishop Luigi Poggi), visiting Poland several times a year, thus assuring continuity of contacts.

A substantive dialogue has likewise been conducted within this country, between the Episcopate, the lower clergy and lay activists on the one hand, and the agencies of the authorities and the administration on the other, and its principal institutional forum has been the Joint Commission. The naturally arising differences of opinion were in general deliberately treated as "matters to be resolved," thus avoiding unnecessary irritants. Thus, the statement made on 3 September 1976 at Mielec by the First Secretary of the PZPR Central Committee Edward Gierek, "...that in Poland there is no conflict between the state and the Church. I have the right to say this, because there is no conflict between the authorities and nearly the entire Polish clergy," was universally accepted as consonant with reality. A milestone at this stage in church-state relations was the visit of Edward Gierek to the Vatican on 1 December 1977, preceded by a meeting with the Primate Cardinal Wyszynski (on 29 October 1977 in the Parliament Building). In his speech, the first secretary stressed the role of the Apostolic See in promoting detente and peaceful cooperation of nations, and he pointed to the great tasks facing Poles, whose accomplishment is more important than divisions in views. Further, he declared that, "We are consolidating in the spirit of the traditional Polish tolerance a situation characterized by the absence of conflict between the Church and the state." Pope Paul VI in reply gave assurances that the Church was ready to make its own positive contributions to the Polish society, above all as regards a moral upbringing in the spirit of respect for the values of social ethics and sacrificial participation in the work for the common good. He also stressed Poland's contribution to the cause of peace and international harmony. The Vatican meeting produced a broad impact throughout the world and influenced positively religious relations in Poland, particularly the resolution of issues on which differences of opinion existed between church and state authorities.

These differences concerned various particular matters, such as permits for building churches, publishing plans, major ecclesiastical spectacles, etc., but principally they centered on the question of the propaganda of materialism. The Church took (and to this day takes) the position that such propaganda should be practiced by citizens with a materialist world outlook within the framework of their civil rights, both as individuals and as members of associations. Identical rights belong, besides, to believers-citizens as regards religious propaganda.... Hence, the Church could not remain indifferent to such occurrences as the omission of the names of religiously oriented creative artists in state-controlled mass media and the curtailment of the rights of believers-citizens in various forms and to a varying extent. The comments of the primate cardinal on these matters concerned questions of principle, stressing explicitly that they should be resolved in accordance with the law and social ethic, rationally and in awareness of the responsibility involved--with the example being provided by the Cardinal himself, that "Primate of the Millenium," who thus obligated accordingly all

clergymen and laymen. Therefore, such controversies did not turn into foci of conflagration, and it was fair to state that there are no church-state conflicts in Poland, at least not on a scale perceptible to the society. It is thus an interesting phenomenon that the 1970s, and particularly their second half, which were a period of the onset of perturbing symptoms of regression in various domains of Polish social and economic life, were also a period of unequivocal progress in church-state relations in the direction of normalization and creative dialogue.

It should be emphasized that the Church did not restrict its defense of human rights to a purely denominational scope but also offered reminders of them in other situations menacing these rights. This attitude of the Church contributed tremendously to the growth of its social authority, even among persons holding themselves aloof from religion.

The joyful evening of 16 October 1978 when a Pole sat down on Peter's Throne became a holiday of the entire nation, and this joy was expressed not only by the countless masses of Catholics but also by the state authorities in their official comments. The subsequent few months became a kind of "Great Advent," with the entire Poland awaiting the visit of its compatriot the pontiff. That was a kind of "Pax Dei": despite the by then urgent domestic conflicts, the period of the pilgrimage of John Paul II to the Fatherland became one of a complete national reconciliation.

That pilgrimage and the subsequent 6 years already represent modern times, practically speaking. It has been broadly commented upon in our press, and its description would greatly exceed the scope of the present historical sketch. Therefore, we shall pay attention to only the principal elements of these difficult years.

/In the course of the August 1980 events the Church acted as the guardian of the social ethic/ [emphasized], refraining from involvement in political conflicts and appealing for reason and national reconciliation. The Jasna Gora Sermon delivered by the Primate Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński on 26 August 1980 and spelling out this orientation provided a signpost to the believers as well as a unique moral testament of the Primate of the Millennium. The Church joyously welcomed the renewal of sociopolitical life, but it resolutely rejected force, lawlessness and irresponsible actions, regardless of which side they originated from. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the dialogue between the church and state authorities had never ceased, not even in the dramatic days immediately following the imposition of martial law. The fact that the second pilgrimage of John Paul II to the Fatherland in 1983, on the 600th anniversary of the Lady of Jasna Gora, became possible, as well as the course of the related festivities, provided evident proof of the fruitfulness of this dialogue.

The past 40 years have demonstrated that the mission of the Catholic Church can indeed be carried out in any sociopolitical system of society, and that the socialist system is no exception here. During that period there was no shortage of difficult issues and sometimes painful decisions, with new developments sometimes suffering great birth pangs, but such is the law

governing any period of great historical changes. Church-state dialogue has not always been an idyll, but it cannot be denied that, mathematically considered, its line of evolution has been clearly upward. It may thus be possible to infer the conclusion that considerations of the good of the common Fatherland make it possible to find a common plane for discussion by all Poles, even those whose views are diametrically opposite. By contrast, any fanaticism, blind passion and onesided view of the reality are very bad advisers and should in no way be given an admission ticket to the next 40 years!

1386

CSO: 2600/313

LOOKING FOR WAYS TO COMBAT 'SOCIAL PATHOLOGY'

PM110911 Wroclaw GAZETA ROBOTNICZA in Polish 22 Nov 84 p 3

[Interview with Prof Zygmunt Beczkiewicz, director of the Institute of Social and Political Sciences of the Internal Affairs Ministry's Academy of Internal Affairs, by Hanna Swieszczakowska; date, place not given]

[Text] [Swieszczakowska] Why are we continuously battling against pathological phenomena that, after all, ought to be alien to the socialist system?

[Beczkiewicz] The sources of these dangers lie both in our human consciousness and in the imperfection of the institutions and the legal safeguards which are supposed to uphold the socialist principles.

Society adopts socialist standards piecemeal, as it were: people consider that the system should in the first place render services for the benefit of the individual; and it is only with reluctance that they accept the individual's duty to render services for the benefit of the community. This attitude was demonstrated in Solidarity's leftist course of making demands for reduced working hours, increased wages, and an extended network of social welfare benefits, without proposing any concrete conditions for meeting those demands.

The inconsistency between public and private lifestyles is evident at first glance. Outwardly we press for egalitarian standards, while for the purpose of our home life we copy middle-class; bourgeois models: We want at all costs to attain material standards higher than those enjoyed by others around us. In consequence, despite the fact that the differences between people's official incomes are not all that great, the disparities between their lifestyles are vast. They cannot all be explained away by saying that some people are good managers and others are squanderers. Those material disparities are also created by people's additional sources of income. These are made possible thanks to the existence of the economic underground, although supplementary profits are not necessarily associated with bypassing the law. The rationing system solutions forced upon us by the crisis are, for example, a necessary evil. They reduce the motivation for earning higher wages, since securing a ration allocation becomes more important than earning more money. Besides, every article obtained in the rationing system, or otherwise secured at the expense of a great deal of trouble; contains a concealed bonus, that

is, the difference between its official and black market price. Here is a breeding-ground for new social tensions.

This kind of negative phenomenon is not going to be prevented by the provisions of the legislation if the social and economic conditions that generate them are not changed first.

[Swieszczakowska] But it would be going a bit too far to say that social conditions are the primary cause of every pathological phenomenon.

[Beczkiwicz] The latter can just as easily arise from people's personal and family circumstances as from the general social situation. They can be caused by the actions of an individual or else, independently of the individual's volition, by the management and administration system, or by some other external conditions. Our economic crisis, for example, was to some extent caused by wrong decisions and incorrect methods of running the state, and also to some extent by the fact that the wealthy West wanted, under the guise of a credit policy, to shift some of the consequences of their own crisis onto Poland's shoulders.

As regards cases of so-called individual pathological behavior, however--that is, alcoholism, parasitism, drug addiction, and prostitution--I am against forced attempts to find their causes in social conditions. For example, I do not find it credible when addicts claim that they take drugs because they are afraid of nuclear war, or because they can see no purpose in life. Individual pathological behavior has its sources both in cultural patterns and in the given individual's psychological vulnerability. In highly developed countries it is not nowadays associated with sociopolitical systems, nor even with material circumstances. Poverty long ago ceased to give occasion to alcoholism or prostitution. It is more likely to be itself the result of addiction. A common feature of these "ways of coping with life" is the desire to solve one's current problems at the expense of one's future existence. The losses, however, prove sooner or later to be incomparably higher than the gains.

[Swieszczakowska] Such an assessment of the causes of pathological phenomena must be accompanied by various concepts for their prevention. In the event of economic mismanagement the most effective course will be to overcome the crisis. And how can other social dangers be averted?

[Beczkiwicz] I believe that in the first place it is necessary to restore society's respect for work. Individuals suffering from pathological disorders begin by refusing to work--and work, after all, is what made us human. Therefore giving up work is bound to result in what I would call "dehumanization." That is why it is necessary for people to be brought up for work and through work starting from childhood. That is, they should be taught to be resourceful while complying with the rules of society, to overcome adversity by fighting it successfully instead of denying its existence, and, finally, to live with others as a collective. This last point is especially important, since people who abandon their jobs often do it because they are incapable of relating to others.

In the second place, it is vitally necessary that we alter our interpretation of the principles of democracy. When defining our freedoms we must also delineate their limits. Rights should be related to duties. Here also is a message for our social and juridical sciences, which do not emphasize that interrelation in sufficient measure.

Prevention of pathological phenomena is thus connected with restructuring people's consciousness. But those environments in which the danger is the greatest are also the most difficult to reach. People who live on the margins of society do not, on the whole, read books or papers: They exist in a sub-culture that they themselves have created and which, in turn, creates for them a false consciousness. That is why attempts at restoring social norms and standards must combine activity aimed at affecting the whole pathogenic environment with the isolation from that environment of those individuals who offer some hope.

[Swieszczakowska] But even in the so-called healthy part of society we note a loosening of moral standards, tolerance of law-breakers, and a fairly widespread admiration for those who have more possessions rather than for those who work honestly and well....

[Becziewicz] That is why it is so important to create new, socialist standards of human coexistence and, as regards life under the economic reform, to highlight also its moral and not only its economic side. In an egalitarianist society the material motivation loses its driving force. That is why economic incentives must be combined with ethical ones.

As regards restoring ethical standards to their proper place, I see here a task for the party and for social and vocational organizations embracing people who belong to the same profession. These should, within the framework of their statutory powers, apply definitive and effective organizational sanctions in the cases of people found guilty of transgressing against moral principles and professional ethics.

But, of course, these duties devolving on our political and social organizations do not diminish our own moral responsibility for molding ourselves and others. I believe that we should write and speak about this more, and more openly, than we have been doing so far.

CSO: 2600/315

BEDNARSKI REPORTS TO SOCIAL SCIENCE SESSION

AU131449 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 10 Dec 84 p 2

[Report by Central Committee Secretary Henryk Bednarski to the 8 December Warsaw Session of the All-Poland party conference on social sciences: "The Role of Social Sciences in the Construction of Socialism and Fostering Social Awareness"]

[Excerpts] An acute political struggle and a struggle between opposing methodological orientations is going on in the sphere of the social sciences and humanities.

Organized centers of opposition, which continue to combat Marxism in a planned way, exist in some universities and research units, and engage in questioning the scientific nature of Marxism through attempting to eliminate Marxist researchers and lecturers. The self-governing powers of the scientific communities continue to be exploited for political struggles, fanning oppositional moods, and introducing anarchy into academic life.

What is the source of the theoretical and ideological disorientation and weakness of many social science communities in Poland? There are many sources of this, and one of them, which has been a distinctive feature for almost the entire period of people's rule, is the fact that it has been impossible to eliminate the views and attitudes formed in another epoch of history from the awareness of large sections of the intelligentsia concerned with humanities. This is the source of this intelligentsia's vacillations and inability to understand the idea of socialism. This is why it is prone to examine the social and political problems of socialism from the traditional bourgeois viewpoint. We have also often been accompanied by "casual fellow travelers"--the people who, while identifying themselves with socialism, have benefitted by merely paying lip service to it. Their devotion has been half-hearted and temporary only.

The influence of bourgeois ideology and revisionism has struck deep roots in some social science centers, in which people continue to pay homage to what could be termed as "worldwide academic coexistence" and to ignore the class nature of the social sciences. In the past few years these trends and the practical activities connected with them have become a driving force of the right-wing political opposition in many academic centers. This has been responsible for the ideological disorientation of sections of our society, especially of young people.

Our opening to the world and the contacts of our academic communities with Western science, which are certainly necessary, have been used by the hostile political centers as pretexts for penetrating the Polish Scientific centers. This is why an artificial scientific authority has been created for the people holding anticommunist views. The imperialist centers continue to grant scholarships to the persons who are ready to take over the Western theories and methods of research and to introduce them into our universities and institutions. Today we also know what errors the state scientific policy has committed in this regard.

Another reason for the weakness of our social sciences has been the wrong concept in line with which all practice has to be based on theoretical ideas. The result has been that theory has always been pleaded for the validity of political and economic practices. This attitude has helped curb and even eliminate criticism and has hindered and distorted the scientific analysis of reality and the articulation of the interests and aspirations of the diverse groups of society. In addition, it weakened one's ability to predict the development of social processes.

All this has helped to reduce the importance of Marxism-Leninism, to diminish its impact on social practice, to intensify the lack of opposition against anti-Marxist doctrines, to boost the eclecticism of many theoretical concepts, and to spread disbelief in the valid and creative nature of Marxism-Leninism--disbelief hidden behind verbalism.

The efforts to undermine the links between theory and practice were above all a result of the attempts--especially in the seventies--to depart in political practice from the ideological and methodological principles of Marxism-Leninism and, consequently, from the scientifically determined principles of socialist construction, which were being eliminated by the technocratic-bureaucratic interpretation of the phenomena of political, social and economic life. At the same time, the proclaimed thesis that the moral-political unity of the people had already been achieved, instead of being aimed at, discouraged efforts to analyze various contradictions and conflicts and to interpret them from the class viewpoint.

Creatively inspiring practical efforts is the mission of the social sciences. This means that it is their duty to honestly analyze social reality.

The methodological principle of the Marxist-Leninist social sciences is expressed by the dialectical connection between affirmation and criticism. A breakdown in this connection always produces bad results, which are likewise produced by a rigid way of propagating Marxism in dissociation from reality and in the absence of confrontation with the views that oppose Marxism.

The intensifying streams alien to the spirit of Marxism have been a serious danger to Marxist-Leninist ideology. The phenomena of right-wing opportunism in the form of ideological capitulation to a massive attack against the party's programmatic principles and policy and the phenomena of uncritical identification with every current of social awareness, on which the activities of the opponents of socialism had exerted an ever increasing influence in the pre-December period, continued to increase space.

At the same time, conservative attitudes acquiring the form of primitive dogmatism within some circles continued to assert themselves. These circles regarded every compromise as fatal to socialism in Poland indulged in revolutionary phrases instead of going for an honest analysis of social reality. The advocates of such an attitude often claimed that only command methods should be used in solving social contradictions and conflicts.

Revisionist and opportunist as well as dogmatist and sectarian trends have always asserted themselves with greater or lesser force in the area of Marxist ideology. In practice they were and are an expression of a defensive attitude vis-a-vis the concepts that are hostile to socialism and an expression of the loss of confidence in the ideological values of Marxism-Leninism. Difficulties and failures help accelerate this loss. Those who profess Marxism-Leninism should offer resolute opposition to attempts to revise the basic principles of scientific socialism and to the doctrinarism in the shape of the cramped adherence to the theses that have failed to pass the test of life. The struggle against antisocialist forces and against our own errors is the present and future task of the social sciences.

The discoveries of the social sciences and their extensive popularization are an important factor in developing social awareness. Side by side with the practical achievements of socialism and the personal and collective experience of people connected with these achievements, those discoveries constitute the main factor in developing the awareness of individuals and communities.

As is obvious from our philosophy, we are realists. We know that typical pluralism continues to hold sway in some of our universities and institutes. It is impossible for us to come to terms with this pluralism and to recognize it as a permanent phenomenon because this would result in weakening the position of Marxism-Leninism and in all the associated negative consequences. However, we do not aspire to a monopoly. What we aspire to is a meritorious domination of our view of the world and our philosophical, ideological, and methodological principles. We are ready to cooperate with representatives of non-Marxist lines of thought who have at heart the interests of socialist Poland. We will be tolerant, patient, and tactful in trying to convince undecided or disoriented people who are loyal to the socialist state, who are inclined to assume constructive socialist attitudes, and who make valuable contributions to the development of the social sciences.

In his speech at the 13th Central Committee plenum, First Secretary Wojciech Jaruzelski stressed: "Socialist construction calls for intellectual efforts to get to know social reality and to work out the rational ways of changing it. This is a great task for the social sciences, nay, this is the combat task posed by the party for its theoretical base."

The specific tasks posed by this demand for greater efforts in researching the key issues of our times include:

--Analyses of the course and form of the basic worldwide class conflict in our times between the Proletariat and the bourgeoisie and between socialism and capitalism, and analyses of our country's place and role in this conflict;

--Research into the changes in production relations and the class structure in Poland;

--Evaluation of economic, social, political and cultural factors that accelerate or retard the further socialist development of Polish society and the associated domestic and external determining conditions;

--The study of the mechanisms by which the socialist political system functions and of the means with which it can be strengthened and improved;

--The study of the factors that help foster social awareness, especially the awareness of the young generation.

Our policy is to offer a hand to all scientists who, while preserving their own views on individual issues, recognize the overriding values and interests of their socialist fatherland and are ready to participate in the life of society and to promote economic, scientific, and cultural development as well as national agreement and social consolidation. We pose no additional political conditions whatever on them. The only condition we pose is respect for the socialist road to development, for our constitutional order, and for the Polish *raison d'etat*.

The road to agreement and cooperation is closed only to the irreconcilable adversaries of socialism. We are ready to engage in a dialogue with all the other people--with the doubting, skeptical, mistrustful and prejudiced. We are not afraid of criticism leveled by scientists who are able competently to point to the errors or irregularities in our policy, to courageously search for new solutions, and to serve our people and [words indistinct] for research, and loyalty toward the state expressed through a responsible approach to their duties as teachers and educators.

What is especially important for our party is cooperation with representatives of the forces rallied in the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth [PRON]--with members and sympathizers of the allied parties, the progressive Catholic and Christian streams, and with nonparty scientists with a progressive and prosocialist orientation. This cooperation should amount to joint concern for observing the methodological rules and ethical rigors of scientific processes, for the quality of education and upbringing, and for common efforts to oppose the trends that are hostile, openly antisocialist and anti-Soviet, and thus antinational. There is room for various viewpoints that can enrich the processes of science in the joint research into the conditions of social and national progress and into the ways and conditions of developing and strengthening the socialist state. The dialogue between the Marxists and non-Marxists is a fact in the social sciences. While diverse methodological and theoretical orientations do exist, this dialogue is able to develop and improve in such areas as the agreement about the humanist and patriotic functions of the social sciences, about the professional ethics of scientists, and about the criteria of their civic responsibilities.

The policy of the outstretched hand, agreement, and cooperation with representatives of the construction non-Marxist orientations does not at all mean that,

as a Marxist party, we could accept the principle of "peaceful coexistence" among various ideologies, world outlooks, and methodologies in the social sciences and that we could renounce the duty of propagating a scientific and proletarian world outlook among all our people. We cannot accept the attitude of eclecticism or supposed ideological universalism in the same way as we cannot accept ideological indifference or relativism.

There is no doubt that we have suffered losses in the scientific potential connected with our party. This always takes place at momentous turning points.

The numerical data of our party show that we are still a considerable political and scientific force. Every fifth psychologist, every fourth philologist, and every third sociologist, historian and educationist is a party member. Every second lawyer and philosopher and almost all political experts are party members.

This means that party members are not a small group. However, what is important is for this group to be united and more consolidated in influencing the entire community of social sciences and in tackling important research subjects. The efforts that have already been made in this regard by the party teams of scientists in the Central Committee Department of Science and Education will continue. These teams have completed the stage of internal organization and have evaluated the situation in the individual areas of the social sciences. The time has now come to launch an offensive in order to integrate the entire Marxist community.

As for social science committees in universities and enterprises, they should regard themselves directly responsible for research and instruction and should account for this to party echelons at higher levels.

In proportion to their influence and authority, university committees should see that university authorities bestow the necessary status on the social sciences and humanities in their respective curricula. No one can replace university committees in programming and coordinating the cooperation between social scientists and other lecturers in the ideological-political process of students' civic upbringing.

Party members are a minority in many academic communities, research teams, and bodies such as the senate, faculty councils, scientific boards, and so on.

The party members who are in charge of scientific, educational, propaganda and publishing institutions bear special responsibility. Their attitudes determine to a great extent whether materials in conflict with the ideals of socialism and a scientific world outlook are prevented from being circulated and whether equivocal or ideologically hostile ideas are not included in programs and publications.

Even party member and every state employee who through his job is able to influence the lines and results of scientific policy must be politically responsible for his work and must be aware of the need to cooperate with party organizations and to reckon with their views.

Every party member and every state employee who through his job is able to influence the lines and results of scientific policy must be politically responsible for his work and must be aware of the need to cooperate with party organizations and to reckon with their views.

I have discussed difficult and at times painful problems in my report. On behalf of the party I have addressed to you many questions that should be addressed at a working session. Knowing personally many comrades present in this hall, I am sure that the discussion will add acute and complicated issues to the present list of issues. I am convinced that this will help our session to produce a rich yield of important ideas, proposals and solutions and will exert a [word indistinct] the position of Marxism-Leninism in the social sciences, on our country's sociopolitical and economic practice, and on further progress of socialist renewal.

CSO: 2600/338

HISTORY OF SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT REPORTED

Warsaw RZECZYWISTOSC in Polish No 46, 11 Nov 84 p 12

/Article by Wladyslaw Goralski: "Poland and the National Liberation Movements (1945-1984)"/

/Text/ Poland's attitude toward national liberation movements and its support for them have elicited different and sometimes fairly contradictory opinions in certain periods. At times, especially in recent years, one could hear opinions that our support and assistance for these movements, as well as for newly-liberated states, exceeded our capabilities and contributed to an intensification of the difficulties in our country. A closer analysis of the facts, however, does not confirm such views.

Questions are also raised frequently about whether our activity and support in this area are sufficient. The answers to this can obviously be different, depending on the criteria adopted. If one takes the needs of these movements as the point of departure, then one can always demonstrate that an increase in assistance to them would be useful, although one should recall that outside support, even if very valuable in their struggle, is always an element that only supplements their own efforts. On the other hand, if one views this problem from the point of view of the activities undertaken by other socialist countries, then Poland has not been in first place, or in last place either, in this regard.

What is essential, however, is not so much the activity itself and the extent of support and assistance as its content and the correctness of the decisions made. In this regard the basic course and the directions of activity can be assessed positively, although certain slips have probably also occurred along this path. On the other hand, the fact that the issue of the national liberation movements has been kept alive in Poland throughout the entire postwar period, including recent years as well, deserves consideration.

Weighing our 40 years, we can note with satisfaction that in the historical process of decolonization, which embraced hundreds of millions of people, our country, bearing in mind its own experiences, sided with the oppressed peoples, giving proof of its attachment to the freedom and independence of peoples.

In this context, meanwhile, one should note that the governments of the leading Western states, which have their mouths full of lofty slogans on the subject of the freedom and sovereignty of peoples, usurping for themselves the right to instruct others, are in practice acting against decolonization. Directly or indirectly, they work to halt or at least delay this process, often using brutal forces for this purpose, as for example in Vietnam, Malaya, Algeria, and Chad. This confirms once more the old truth: the real attitude of people or states is shown not by beautiful words but by practical activity.

The liquidation of the colonial system, and in the wake of this the weakening of the imperialist forces, suit the vital interests of the Polish people, and serve the cause of the security of our country and peace in the world. Poland's support for the national liberation movements, which is an expression of solidarity with oppressed peoples, has also served to create favorable conditions for the future development of relations with the postcolonial states. The importance of this question is demonstrated by the fact that during the last 40 years over 100 new states have appeared in extensive regions of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Oceania, and changed the political map of the world.

In spite of many weaknesses and a great deal of differentiation, these states play a fundamental and growing role in certain areas of international relations. At least in view of the large number of them, their position has corresponding influence on the adoption of many decisions in the forums of the UN and other international organizations. And although--as we know--the significance of such decisions is in practice relative, they remain a factor that creates a corresponding atmosphere in international relations. Furthermore, on the territory of these countries there are rich reserves of many valuable mineral and agricultural raw materials, which no modern state can do without. These countries have a monopoly or occupy a dominant position in the production of certain raw materials, such as natural rubber, tin, and other nonferrous metals.

As decolonization proceeded, Poland established relations with a majority of the newly-liberated countries. Presently, of the 127 states with which we maintain diplomatic relations, about 90 are what are called--not too precisely--developing countries, or the Third World. One can add to this the fact that economic relations are maintained with a larger number of countries (for example, a fairly lively trade has been developed with Saudi Arabia, with which Poland does not have diplomatic relations). The extent of relations with individual states varies, depending on their position and our political and economic interests. At present Poland maintains more significant and active relations with about 30 developing countries--India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, and Syria in Asia; Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Nigeria in Africa; and Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico in Latin America.

In practice, with respect to this group of states, Poland has tried to combine general international interests with problems that directly or indirectly serve our country. In talks and all the contacts with partners from the Third World, the representatives of Poland have presented our position on the subject of the two German states, including our borders and problems affecting peace and security in Europe. They have tried to obtain understanding and support for our position on these issues. The efforts we have made have turned out to be

fruitful. This has been directly or indirectly reflected in many joint statements and communiques, as well as in statements by the leaders of our partner states, especially in Asia.

One should recall Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's support for our border on the Oder and the Neisse. In 1961, in the atmosphere of great tension over West Berlin and the entire German problem, J. Nehru took the floor in parliament twice on this issue, stating that "the existence of two German states is a fact," and that changing the border on the Oder and Neisse would lead to war. Prime Minister Nehru repeated his position in September 1961 at the first nonaligned summit conference in Belgrade, and also presented it in other later statements.

At that time Indonesia also took a similar position. A joint Polish-Indonesian communique in the fall of 1961 specifically included a statement that "the successful settlement of the German problem has to begin with recognition of the fact of the existence of two German states and their present borders, including the border on the Oder and the Neisse." Numerous Third World countries have also supported the Polish initiative for the establishment of a central nuclear-free zone in Europe (the Rapacki Plan).

In the course of time, some Arab countries also adopted definite positions with respect to European issues. Among others, attention should be given to the Iraqi statement in 1968 in a Polish-Iraqi communique, rejecting all claims or attempts to expand the Federal Republic of Germany, and confirming recognition of "the status quo in Europe, which constitutes the basis for its security and peace." The position of the countries cited was one of the elements that created a climate favorable to us in international forums. The attitude of some Third World countries, especially the Arab ones, which at the end of the 1960's recognized de jure the Democratic Republic of Germany, also had practical significance, since it weakened the Hallstein Doctrine and in combination with other factors promoted the recognition of the GDR in international forums.

Poland found a common language in relations with many developing countries with respect to the international problems of interest to us, such as peaceful coexistence, disarmament (especially banning the spread of nuclear weapons), the relaxation of tension in international relations, and working to eliminate barriers in world trade. In recent years, some of these countries individually, and sometimes collectively as well, have supported the efforts of Poland and the other socialist states aimed at building collective security in Europe. For example, Syrian President N. Attasi, during his visit to Warsaw toward the end of 1969, expressed among other things support for "all constructive steps aimed at ensuring peace and security, which are threatened by the actions of vengeful and imperialist circles." Also, the nonaligned movement, which with minor exceptions includes most of the countries of the Third World, acknowledged the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the declaration adopted in Helsinki, expressing its hope that it would lead to a slackening of tension in the world.

Poland's relations with the countries of the Third World have focused and still focus on economic issues. These have also frequently paved the way for diplomatic

and political relations. Treaties on commercial trade have been concluded with most of them, and with many of them we have also concluded treaties on economic and scientific-technical cooperation, and more detailed agreements dealing with communications and transportation, among other things. The results of the efforts in this area have varied, but in general one can state that they have not fully corresponded to expectations and needs, and possibly to capabilities as well.

The most measurable criterion in this area, trade turnover, grew together with the development of Polish foreign trade as a whole, but its share in total exports and imports was below 10 percent, exceeding this level only in the last 3 years. The dynamics of trade with the developing countries and its place in total turnover are shown in the table presented below.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Exports</u>		<u>Imports</u>	
	millions of foreign exchange zlotys	share in exports	millions of foreign exchange zlotys	share in imports
1950	86	3.4	85	3.2
1981	5168	14.5	3180	7.9
1982	--	13.8	--	5.8
1983	--	12.8	--	7.1

The reasons for the fairly low share of these countries in foreign trade with Poland are different, and often rather prosaic. They have often been the subject of critical analyses by specialists, statements by responsible economic and political figures, and also resolutions by party and state echelons, and as in the past, without concrete results. It was precisely the difficulties of gaining a profit in the highly-developed capitalist countries in the years 1981-1983 that led to larger amounts of goods being shifted to the markets of the developing countries. The share of these countries in the foreign trade of the other socialist states varies considerably.

The value of trading partners, however, lies not only in the amount of turnover, but also in the structure of the goods, the conditions, and stability. In this regard it is possible to point out that the developing countries are partners of interest to Poland. We export considerable quantities of machinery and equipment there, in addition to finished industrial facilities. This is also a market that provides profit for scientific-technical thought and employment for highly-qualified specialists. We import from these countries raw materials and agricultural products, but not just these, since there has been considerable technical progress in some Third World countries. In commodity trade with this area we are obtaining a favorable balance of trade, which is not that easy at all--as we know--particularly in recent years.

Let us also call attention to a fact of great political significance. Most of the Third World countries approached the events in Poland at the beginning of the present decade with understanding, considering them our own internal affair. They disassociated themselves from the American policy of sanctions against Poland, and maintained normal commercial and other relations with us. The expressions of this included, among other things, ministerial, parliamentary, and other visits, which constituted a fundamental factor in counteracting the

attempts to impose isolation on us. During a discussion in the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva in March 1983, in which the NATO countries attempted to indict Poland, most of the developing countries adopted moderate positions. Among the 17 states that supported the decision to postpone a discussion of the situation in Poland, there were 10 developing countries, including India, Jordan, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Libya, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Syria, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. Among the 14 countries that supported the position of the NATO states, there were only 4 Third World states (Argentina, the Philippines, Togo, and Uruguay); 10 countries in this group abstained from voting, which was also beneficial at that time from the point of view of Poland's interests.

As Minister Stefan Olszowski stressed before the Sejm Commission on Foreign Affairs in July 1983, our friendly relations and cooperative with the developing countries have stood the test of time. "During the difficult period of the massive attack against Poland that was undertaken by world imperialism, our Third World partners did not disappoint us." The foundations also exist for further successful development of our relations with this group of countries.

9909

CSO: 2600/285

COMMANDER DISCUSSES AIR FORCE HISTORY, OWN CAREER

History, Mission

Warsaw SKRZYDLATA POLSKA in Polish No 34, 19 Aug 84 pp 2,3

[Interview with Major General Tytus Krawczyc, Air Force Commander, by Jerzy R. Konieczny; date and place not specified]

[Text] Air Force Commander Major General Tytus Krawczyc began service in the Air Force in 1948. After undergoing glider training in the Service to Poland Universal Organization in June and July at Lisie Katy, on 9 October 1948 he entered the Air Force Officer's School in Deblin. During the second year of instruction (the course lasted 3 years), because of his excellent progress in his studies the school headquarters decided to employ him in the position of instructor, advancing his promotion 1 year. On 1 September 1950 he was promoted to the rank of pilot warrant officer, after which for nearly 19 years he served at the Air Force Officer School, and then at the Higher Air Force Officer School, as an instructor. In 1960, at his own request, he began study at the General Staff Academy of the Polish Army. He completed his studies at the Academy in 1964, and then returned to the school in Deblin. In 1968 he was transferred to combat units, being commander of the Krakow 2nd Fighter Regiment, among other units. From 1973 to 1975 he studied at the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the USSR. He served in the Sejm [Parliament] of the Polish People's Republic for the 1972-1976 term. After completing his studies he held responsible positions in the Air Force, among them Deputy Commander of the Air Force. In May 1983 he was appointed to the position of Air Force Commander. He currently flies a MiG-17 aircraft. He has logged 4000 hours of flight, half of them in jet aircraft.

[Question] General, we are visiting you here in Poznan on the eve of Polish Air Force Day, which has a special meaning this year, coinciding as it does with the 40th anniversary of the Polish Air Force. This is an occasion for reflection, but not exclusively on past history. The Polish Air Force has been in existence for 66 years; is this 40-year period of development of a people's air force a special development in our history?

[Answer] It is proper to begin our discussion with the event represented by the 40th anniversary of our Air Force, but it should be pointed out

that in reality organization of the Air Force began in 1943, parallel to creation of the 1st Division, the Tadeusz Kosciuszko, in the USSR. The first squadron of this division came into being in Grigor'yevskoye in July 1943, and in August of the same year the first fighter aviation regiment, in October named the Warszawa, was established. In August 1944, the first air force units were transferred to bases on Polish soil. At that time we had a composite air division, the 1st air regiment, the Warszawa, the 2nd night bomber regiment, the Krakow, and the 3rd ground attack regiment. On 23 August 1944 they left Zadybie Stare to engage the National Socialist Luftwaffe, supporting the combat operations of units of the people's Polish Army at the Warecko-Magnuszewski bridgehead. This was our "Lenino in the air" 40 years ago at Warka. I do not think it necessary to expatiate further on this topic for readers of SKRZYDLATA POLSKA.

[Question] True, since we are printing a series of articles on this subject in connection with the 40th anniversary, written by the noted historian Colonel Zygmunt Bulzacki. We have published much on this subject in past years as well.

[Answer] There is one thing I would like to stress, however, obviously without taking anything away from the other Polish airmen fighting the enemy heroically on other fronts in the Second World War, namely, that it was precisely the Polish airmen of the people's air force trained in the East, in the USSR, who had the shortest distance to travel to Poland and so took part immediately in the struggle for liberation of their country, up to the assault on Berlin. It must also be remembered that the 1943 to 1945 period was one of intensive development of the Polish Air Force under difficult conditions. As is known, under an agreement between the Soviet government and the Polish government of General Wladyslaw Sikorski, the majority of Polish airmen were evacuated from the USSR. Thus, when training of the people's Polish Air Force began, it was necessary to start virtually from scratch. We were given intensive assistance by our friend and partner, the USSR, which made both manpower and airplanes available to us. This permitted formation of new combat units and the farsighted training of more than 600 young Poles in Soviet air force schools, persons who had had no aviation training. All this was done with a thought for the future of Poland, and in turn permitted the development of aviation after the war and replacement of Soviet specialists with Polish ones.

[Question] We still have few published accounts and reminiscences of the beginning of training of the people's air force.

[Answer] I agree, since we did not have such prominent writers in the ranks of our airmen as in the West. But I do think that the situation has improved in this respect in recent years. Several veterans have taken up their pens and have written or are writing all their reminiscences. What we need most are integrated historical surveys.

[Question] We hope that, with the assistance of Air Force Headquarters, SKRZYDLATA POLSKA will also be able to add more than one title on this subject to its library. There is a lack of contemporary as well as historical

studies, since the last 40 years are the equivalent of an entire epoch in aviation.

[Answer] That is true. We have undergone enormous changes over this period, both in personnel training and in technical development. It is true that military historians are not always in agreement when it comes to distinguishing the individual periods of air force history. However, without going into details, we can distinguish the following: the first period, that of formation and combat (July of 1943 to May of 1945), in which all military combat activities took place. The next period, following transition to peacetime structures, was one of personnel training. It may be divided into several component periods, the first being one of reduction in the size of the Air Force. Next came the time of the Korean War and the cold war and its development because of the war, among other factors. We had our own industry which began production of jet planes under Soviet license. By the end of this component period our Air Force had switched from piston-engine to jet aircraft. The second stage began at the end of 1949 and beginning of 1950, although historians have not yet pinpointed the time when the first group of pilots began training with jet aircraft. The first public flight in a Yak-17 jet airplane took place above Warsaw on 22 July 1950; we may assume that at that time our Air Force entered the jet age, which is still in progress and in which two component periods are to be distinguished, that of flight in subsonic aircraft and later in supersonic airplanes, first in fighter planes and then in fighter bombers. At the beginning of the 1970's we entered the third stage, making the transition to the next generation of aircraft with variable wing geometry and more extensive electronic equipment. We are currently in the fourth stage in succession, that of transition to new aircraft characterized by even better aerodynamic properties, more extensive electronic equipment, and by greater firepower and new means of destruction.

[Question] This division into stages from the technical viewpoint is closely linked to the training of highly skilled flight personnel, in which, as we know, a prominent part is played by our leading school, the Jan Krasicki Higher Air Force Officer's School in Deblin. We have it to thank, along with other specialist training centers, among which we should mention at least the schools in Zamoscie and Olesnica, for the personnel of our modern air force.

[Answer] The veterans have gone or are going into well-deserved retirement, and today we have a new, second generation of Polish airmen, trained entirely in people's Poland; I am one of that generation. There are entirely new personnel now in all important positions both in the Air Force and the air forces of the Home Defense Force, the Naval Air Forces, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. We are the generation which was trained both by the 600 specialists who underwent training in the USSR in wartime and to some extent by the specialists who stayed there after the war and underwent training because of the shortage of personnel. They were the pioneers of our Air Force and are an integral part of our history.

[Question] General, let us return to the matter of personnel training. What I am referring to are the aviation lyceums, which to my knowledge are unknown in other countries, with the possible exception of Yugoslavia.

[Answer] The method of recruiting for the Air Force through the lyceums has proved to be the right one for us. It must be remembered that pilot training costs are constantly rising, and so the candidates we have for the Air Force must be ones who have been well tested and identify themselves with aviation from early youth. Modern military airplanes are becoming more and more complicated, and in the course of 4 years of instruction the aviation lyceums permit specific selection under the guidance of experienced Air Force pilots. We introduce into the training process subjects which a candidate would normally study in an aviation school. Among other things, the lyceum students learn the principles of aerodynamics, the structure of aircraft instruments, and other technical aviation subjects. The 4 years of study enable the young person to determine definitively whether he has a true liking for aviation or whether his interest is only ephemeral. If he wants to enter the Deblin school after he completes the lyceum, this means that he feels a permanent affinity for aviation. In the lyceum the student receives practical as well as theoretical training, since in the air club he performs parachute jumps and flies on gliders, and during the last year also flies airplanes, within the framework of pre-military air training. He is thus a full-fledged candidate for becoming an Air Force pilot. In addition to these lyceums, at Deblin and Zielona Gora, opportunities are provided for young people from small localities which have no air clubs in the vicinity.

[Question] In connection with the air clubs I recall that, as in earlier years, in 1983 the Ministry of National Defense assumed superintendence of the Air Club of the PRL [Polish People's Republic] in connection with the new duties of Air Force Headquarters relating to direct supervision of the association.

[Answer] The duties aren't new, since we have always cooperated with the Air Club of the PRL. The Air Force has again assumed sponsorship of the Air Club of the PRL primarily in order to assist the association in performing its statutory functions and to aid in the training of a sufficient number of pilots for both civil and military aviation. We are working diligently to help the Air Club of the PRL in all the sectors of its activity. By using the so-called penetrating power of the military, we want to secure an increase in the volume of equipment for the Air Club so that it can return to larger scale and broader glider training. We are aiding among other things in bringing about increase in the production of glider launching winches, which had been neglected in previous years, so that pilot training will be less costly. New and cheaper types of gliders are also under study. I personally am interested in these matters, and I hope that our joint personnel and financial efforts will result in making the youth recruitment base broad enough so that we can safely take the most competent people for professional aviation, without forgetting that the Air Club of the PRL must also promote aviation as recreation. We are very interested in having a broad recruitment base.

[Question] It follows that this time the aviation industry is seeing to production of new and modern equipment for recreational aviation, so that our pilots will not have to start out in contests and championship events with foreign or borrowed gliders and airplanes.

[Answer] And I believe that our aviation industry in particular is in general progressing well, aside from severe personnel shortages. It may be said that it is on the threshold of a new era of prosperity. I am happy to be able to command the Air Force in an era in which industry is giving us something new. Industry currently is building 3 types of gliders, which are inexpensive ones intended for mass training, and two prototypes of piston-engine airplanes which will enable the Air Club of the PRL to acquire equipment of higher quality and to undertake complete pilotage training. It must also be remembered that our industry produces the TS-11 Iskra combat training jet aircraft, although even here we have not yet said the last word. Also under development is the production of aircraft engines, the assortment of which is continually being broadened in the piston-engine and jet engine categories. I want to stress that there are many aviation enthusiasts working in our industry, admirable persons constituting one of our natural resources, as are the personnel of the Air Club of the PRL, the LOT Polish Air Lines, and medical and industrial aviation.

[Question] General, what definition would you give today of the Air Force and the Home Air Defense Forces?

[Answer] The most concise definition I can give is the following: the Air Force is an air strike force designed to conduct independent combat operations and to support and shield ground forces on an internal front. It has units of fighter-bomber, fighter, and reconnaissance airplanes, tactical helicopters adapted for combat and landing forces, transport, communications, and medical aircraft, etc. On the other hand, the Home Air Defense Forces are adapted for shielding and defense of the country against attack from the air, particularly industrial and political administrative centers, communication centers, and other important areas and structures situated throughout the country. These forces include missile and antiaircraft artillery, radar, and fighter aircraft units equipped with modern interceptor aircraft.

[Question] It is often stressed that the modern military airplane is excessively mechanized, that a pilot cannot be an individualist in one, and that there is nothing of the past romantic aura about it, and so young people are not attracted to the profession of pilot.

[Answer] I do not agree with that at all, at least in my case. For 36 years I have sat at the controls of an airplane with the same enthusiasm as ever. It is true that the pilot now carrying out his mission is at all times under constant radar control from the ground which assists him in his flight. The pilot works in an aerial environment not natural to man. But presence in the air enables a person to experience many esthetic emotions and impressions. While on the ground it is raining, the sky is covered with clouds, and lights must be lit in houses, for a number of seconds the pilot is flying above the clouds, seeing the blue of the sky, the sea of clouds seemingly made of cotton wool, and the brilliant sun. This is quite an experience. The more experienced the pilot is, the more time he can spend in admiration of the beauty. Only from the air can one see a rainbow as a circle; persons on earth see only a semicircle. This is one of the pilot's rewards. In addition, consider the speed factor itself: it is impressive

to be able to have breakfast in Warsaw, lunch in Moscow, and dinner in Kiev, and land in Poznan before dark. There is another important aspect. The profession of military pilot is one of the rare ones making it possible for a person to test himself every day. And practically every male seeks out opportunities for testing himself. Even today, in peacetime, the Air Force permits flights in defense of the air frontiers of Poland, since our pilots currently take off to intercept foreign aircraft which attempt to violate, or do violate, our territory.

[Question] Can women fly military jet aircraft?

[Answer] They can, and there have been instances of their doing so. But I must point out that the profession of pilot of a jet airplane, a combat aircraft, is a profession for men. What we anticipate is that women will enter the Air Force to perform other duties at air bases, and if the need arises, they will fly communications and transport aircraft and in recreational aviation.

[Question] General, our 40th anniversary is at the same time an occasion for emphasizing the continuity of the traditions of Polish aviation, now kept up by the Air Force of the PRL.

[Answer] We emphasize it constantly; not just in conjunction with anniversaries. We have a deep respect for all Polish airmen, those who were active during the 20 years between the wars and those who fought heroically on different fronts in the war. Without them and their accomplishments and enthusiasm in the service of the Polish Air Force, we would not have our 40th anniversary, even if because of their different views they did not serve in our ranks. We will strive to keep the memory of them alive and to honor them.

Taking advantage of the fact that our discussion will be printed in SKRZYDLATA POLSKA for Air Force Day, I want to offer heartfelt greetings to all elders and veterans of Polish aviation who have spent part of their lives in the Air Force. I wish them good health and all happiness in life. On the occasion of our Air Force holiday I also offer greetings to all flight personnel of recreational, communications, medical, and industrial aviation and personnel of the aviation industry. I extend greetings to the great number of Air Force social welfare activists.

I salute the personnel of the Air Force, the Home Air Defense Forces, the Navy Air Force, and the air forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

I offer especially warm greetings to young people in aviation who are now on vacation undergoing training at Air Force training camps and who in a year or two will enter the Air Force Higher Officer's School or will join the Air Club of the PRL. I send greetings to the great number of airplane model makers and to all of those young people who are sympathetic to aviation who intend to take part in aviation activities for any great length of time.

I also offer greetings and my best wishes to all readers of SKRZYDLATA POLSKA who are faithful aviation enthusiasts. To the editorial staff of

our aviation weekly I express the hope that they will continue with the same dedication as in the past to popularize aviation in society, winning over increasing numbers of young people to the cause of developing aviation in the PRL.

[Question] Thank you for your greetings and the interview.

Reminiscences, New Requirements

Warsaw GAZETA MOLODYCH in Polish 24-27 Aug 84 pp 1,6,7

[Interview with Major General Tytus Krawczyc, Air Force Commander, on the occasion of Air Force Day, by Janusz Uziemblo and Major Andrzej Gorczynski; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] It is now 40 years since the Air Force of people's Poland was established, and this is a good occasion for taking a thoughtful look back over the period.

[Answer] The decision to establish a squadron under the 1st Division, the Tadeusz Kosciuszko, was made in the League of Polish Patriots in 1943. At that time there were no Polish specialists in the USSR, since they had all left for England under the agreement signed with the Sikorski government.

We started everything from scratch, with an enormous amount of Soviet assistance. We would not have been able to begin operations at all without Soviet specialists and equipment. The Soviet commanders, instructors, and pilots imparted to us all their combat and organizational experience. This fraternal cooperation is still continuing. Only a few of the richest countries in the world can afford to produce the types of aircraft needed by modern air forces. We cannot afford to do this, and so we buy combat aircraft from the USSR.

The organization of the Air Force after the war, up to 1949, was adapted to the capabilities of a country in ruins. Of the 3 divisions (in a single combined-arms corps) which we had toward the end of the war, the Polish Air Force amounted to 7 regiments directly subordinate to Air Force Headquarters. There were 3 fighter regiments, 3 strike aircraft regiments, and 1 regiment of dive bombers.

In the 1950's we began to make the transition from piston engines to subsonic jet engines. The first demonstration flight with jet airplanes took place in July 1950. It was performed by a group of Polish pilots trained in the USSR. At the same time, Poland began its own production of the MiG-15 jet under Soviet license. These years were the period of the Korean War and the so-called cold war, and at the same time a time of intensive Air Force development extending to 1956.

MiG-19's began the era of Polish supersonic aviation at the end of 1959. After another 2 years we obtained the first MiG-21 planes. This marked the beginning of the period of consistent employment of supersonic aircraft.

The last 5 years were a period of transition to the next generation of jet and supersonic aircraft. As a result of the introduction of modern electronic equipment and improved structural and aerodynamic designs, this transition brought about a dramatic change in the combat and piloting capabilities of these airplanes.

[Question] And now would you tell us something about yourself?

[Answer] I have been in aviation since 1948. The successive stages of development of aviation that I referred to also affected my aviation career. As a result of the Korean War and the fact that I was not the worst of pilots, I became an instructor at a school using the UT-2 airplane. In a relatively short time I became a flight commander. Then I underwent training with the Po-2 plane, the popular Soviet "kukuruznik." Only in 1955 did I make the transition to the YAK-11 piston-engine fighter trainer. A year later I began training with the MiG-15, and so the jet age began for me.

After completing studies at the General Staff Academy, I went back to the school. In 1968 I was transferred to a combat unit. I had the honor of commanding the Krakow 2nd Fighter Regiment. Promotions then followed which after 36 years took me to the highest position in the Air Force, that of Air Force Commander. I still fly. I have logged about 4000 hours in the air.

[Question] Of course, you have your own reminiscences and impressions of the past.

[Answer] Yes, these 36 years have been a truly splendid period, a very romantic one filled with dramatic experiences, but also one demanding much hard work. They have also been years of bitter experiences as well as pleasant events. But they have been so splendid that, if I could begin everything all over again, starting in 1948, I would join the Air Force without hesitation and set to work. I believe that the Air Force is the place for real men, a full opportunity for releasing one's energies and experiencing esthetic romantic impressions, something which should be a source of fascination to young people. What is most important, a man can test himself every day and in every flight. Airplanes are no respecters of rank or position. They obey only persons who can control them.

[Question] But today there is a different way to enter the Air Force.

[Answer] During the German occupation we could only dream of wearing a Polish uniform. For this reason recruitment to the air force school was spontaneous during the first stage. In 1947 and 1948 candidates for the Air Force were selected by the youth organizations, the Union of Young Fighters and the Polish Youth Union. I was one of those recruited by the Polish Youth Union.

In later years, in connection with the necessity of mastering increasingly complicated aircraft, it was necessary to make changes in the recruitment system. At present there are basically 3 ways to enter the Air Force. The

first is directly from the higher aviation schools, the second through the air clubs, and the third is completion of one of the 2 aviation lyceums (in Zielona Gora or Deblin).

[Question] What qualities are required of a good airman?

[Answer] A person must assign himself tasks and then accomplish them and must strive to reach a goal. These qualities are needed both during examinations and when mastering the requirements of the officer cadet classes of the air force school, and then in mastering the individual piloting classes, from the third to the master class, or the title of Meritorious Air Force Pilot of the PRL. I advise those who want to fly to try it. The medical aviation examinations cost nothing, and it may turn out that a person is fit to fly.

[Question] But the Air Force is not made up of pilots alone. Pilot candidates who cannot pass the examinations can still serve in the Air Force.

[Answer] At one time 1 mechanic serviced 2 airplanes, and today 1 plane requires a great number of specialized engineers, technicians, and mechanics. This is a large group of technical personnel without whom an airplane cannot fly.

Another group is made up of communications and flight safety specialists. And there is a growing third group, that of navigators, who guide an airplane over its routes, determine its position in space, and track its flight. The majority of modern combat aircraft are single-seat airplanes. Hence one person must perform the duties of pilot, navigator, gunner, radio operator, and others. This explains why assistance from the ground is needed. And here there are openings for persons who cannot fly for reasons of health.

[Question] Most of our readers are in their teens or twenties, so they want to know about young people in aviation.

[Answer] The Air Force is made up mostly of young people. They do their duty extremely well, despite the fact that most often they work more than 8 hours a day, frequently under difficult conditions. Young people can be ambitious and energetic. Their attitudes are exemplified by the operations of the Youth Flight Safety Teams established on the initiative of ZSMP members in steel gray uniforms. Young Air Force members also maintain close contact with plants and factories, as you well know.

[Question] The Air Force is expensive, but it must be financially supported, since it is needed to defend our borders.

[Answer] Well, various kinds of books and films have created the impression that the American or West German soldier is one who represents no threat to us. But the truth is entirely different. We of the Air Force have occasion almost every day to see that our opponents are a menace to us. No month passes without some of our planes taking off exclusively to defend our frontiers against the air spies of NATO. No week goes by

without there being a reconnaissance ship of the Federal Republic of Germany or another NATO country standing immediately outside our territorial waters. And so we must have aircraft ready for action at all times. It is difficult to imagine modern military operations in which aircraft do not participate. They can carry out many important missions with the greatest speed in defense of our borders and our lives. Aircraft are obviously very costly, but just as obviously they are indispensable. We are very thrifty in our branch of service. A flight will be flown only when it yields a specific training or economic result.

[Question] What advice can you give to young people still undecided about their choice of a profession?

[Answer] Aviation is a difficult profession. This is a fact. But young people do often dream of taking up an occupation which will allow them to speed up the pace of life, a profession which will give them a taste of adventure. This can be done in a positive way of benefit to their country, in the air. There is another consideration. In aviation there are still many splendid elements that allow man to treat this profession as a ruling passion. And so I would recommend this profession to all young people who want to put themselves to the test, who want to have a full and rich life. And to end our discussion, I should like to offer my best wishes to all persons associated with the Air Force on the occasion of its 40th anniversary.

[Question] Thank you for the interview. On behalf of readers and the editorial staff, we should like to convey through you, General, our best wishes for Polish airmen and their families.

6115
CSO: 2600/253

MIG-23 PILOT DISCUSSES CAREER, DUTIES

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ POLSKI in Polish No 42, 14 Oct 84 pp 5, 10

[Interview with Lt Wladyslaw Begieda, Pilot of the Year, chief of OPK fighter group air gunnery, by Tadeusz Oziemkowski]

[Text] [Question] A moment ago you landed the Mig-23 you were flying, touching down lightly and easily, and then you taxied to your spot on the apron. Was it an easy flight? What number was it?

[Answer] Today, the fifth, but it would be hard to give the overall total, because I never kept track. One thing is certain: In the "23" I have already passed the 300-hour mark, but one flight is not like another.

[Question] What do you mean?

[Answer] During the initial period Mig-23 training took place under rather easy conditions. Take-off, a few turns over the airport, and landing. Later the degree of difficulty systematically increased. I flew in bad weather and at night, higher and higher, to the stratosphere, faster and faster.

[Question] You have already left the most difficult part of the training behind you?

[Answer] You could say that. The crowning point of my training was my being named pilot first class and being given instructor's privileges. Two of the five flights today I spent with junior officers.

[Question] Is the responsibility of training young pilots equivalent to taking great responsibility on yourself?

[Answer] I travelled a road somewhat different from the youngest in my group. I think it is easier for them, if only because they skipped a certain stage and right out of officer's school came to us, immediately starting training on the "23's".

[Question] Does this mean that they never flew the Mig-21?

[Answer] Exactly. And this is the unusual jump, the exceptional opportunity they have, right away to climb into a Mig-23 jet.

[Question] Is it good or bad to be making such a bold experiment?

[Answer] Good. The design and technical requirements of the MiG-21 force the military pilot to approach in the aircraft over the runway at a fairly high altitude and suddenly land after a great reduction in altitude. To transfer habits developed and fixed from the MiG-21 to the MiG-23 would create the danger of incalculable consequences on landing. The MiG-23 requires that the pilot ease up to the runway after a rather level flight. We should add that the whole complicated process of the approach and landing lasts barely a dozen and some seconds and occurs at tremendous speed...

[Question] To reduce the distance from the point the aircraft touches down on the runway to the point where the aircraft reaches taxi speed...

[Answer] ...the pilot uses parachute-braking.

[Question] Was the path you travelled from the flying club to today's flight more difficult?

[Answer] Let me cite a few facts. When I was 16 -- at the time I was in the second year of a general high school in Ornek -- a friend at school, Zdzislaw Zabiello, invited me for a "trip" (not far, 60 kilometers) to the flying club at Dajtki near Olsztyn. There, under the eye of the glider instructor, Mr Gokielewicz, I began my first flights on the Czapels, the Bocans, and the Muchs. After 45 hours of flight-time I mastered the fundamentals of flying, and along with my high school diploma I received a glider-pilot's license. Then Zdzislaw and I applied to the WSO for pilots, but things worked out differently for the two of us, because he went on to study as a civilian and is an engineer today, deputy head of the gmina in Milakow.

[Question] There was a great deal of competition to get into the Deblin flight officers school?

[Answer] The proverbial "ladder" began at what was then the Braniewo Powiat Army Staff Headquarters, where it was suggested to me that I might be more easily accepted into a tank unit, owing to my rather unimposing stature -- I am only 1.65 meters. In a friendly way they pointed out that the competition was not so great there. I told them that it was aviation or nothing, and I pulled out the glider-pilot's license I had already earned before. This helped.

[Question] Was it just as easy at Deblin?

[Answer] Upon my arrival I was justifiably uneasy, because 20 applicants showed up at the entrance exams for each candidate opening, but I passed the physical and the entrance exam and was accepted.

[Question] Your first flights?

[Answer] Back before beginning studies at the WOSL I started on the TS-8 Bies, piston-driven. I had barely 20 hours in the air. Then there was a

break of a year in flying. It was only during the second year of studies, after mastering the ground school, that I flew jets, the Lim-2 and Iskra combat-training jets.

[Question] Graduation was undoubtedly a landmark in the life of a young man.

[Answer] I was in a group of nine young officers sent to the same regiment. Out of this group three to this day are flying MiG-21s and one, the Lim-5. I was the fifth who trained for the first 2 years on the Lim-5 jet and then for a somewhat longer time on the MiG-21. If I were to count the flying as a single nonstop flight, I spent more than 10 days and nights in the air in the MiG-21. I actually logged more than 500 takeoffs and the same number of landings. I remember my first jet flight with an instructor was in the spring of 1978. It is with some feeling that I recall several of my excellent instructors: Lt Cols Bogdan Wasilewski, Wladyslaw Pelka, and Andrzej Stanek, and Major Zbigniew Sachadyn. It is because of them that I became a pilot.

[Question] Then...

[Answer] It was suggested that I and some of my colleagues train on aircraft of the latest generation, the MiG-23s. The Polish instructor pilots who had been thoroughly trained at Soviet military airports frightened us into believing that the MiG-23 is a hard aircraft to control, but they were wrong (or maybe stubbornness came through?), because we learned to pilot these modern aircraft in record time. At the same time along with a type rating we received our instructor's certificates.

[Question] In the life of every military pilot there comes a time which is the climax of a difficult professional career.

[Answer] Recently in a USSR training area Major Jasinski and I received the task of bringing down a low-flying, maneuvering target. Major Jasinski was to be the first to fire one of two rockets designated for this exercise. I was remaining in reserve. In practice the situation changed. I found myself more conveniently situated in the air, and I fired from the rear hemisphere the rocket which found the mark! I returned to the airport with the second rocket saved!

[Question] And today?

[Answer] Another distinction awaited me: I was named Pilot of the Year, me, the son of a carpenter from the Warmin village of Swiatki, by virtue of the altitude of my overflights, my activity in the air and efficiency in various areas of the aviation art, and my availability, and the friendship and trust I enjoy among my fellow pilots. And to think that not long ago neighbors in my family's village did not even believe that I could fly any sort of aircraft at all, let alone a jet, and a MiG-23 at that! But it turned out that they saw me once on television, and now they believe.

[Question] In closing our interview we would like to express to you some sort of special wish which would count among pilots.

[Answer] If I can help you out, the proverbial bit of luck in the competition for the WOPK title of "Master of Air Combat," which I will enter to represent the pilots in my unit.

[Question] Well, then, we wish you good flights and a place "in the box." Good luck, and thank you for the interview.

[Editor's note] Just before this issue went to press we were informed that on the occasion of the Polish Army Holiday Pilot Wladyslaw Begiedza was promoted to the rank of Captain. Congratulations!

10790

CSO: 2600/249

POLAND

PROGRESS ON CREATION OF INSPECTION TEAMS ASSESSED

Experiment in Radom

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 3-4 Nov 84 pp 1,2

/Article by Malgorzata Kakiel: "Worker-Peasant Inspection Teams
Established in Radom Province: Benchmark of Effectiveness"/

/Text/ Radom Province, 1 out of 13, has assumed the task of testing the purpose and effectiveness of the Worker-Peasant Inspectorate /WPI/ teams. Our story on the work accomplished by those teams follows.

In the Wilkowo Milk Procurement Center, refrigeration facilities are faulty and the health books of dairy staff are out of date. On the other hand, in the Bendkowska Huta Procurement Center apples are stored in the open and get wet and rotten. At the construction site in Bialobrzegi there are no lockers to keep work clothes in, while power switching equipment is not assembled. Faulty tanks leak water. There is a shortage of fire-fighting equipment.

In the Budochem construction and assembly enterprise at Radom it is considered good form to be 15 to 20 minutes late for work, to look calmly at ruined fences, and to care nothing for tools and industrial equipment.

Somebody might say that there is nothing new here. Everything has been described again and again on TV, in newspapers, or in official reports. Obviously so, since all over the country we observe as much carelessness as well as a surfeit of inspections of all kinds of reporters who follow in their wake.

So why write once again about uncovered shortcomings? To prove that there can be a different way of checking--not by denouncing wrongdoing only, but also by trying to eliminate immediately some of its roots, by acting in support of those undergoing verification instead of just calling them to account.

If in a Niedobyl grocery store butter and cold cuts have no place in the refrigerator and some of these products are kept on the counter to rot, there is only one conclusion to draw: help the store to buy another refrigerator.

If there is no easy access to a milk procurement center at Bledow because no one was ready to put the road in order after water main repairs completed 3 months earlier, one can draw just one conclusion: speed up the road paying, and check it later.

Such specific recommendations are typical for the WPI experimental inspection teams which are operating in Radom Province.

The Effects Are Socially Significant

The PZPR Provincial Committee has appointed a working group for introducing the Worker-Peasant Inspectorate, which in turn initiated the selection of 176 voluntary inspectors. Half of them were recruited from the people's councils, the other half were recommended by the party, labor unions, youth organizations, or village-head offices. The legal basis for the operations of the Radom WPI inspectors is provided by the 20 July 1983 law on people's councils and territorial self-government (in other provinces the inspection is carried out according to rules set up in the 1980 law on the Supreme Chamber of Control /NIK/, or by reference to provisions of both laws, taking into account the Council of Ministers' decision on the Main Field Inspectorate).

Experimental WPI teams operate in Radom, Pionki, Grojec, Szydlowiec, Bledow, Stromiec, Potworow, Sieciechow, Sienna, and Jedlnia-Letnikso. From these towns and villages inspectors go out in the field. Their control activities include, above all, protection of public property, functioning of foodstuff procurement centers and trade outlets, as well as services for consumers.

Sixty-six outlets were first submitted to control operations. These resulted in over 200 citations, prepared by the voluntary inspectors.

The effects of inspections carried out by the WPI are socially significant. The teams are supposed to continue until all their recommendations are implemented by the units checked. In the PZPR Provincial Committee a meeting was also held with directors of all the institutions to which the controlled units are subordinated; the audience was informed about the shortcomings spotted and about actions recommended by the WPI in order to eliminate them.

The inspection acts in a most consistent manner: the last days of November will be devoted to verification of the extent to which the post-inspection recommendations have been implemented.

"What is all this bellyaching? Have we not had enough inspections? They keep coming and pointing at a hole in the fence, through which we carry lime (to avoid the roundabout route--that is how we always used to do things!). The planks in the warehouse door are missing? So what!

I, too, can see all that, but I have no money for repairs. We are a profit-making unit, but what kind of profit can we achieve?" Thus speaks the chairman of the Agricultural Services Cooperative at Stromiec.

We Are Here To Help

He has his reasons, but the inspection has reasons of its own. The site is dirty, even under the chairman's window old tires lie about; the vigorous councilwoman, Regina Witkowska, puts them on the doorstep. If they could lie about on grass, let them now stay on the doormat; perhaps somebody will take mercy and put them where they belong. Fuel tanks have padlocks on taps only. Should anyone wish to use state-owned fuel, he would find it fairly easy.

"Do not lose your temper, we are here not to anger you but to help. I will submit all your complaints at the council session."

Regina Witkowska is sure of herself and of her ability--as a member of the inspection team--to put things right. It is easier for her than for other inspectors to point out shortcomings and to believe in their elimination. To start with she is a councilwoman, and second...she does not live in Stromiec. Unlike Bartlomiej Olszewski, a storekeeper in the village cooperative. He does not object to inspection, everything should be checked up, but should he denounce anybody he will hear in reply that his own warehouse might well deserve a check-up, too.

"Perhaps it would be better to send such an inspection team to a different village," he suggests. "To check up people you do not know..."

At Jedlnia-Letnisko the shop attendant at the grocery stall at first greeted Edward Dwojak as a regular customer, and only later recognized him as an inspector.

What Next?

In the post-inspection reports, kept by the Organizational Department of the PZPR Provincial Committee, one can often find stylistically awkward formulations. They, too, confirm the genuine character of Worker-Peasant Inspectorate. The teams I have come to know best, the ones from Stromiec and Jedlnia, were actually composed overwhelmingly of workers and peasants. Their class composition and the enormous involvement of voluntary inspectors in their activities argue strongly on behalf of establishing the WPI.

On the other hand... How much time have the worker, the farmer, the housewife, lost due to attendance at the two preliminary courses organized by the PZPR Provincial Committee? Those people have never had anything to do with inspection work. They had to be told about the inspection system in force throughout the country and about the legal

grounds of WPI activities, to absorb elementary knowledge of the mode of their future work. How many hours do they devote to verifying somebody else's work, while at the same time they are absent from their own place of employment?

Doubts of this kind have emerged more than once during the consultations that followed the PZPR 16th Plenum. All the "pros" and "cons" should therefore be meticulously balanced.

Positive Contribution to Society

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 3-4 Nov 84 pp 3,5

/Interview with Jozef Oleksy, head of the Office of the Central Audit Commission of the PZPR Central Committee, by Ryszard Naleszkiewicz: "Concerning the Proposal To Establish the Worker-Peasant Inspectorate: Social Inspection;" date and place not specified

/Text /Question In what stage are the preparations for establishing the Worker-Peasant Inspectorate just now? It seems that the issue has been hushed up lately...

/Answer After the consultations held in the PZPR provincial committees, and after the social consultation that followed the 16th Plenum of the Central Committee, the Center for Public Opinion Research has been especially instructed to start polls of its own; working out their results is just drawing to an end. These are the views held by a representative sample of respondents. Another team of six scholars is testing the concept in its sociopsychological aspects. Let them suggest how are we supposed to propagate the inspection, how to convince people that it is needed.

/Question I am most interested in the social consultation and its results.

/Answer The consultation has shown that people regard the concept in a contradictory manner. It is not yet clear whether we should opt for establishing a new institution, legally separate from the existing system, and to whom it should be subordinated, or whether we should merge the inspectorate with the already existing organs, the people's councils or the NIK. The Secretariat of the Central Committee has therefore decided to carry out a 2-month experiment, due to start in mid-October.

/Question Experimental inspection? Would its result, too, be regarded as "experimental," and the expected reports on corruption be thrown away?

/Answer Well, we will rate the results of the experiment according to their effects, their ultimate effects, that is to say, according to the

immediate implementation of their recommendations. The more effective and quicker the implementation, the more positive points will be given to the different versions.

/Question/ May we talk at greater length about the different versions of such an experimental inspection? Where will it be conducted, and by whom?

/Answer/ We have chosen 13 provinces which by themselves--or rather through their provincial committees--have volunteered. The Secretariat of the Central Committee has issued guidelines concerning the manner and ground rules for carrying out the inspection.

/Question/ Will they proceed everywhere in the same manner?

/Answer/ No, in three different versions. Bielsko-Biala, Chelm, Krosno, Legnica, Radom, Plock, and Sieradz provinces will test the version of inspection subordinated to the people's councils. There the inspection teams will be appointed as extraordinary commissions at various levels. We shall find out whether that will suffice for achieving maximum effectiveness in their actions. We shall find out whether their powers derived from the law on people's councils will prove adequate.

The second version, implemented in Koszalin, Opole, and Rzeszow provinces, provides for inspection based on the NIK law, and affiliated with its provincial agencies.

The third version, carried out by Bialystok and Katowice, the so-called integrated version, operates through inspection teams which derive their powers from all the available legal grounds--people's councils, NIK, and the Main Field Inspectorate. It might also reveal some legal loopholes and the need for legislation. On behalf of the Central Committee's teams, its members will keep an eye on various provinces.

/Question/ How are members of the inspection teams being recruited?

/Answer/ We have adopted a principle of full publicity. Candidates for such teams are being recommended at party meetings, sessions of the Patriotic Front for National Rebirth, councilors' groups, meetings of trade unions, and youth or civic organizations. No secretary or director can point at somebody and say: "He should be the one!" People themselves have to voice their opinions. Obviously, team members should be the best, morally upright, influential people. That is the principle of collective open recommendation.

/Question/ Even the most crystal-clear people will do nothing on their own!

/Answer/ That is why in every inspection headquarters in addition to the secretaries of the provincial and gmina committees there will be, at the appropriate level, the police chief, the prosecutor, head of the NIK agency, deputy chairman of the people's council, and the provincial governor, if he is a party member. All are party members, because the experiment is being carried out under the aegis of our party; the party initiated it. Thus, all those whose cooperation in these operations might be necessary will take part. Should the inspection find something reprehensible, its members would not have to make rounds, beg, write to ask the police, the prosecutors' office, or the NIK to do something about it; as members of those institutions, they will be able to set them immediately in motion.

/Question/ Have you no doubts that such a pattern assumes campaign-style actions only? Such people cannot be engaged permanently--they have their own jobs to do.

/Answer/ At present, by the very nature of the experiment, those are indeed inspection campaigns. Once the experience is there, we shall decide which is the most feasible version. We are not sure whether the experiment will succeed at all. It might well happen that, once all those tests are over, the whole issue will collapse. We are very concerned about that. After all, much depends on the citizenry themselves, on their will to engage in such inspection operations.

/Question/ But to inspect one has to have at least a modicum of knowledge...

/Answer/ That is why instruction is so difficult. The teams consist of workers and peasants who do not know much about inspection. What level of expertise should we postulate for a member of the team--that is the dilemma. To ensure effective inspection, to avoid knocking down open doors. The dilemma is closely related to the inability to define the nature of crime in our society. After all, in common parlance a small gift for a doctor is not a bribe, one sack of concrete going to waste is nothing to condemn, taking out a small quantity of envelopes and paper from an office or a handful of screws from a factory is not theft... Large quantities--that is bad. But in a workplace even something which conforms to the law but causes socially negative effects sometimes remains ignored, difficult to punish. It is the nature of crime, the ability to discover wrongdoing in embryo, actions which at first, taken by themselves, seem insignificant, but once accumulated as a universal phenomenon bring most dangerous results.

/Question/ Do we know of any instances of parallel voluntary institutions among our neighbors in the socialist countries?

/Answer/ Of course. In the Soviet Union there is a nationwide uniform worker and peasant inspectorate. Its structure is centralized, it has a well-developed administrative branch at its upper levels, professional inspectors and full-time comptrollers. The lower part, however, like the

base of a pyramid, is very vast and almost totally composed of volunteers. The inspection carried out by such social volunteers is of a sociopolitical rather than economic nature. They have just to come and say "It seems to us that here, in this area, in this enterprise, something is out of order." Then their role is virtually finished. From then on the professionals--police, etc.--take over. The civic activists, however, have the right to order such organs to verify their concerns or suspicions. To verify them in public, in their presence. And then they see to it that the culprits do not escape punishment. Similar bodies operate in the GDR, Hungary, and other countries.

/Question/ And what does that imply for us?

/Answer/ We have to answer the question of whether we want popular inspection as a component of the people's power in the state, or would rather socialize the state inspectorate. The first model is socially broader; the latter, however, is more punitive and provides better safeguards of professionalism and efficiency.

/Question/ Besides, the first model might give more scope for local cliques, cabals, interest groups with dishonest intentions...

/Answer/ Yes, in particular in smaller centers where everybody knows everybody else, including volunteer inspectors, and where everybody is somehow dependent on everybody else. Thus whoever checks somebody else's shortcomings might be inhibited and tend to overlook similar faults among "our own people." This kind of subjectivism is especially dangerous for every kind of volunteer inspection, and might well render it ineffective.

/Question/ But what is going to happen if the experiment endorses neither the people's councils law nor the NIK law?

/Answer/ Such a contingency is being tested in the third experimental version in Bialystok and Katowice: the inspection teams there will operate under broadest powers, so to say, backed by the political authority of the party wherever specific regulations are temporarily lacking. They will operate in all possible areas. We shall see what will come of it. This version is intended to provide supportive evidence for potential legislation on the Worker and Peasant Inspectorate as a separate institution at all levels, subordinated to the Sejm, the Council of State, or to the Council of Ministers.

/Question/ In my opinion, everything depends on their legal authority to act. Professional inspection has such powers, but a voluntary one does not, since it has always fallen apart--we can mention just the quiet death of the social inspection committees... After all, we have fewer than 19 professional state inspection bodies, so what?

/Answer/ Voluntary inspection should not be judged from a purely instrumental point of view. Its main role is systemic: implementing the constitutional right of people's power. If the working people are indeed to rule in our country, they must enjoy the right of overseeing the effectiveness of their rule. The whole idea of inspection concerns creating conditions for citizens intervention and judgment, how different sectors of our life perform, especially where things are going badly.

/Question/ But the representative system guarantees such a right of control through the very same representative organs, that is to say, organs of the working people, does it not?

/Answer/ That is right--and the existing laws on people's councils and territorial self-government considerably broaden this authority.

/Question/ But the implementation of these powers is not always satisfactory...

/Answer/ For two reasons. First, the elected representatives themselves are still not very skilled in using their right of control. Second, their environment, the organs of the executive power, the administration, etc., are not always ready to submit to such surveillance, they do their best to make it more difficult, and from the psychological point of view that is natural. One should not generalize, but the overall situation is not good.

/Question/ There is also general weariness caused by inspections, which recently have been quite numerous...

/Answer/ Yes, indeed. For 3 years now, the control operations of the armed forces, of territorial operational teams, of the Main Field Inspectorate, of the Main Inspectorate of the Council of Ministers' Office, and of the NIK have been most intensive.

/Question/ So, is there a need to form a new body, the Worker and Peasant Inspectorate?

/Answer/ We have already talked about the need to establish it--its systemic aspect, the strengthening of the people's power--as stressed emphatically at the 17th Plenum. In my view that is unquestionable. In addition, there are two other arguments. The authorities would like to involve as many citizens as possible in participation in ruling the country. People see most wrongdoing as being somewhere else, or at the top. In fact, more wrongdoing occurs among the people themselves. Shoddy products are cleared by the internal enterprise /quality/ inspection, the government is not responsible for mistreatment of citizens or for malfunctioning of public services. An arrogant clerk leaves his desk and gets insulted by a salesgirl who treats him, as a customer, in an arrogant manner. We therefore lack a uniform social approach to our common duties in our own domain. Without

co-management and citizen participation we will make no headway. The cooperation between society and the state is the supreme requirement of law and progress in every country.

/Question/ I can see danger in the whole issue: if nothing comes of the inspection, or if after its establishment it should prove ineffective or moribund, the party itself as its initiator will have the most to lose.

/Answer/ The party leadership is most concerned about winning popular support of this initiative and convincing people that a lot can really be improved. We now face a responsible decision, a political choice out of many possible options. It is a decision which has to be made under uncertain options. It is a decision which has to be made under uncertain circumstances. It is neither a propaganda ploy nor a camouflage. We are faced with a genuine dilemma: which version to choose, or even, if people are not at all interested in it, whether to engage in establishing the inspectorate at all.

/Question/ Is there then a possibility of abandoning the whole project?

/Answer/ No one makes any secret of the difficulties involved. After all, the authorities have given up concealing difficulties and dilemmas from the population. If the decision is bound to cause damage, its abandonment would be less harmful. That is obvious.

/Question/ In our past political experience, once the authorities have made their initiative public, any withdrawal would have been inconceivable. It would be regarded as discrediting the authorities.

/Answer/ Things have changed, fortunately. Once we would never have withdrawn and would have pushed ahead into mistakes. Today we are developing a system of consultations in order, inter alia, to verify the ideas and the concepts of the authorities in confrontation with people's opinions. What sense would such consultations make if they could in no way affect the original concept?

12485

CSO: 2600/197

WAYS TO REACH COOPERATION WITH INTELLECTUALS DESCRIBED

Warsaw PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY in Polish No 48, 25 Nov 84 pp 1,6

[Article by Mikolaj Kozakiewicz: "Intellectuals and the Crisis"]

[Text] Both elements of the topic, "intellectuals" and "the crisis," have many meanings. Let us define them:

"Intellectuals--Persons distinguished by a cultured mind, predominance of intellect over temperament, those who work with their minds" ("Słownik języka polskiego" [Dictionary of the Polish Language]);

"Intellectuel--Personne, qui s'occupe par gout ou par profession des choses de l'esprit" ("Larousse");

"Intellectual--A person who works (creatively) in the field of science or art; distinguished by a cultured mind; devoting himself to studies, reflections, extensive reading" (Kopalinski's "Słownik wyrazow obcych" [Dictionary of Foreign Words and Expressions]);

"Intellectual--Given to study, reflection and speculation, engaged in activity requiring the creative use of the intellect" ("Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary");

"Intellektuelle(r)--Einseitiger Verstandesmensch, Geistesarbeiter, Wissenschaftler" (Wahrig, "Deutsches Woerterbuch," FRG).

I did not locate the term "Intellectual" at all in the "Entsiklopedicheskiy slovar' yazyka russkogo" [Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Russian Language] and in the 2-volume "Lexikon deutscher Sprache" published in the GDR (in 1956). On the other hand, it includes the term "intelligentsia" as a separate social stratum performing services to the ruling class and divided into the production-technical intelligentsia and the creative intelligentsia. There also are other dictionaries that do not contain the term "intellectual."

No less multiconnotational is the concept of the "crisis."

--The psychological, political and cultural connotations of the crisis are tantamount to a turning point, a turnabout;

--The medical connotation of the crisis is a climax (of a disease);

--In its economic connotation, a crisis is a prolonged period of economic collapse.

I provided at the outset a listing--partial only--of the connotations only to show that I am aware of the terminological slipperiness of the topic "intellectuals and the crisis," as well as to give advance notice that I will not be surprised by criticisms of my conclusions, particularly considering that the abovementioned different interpretations of the meanings of the principal terms, "the intellectual" and "the crisis," raise questions to which I do not always know the answers. For example, is every scientist (or more precisely, every investigator of social trends) an intellectual? But the answer here hinges on the prior answering of other questions such as whether all research and scientific activities are of a creative nature. Because after all it is known that not all creative activities are of a scientific nature. What is, after all, the meaning of the creative nature of an activity?

Many questions can be similarly asked regarding the concept of the crisis. We speak colloquially of a crisis of confidence, the educational crisis, the crisis of values and credibility, the crisis of authorities, the moral crisis, the social crisis, the political crisis, and the crisis of the ideology. Does "crisis" have the same meaning in every case?

Here another doubt arises. If a crisis is, by definition, a "moment," a "turning point," a "climax," how can it be possible to speak of a crisis lasting 4, 5 or 10 years? It may be that in this case the economic connotation of the term "crisis" has been illegitimately extended to the sphere of consciousness, culture and politics.

Perhaps in this field we have experienced only two turning points, those denoted conventionally by the dates 31 August 1980 [Solidarity] and 13 December 1981 [imposition of martial law], with everything else being a consequence of these two turning points?

Was the process of social (political and awareness) transformations initiated or distorted by these crises alone? I believe that answering this question is of major importance to our topic.

Also plurisignificant is, lastly, the phrase, "the role of intellectuals in the socioeconomic crisis." It can be interpreted in at least three different ways. It can be interpreted as the causative role played by intellectuals in preparing, inducing or accomplishing the socioeconomic crisis in Poland in Poland, and there is no lack of documentary proof that such reflections have been made in the press, particularly directly after 13 December 1981.

But this can also mean the question of how did intellectuals conduct themselves during the crises and in the course of the subsequent events, and what consequences did this cause to the intellectuals themselves and to the society. Both these questions are of a diagnostic-descriptive or even historical nature.

It is thus possible to formulate prognostically or postulatively the following question: What should be the attitude and role of intellectuals toward urgent tasks of leading the country out of its deep economic decline and the persistent societal disintegration? What is their role during this difficult period?

While I do not deny the importance of the first two questions, I will try to concentrate on the third. To be sure, that question can be considered in its normative form upon providing an at least cursory definition of the present situation between "the powers that be," the "authorities," and "the intelligentsia," or more closely, between "the authorities" and "intellectuals." During a discussion held half a year ago, one of the speakers claimed that the past crises have resulted in the existence of a conflict between the authorities and intellectuals, due to the material [income] discrimination against the intelligentsia as well as to the different guiding values, which to the authorities are the state and *raison d'etat*, whereas to the intelligentsia (intellectuals) they are the eternal and universal human values.

This thesis aroused several doubts in me. First of all, I am not certain that it is justified to speak of a conflict between the authorities and the intelligentsia. The point is not the absence of any such thing as uniform and unanimous "authorities" on one side and an equally uniform and unanimous "intelligentsia" on the other. It is the concept itself of "conflict" that I doubt in, since it does not apply to the description of the state of the relations between those mythicized authorities and the no less mythicized intelligentsia.

There is no doubt, however, that within the intelligentsia there are certain groups and individuals existing in a genuine conflict with the authorities.

This means that the political and social goals of these groups and individuals conflict with those of the authorities, and that they are waging an active struggle against the authorities, and are being just as actively combatted by the latter. This concerns essentially a handful of intellectuals whose aims conflict with, and indeed cannot be reconciled with, the aims of the authorities or, more broadly, with the realities of the Constitution and the system of society or with Poland's *raison d'etat*.

The entire mass of the intelligentsia (1,400,000 persons with higher educational background) has many pretensions, reproaches and justified grievances, but it also feels a great deal of resentment and has experienced considerable frustrations owing to the authorities. Yet in this case there is no conflict of interests, programs and long-range political goals. It cannot be otherwise besides, considering that the entire intelligentsia (including

also the majority of creative people and intellectuals) is "in the pocket" of the authorities, depends on their patronage, and is concerned about professional advancement, awards, academic degrees, publication of books, getting credit for a film, or getting a theatre budget approved--all activities which depend upon the approval of the authorities. There is no country in the world where the intelligentsia, no matter how creative and prominent, has played an autonomous, let alone primary political, role.

Creative individuals and intellectuals may switch patrons ["maecenases"], but they cannot free themselves of their dependence on them.

They may switch from a secular patron to an ecclesiastical patron, from a domestic one to a foreign one, but they cannot get rid of their dependent status. Any other thesis of the situation of intellectuals is self-delusion and the creation of myths intended to sweeten the bitter truth.

But while this dependence is a fact, the degree of its acceptance varies. Following the year 1980, intellectuals in Poland ceased to be servile without ceasing to be dependent. This is a major change. For it means that they will not carry out every wish or recommendation of the authorities, particularly in cases in which they sniff out manipulation or trampling of values: in such cases they react by disappearing, becoming passive, dropping out. It also happens unfortunately that often they react thus in cases where such suspicions are imaginary owing to a general mistrust in the authorities as a consequence of the traumas and frustrations experienced.

I do not think it plausible to reduce the causes of this conflict to merely the chronic material discrimination against the intelligentsia, especially the scientist intelligentsia (although it certainly exists) and to differences in guiding values (with the intelligentsia believing in humanist values and the powers that be in the values preserving the Polish *raison d'etat*). For beside the objective differences in the hierarchy of values between the authorities and the intelligentsia (ensuing from the fact that the authorities bear a direct responsibility for the state, which is not borne by the intellectuals), there operates an additional factor.

The intelligentsia--particularly the intellectuals--is sensible of its own historical mission of defending and preserving humanist and democratic values, of which it feels itself to be the guarantor and bearer.

Wherever these values are threatened, violated or manipulated, intellectuals (at least a major part of them) deem it their duty to protest against or at least publicly condemn such cases.

Instructive in this respect are the observations of the changes occurring in intellectuals who become members of elements of the authorities that deal contact with the public, as when a professor becomes a government minister, and conversely in those who leave the apparatus of power and again become mere academics, creative artists or just members of the intelligentsia. Public opinion accuses the former of sudden bad faith, of turning from democrats into autocrats, and the latter of suddenly recalling democracy and turning liberal.

Yet such individuals do not necessarily change; what changes is merely their social role or the pressures to which they are exposed. It is not they who change abruptly; it is their life situations and jobs that thus change.

But while intellectuals consider their mission to be the protection of time-transcendent values, the function of the authorities is the protection of the present and immediate future of the state, which is and must be to them the paramount value. Hence also, the authorities often view the intelligentsia (intellectuals) as a constant source of trouble and a factor complicating the implementation of pragmatic tasks. In its turn, the intelligentsia views the authorities as an element that does not appreciate, menaces or even violates eternal values with the object of achieving short-term pragmatic effects, which the intellectuals disdain.

Both sides are right, and both have a role to fulfill, and hence some tension between intellectuals and the authorities exists in every country regardless of its system of society. If these tensions manifest themselves, the resulting social consequences are not only negative but also positive: on the one hand, they limit the arbitrariness of the authorities and on the other they prevent an unrestrained pursuit of lunatic ideas and projects for saving the world, developed by intellectuals.

The authorities should not demand to be loved by intellectuals (especially after so many traumatic experiences); a marriage of convenience will suffice.

For the intelligentsia derives its sustenance from the authorities, and without them it cannot survive, while the authorities need the intelligentsia to perform many tasks basic to the development of various domains in the country (culture, education, science, technological progress), which only the creative intelligentsia, and no one else, can accomplish. Yet various official comments display overtones of sorrowing because such good authorities are not loved by the intelligentsia.

An understanding between the authorities and the intelligentsia is usually construed mainly as the understanding of the authorities by the intelligentsia, and its acceptance of their rationale. Yet, as I interpret this term, understanding does not imply consent to--or acceptance of, owing to persuasion or coercion--the position of the other party (here meaning the authorities); it rather means taking a position on disputed issues that would be acceptable to both parties without violating the mission of either party or nullifying its social role.

Thus when a considerable part of intellectuals is in a kind of psychological and ideological-moral opposition--in the sense of being critically disposed--and only an insignificant minority practices actual political opposition, the only way of changing this situation is, of course, achieving a mutual understanding.

However, this understanding does not mean liquidating the opposition; rather, it means measures which in time would transform the opposition from a destructive, or more often merely obstructive--by standing aloof from civic-

spirited actions--force into a constructive force invigorating the transformations in Poland.

If the whole matter is considered more deeply, it will be seen that the dependence of intellectuals on the authorities is essentially a mutual dependence, since the powers that be need intellectual support not only for the aforementioned pragmatic reasons (they need experts in science, technology, culture, propaganda, education, etc.), but also for moral-political reasons as well as for reasons of prestige. A situation in which the most aware, creative and independently thinking part of the society (even if its numerical proportion is low) refuses to support and cooperate with the authorities, weakens these authorities and lowers their national and international authority. Attempts of the authorities to establish speedily their own intellectual base are bound to mobilize mechanisms of pressure to which submit weak individuals who are of little worth morally, dependent and uncreative, that is, who display precisely the traits opposite to the traits of intellectuals.

Lacking social recognition and charisma, such a hastily and artificially created state intellectual elite cannot perform any of the social functions that are actually of importance to the powers that be, and its participation, even if en masse, and support, even if raucous, do not improve socially in any way the situation of the powers that be. This fact accounts for the bargaining power of genuine intellectuals and causes them, despite their small numerical size, to have a major voice in and a potentially large influence on the course of affairs within the state--on condition that that voice is heard, that people do not voluntarily retreat into silence, that they be ready to accept the personal, political and moral risks of proclaiming their truths without kowtowing to anyone and anything, bearing in mind the common national and state good and, at the same time, though, on taking into consideration the historical realities of present-day Poland.

*

Tadeusz Kotarbinski in his brilliant article published in 1929, "On the Abilities Peculiar to the Researcher," distinguished three types of individuals unsuitable as creative scientists:

"1) Model students: In such internally ossified individuals work kills initiative. They are suited for executing the projects of others, training the mediocre masses, mediating between the main discoverers and the whole. They are needed in organizations as an antidote against noxious troublemakers....They officiate in science without contributing creatively to it.

"2) The unproductives: Such people are not necessarily idle. On the contrary, they usually keep busy and even fuss around, but they only do easy things. They do wander, but only in the plains, not up the mountains. They read about this or that, make small talk without going deep into the subject, kill time by copying by hand or by mouth what is commonly known, chatting, etc., this being the 'working method' of these idlers;

"3) The abulics (from 'abulia'--absence of will): These are people who cannot cope with the richness of possibilities; they always spread themselves thin without creating anything of value anyway; eager to change their interests, they begin then abandon it, switching to something else and then also abandoning it half-way." Kotarbinski comments that the abulics are "ready to join various organizations. And whoever is trapped in the quicksands of organizational life, he sinks deeper and deeper until finally the sand invades the brain of the social joiner and petrifies it."

It may be conjectured that most of the readily corruptible intellectuals are recruited from among persons lacking a well-defined and integral selfhood, and hence the authorities basically attach little importance to their support.

It also happens that the intellectual misfits recruited from these categories of model students, unproductives and abulics exploit a moment in history in order to freeze in statuesque poses of "incorruptible" and "unbreakable" dissidents, oppositionists and reformers, viewing this politically extreme "anti" attitude as the only way of winning renown, since they cannot win renown through creative endeavors or indubitable scientific or intellectual accomplishments. This too has to be recognized, for truth's sake.

*

What then should be the role and function of the intellectual during the period of emergence from the crisis?

The expert's role is obvious. He should perform work and assignments at the highest level of his qualifications that could hasten overcoming the crisis, not in order to help the authorities but in order to help the country. He is not thereby doing a favor or making a concession to the authorities; rather, this is his elementary legal and moral duty. He should do what he is paid for, what he has signed the contract for or what he obligated himself to do by accepting his appointment.

Manifestations of the Polish paranoia are exemplified by scientists who refused to perform expertises that are part of their social function, who refused to participate in seminars and conferences in which their participation was indispensable, or by actors who refused to act on stage or TV.

The role of "the conscience of the nation," of "keepers of national and humanist values," of "signposts to the nation," etc. This role can be performed only on demonstrating publicly what Kotarbinski terms "intellectual courage, expressed in ardor of disputation and honesty of criticism."

Such intellectual courage demands of the intellectual that he raise his voice in admonishing the authorities whenever they disregard or menace these values. But intellectual courage also demands of the intellectual that he speak the bitter truth to the society as well whenever it violates and tramples the values which he supposedly defends.

The same intellectual courage is needed to tell the truth to the Church whenever it acts like a brake. And to tell the truth as well to one's fellow intellectuals when they err or fall prey to hysteria and harm the values that are the most important in the country's present situation. We have lived to witness paradoxical times in which it is easiest and safest to display that courage and uncompromising attitude toward the authorities.

But in order to be the conscience of the nation, one must first have a sensitive conscience of one's own. In order to be the keeper of values, one must himself believe in values and demonstrate his attachment to them by his own life and work, by his attitude toward others. In order to be a signpost to others, one must know the road, the goal followed, the relief of the terrain across which one is to lead, the obstacles barring the road, the stages in which it is to be built--otherwise it is easy to turn into a signpost leading nowhere.

It is also necessary, in my opinion, to distinguish between intellectual courage and intellectual adventurism or intellectual demagoguery designed for applause or other kinds of gratification. Intellectual courage serves truth and the social good, even at the risk of personal harm. Intellectual adventurism is intended to win plaudits from the crowd or from like-minded social groups as well as, "for the rockfastness and fidelity demonstrated," from the authorities and other potential domestic or foreign patrons, in the form of, for example, an order for a scientific project, a film, a sculpture, or a painting, or the granting of a stipend, an award at a festival, etc.

Lastly, there is the role of a partner of the authorities. It is self-evident that intellectuals cannot perform the role of the expert in such a manner as to influence the course of events or preserve values and outline directions if they remain silent, sever communication with power centers and withhold cooperation in whatever the authorities ask advice or consult about or present for assessment. Essentially, it is the intellectuals who should (whether or not asked their opinion) express their opinions and warn and protest whenever something is obstructing the cause of raising Poland from her feet; it is they who should suggest other solutions if those proposed by the authorities seem too faulty to them. It is they, too, who should provide professional and moral support wherever the actions of the authorities follow a correct and socially desirable direction.

Will this be an easy road? No. It is known that it will be a thorny one. Truth does not necessarily win all at once, but it must be continually proclaimed. Similarly, good does not necessarily always win, but it must be ceaselessly done. Only on this road can the course of the renewal in Poland be influenced. This influence cannot be exerted by staying silent on crucial present-day problems or confining oneself to coffeehouse analyses and programs for improving the Republic written on table napkins.

1386

CSO: 2600/324

MEETING OF PZPR CENTRAL AUDITING COMMISSION REPORTED

AU171446 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 14 Dec 84 pp 1, 2

[Report by Izabella Wajszczuk]

[Text] What the Central Auditing Commission has done and how it has worked in the second half of the year was the subject of the Central Auditing Commission's plenary meeting on 13 December. The tasks facing auditing commissions at all levels during the first half of 1985 were also discussed. The talks were chaired by Wacław Skoczylas, deputy chairman of the Commission.

The last meeting this year of members of the Central Auditing Commission and chairmen of voivodship auditing commissions possessed a firm business-like nature. The resume of the 6-month activity and assessment of the controls carried out were combined with an assessment of the effectiveness of the work of commission members and of the methods of action by all auditing bodies.

Of all the comprehensive controls carried out by the Central Auditing Commission during the period in question, the greatest amount of time during the talks was devoted to controls of the implementation of the resolution of the Ninth PZPR Central Committee Plenum concerning young people.

Reading the report, Jacek Trojanek, deputy chairman of the Central Auditing Commission, recalled that the controls had covered 13 Central Committee departments, 42 voivodship committees, 567 primary party cells, and 1,810 factory committees and primary party organizations. Because the Politburo had adopted a schedule for implementing the tasks defined by the ninth plenum, it is these tasks that have been the primary target of control and assessment by the Central Auditing Commission.

Control [word indistinct] had concentrated mainly on the correctness and effectiveness of organizational activity. The results of the controls have confirmed a large organizational effort by most party organizations and cells, but they show at the same time that the propagation of the contents of the ninth plenum resolution has been proceeding very slowly recently.

Comrade Trojanek said that most voivodships display a vague approach toward young people, which does not encourage the solution of young people's problems in a given time and place. For example, young workers' interest in economic reform matters is usually small, and the propagation of reform tasks has only

been occasional. The results of the controls have pointed out that party work with young people is too often in the form of a campaign brimming with slogans and words. Post-control assessments have revealed barriers that still hamper the activity of party bodies in implementing the ninth plenum resolution.

Eugeniusz Stepień referred to this part of the report, calling that the results of the controls confirm a [words indistinct] this effort on the other. He said that this is because we are working as individual cells, and not as an entire party.

It was also said during the talks that youth organizations cannot merely send lists of demands to party [words indistinct]

While on the subject of the duties of auditing commissions, an important part of the work of these commissions was also discussed, in other words the payment of party membership dues. This was also a target of [word indistinct] membership fee is a [words indistinct] of members' discipline. The report revealed shortcomings in this respect, especially in rural organizations and organizations where pensioners are present.

The results of the above [phrase indistinct] said that these latter controls had revealed that workers on a contract abroad fail to pay their dues and do not even admit to being members if the dues have to be paid in hard currency. These facts were confirmed by another member of the Central Auditing Commission, Bronisław Wilk.

Józef Makowski, chairman of the Elbląg Voivodship Auditing Commission, discussed the level of membership dues in the field and the regularity of paying them.

The Central Auditing Commission adopted a work plan for the first half of next year. W. Skoczylas, the chairman of the talks, pointed out the tasks facing auditing commissions at all levels in connection with the approaching party accountability campaign. He said that members of the commission should remind party organizations while controlling and helping them that the essence of a matter is contained not in laws or resolutions, but in attitudes.

CSO: 2600/355

BRIEFS

GLEMP'S CHRISTMAS LETTER--The primate of Poland, Cardinal Jozef Glemp addressed a letter to the faithful to mark Christmas and New Year. Speaking about the church's mission in the contemporary world he recalled that it is its duty to point out that prosperity is not the only ideal of man. The church continues to seek appropriate ways to awaken human conscience in order to create just division of food in the world to prevent people dying of hunger. The church is also seeking ways of convincing rulers of this world that mutual armaments against each other is the error of humanity, and great sin which increases the division of the world into camps hating each other. The primate indicates that the beginning of freedom, justice and dignity starts with human person, with moral value of each man, with conscience shaped in truth. [Text] [Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1800 GMT 16 Dec 84 LD]

PARTY SOCIAL SCIENCE PROGRAM--A developed and detailed program of party activities in the field of social sciences is to be presented by the end of January next year. This statement is to be found in the final resolution of a nationwide, party conference on social sciences which has ended in Warsaw. In his closing speech, Jozef Czyrek said among other things, that the course and the achievements of the conference fully justify the view that going over to a broad, political, Marxist-Leninist offensive in the field of social sciences is not only necessary but also possible. [Text] [Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 0700 GMT 9 Dec 84]

PRC FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY ANNIVERSARY MEETING--To mark the 35th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Poland and the People's Republic of China a meeting was held in Peking organized, among others, by the Sino-Polish Friendship Society. Zhou Peiyan, chairman of the society, said that China was pleased so far with the development of relations with our country in such areas as trade, navigation, science and culture. [Text] [Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 0200 GMT 9 Oct 84]

NEW BISHOP IN WROCLAW--As the Secretariat of the Primate of Poland reports, Pope John Paul II has raised Father Jozef Pazdur, priest in the Metropolitan Seminary in Wroclaw to the position of bishop, and at the same time has appointed him an auxiliary bishop to the Archbishop Metropolitan of Wroclaw. [Text] [Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1500 GMT 18 Dec 84 LD]

JUSTICE MINISTER SIGNS PRAGUE AGREEMENT--The ministries of justice of Poland and of the CSSR have concluded an agreement defining the principles for further development in the sphere of ministerial contacts. The agreement was signed in Prague by Justice Minister Lech Domeradzki and on behalf of the CSSR by the minister of justice of the Slovak [as heard] socialist republic, Jan Pjescak. [Text] [Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 0200 GMT 14 Dec 84 LD]

CSO: 2600/337

CROATIAN LC DEBATES STABILIZATION PROGRAM'S IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS

Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 20 Nov 84 pp 8-10

[Article by Jelena Lovric: "The Blind Alley of an Ideological Offensive"]

[Text] There was no way whatsoever to avoid the comparison. But it would have been difficult for a newsperson to decide to draw the parallel between the so-called "May conference" on the ideological struggle in the sphere of culture and art and the one which was held on Tuesday and Wednesday in the Croatian LC Central Committee if this had not been done, after several speakers had taken the floor, by Stipe Suvar, when in his concluding speech he said that "the truth about the May conference has not reached the Yugoslav public," and he once again judged it to be a "splendid gathering of communist intellectuals."

Although both events were "mass meetings," as someone put it, the makeup of the participants was quite different: in May the meeting consisted of cultural figures, people in the arts, science and public affairs, this time it was party people--activists on the ideological front from opstina party organizations, from Centers for Marxism, ideological activists, as someone has put it. The participants in last week's meeting were not sent any sort of preparatory book in advance, but rather the set of problems were presented at the conference itself in four introductory addresses (Stipe Suvar spoke about the current problems in the ideological effort, Mirjana Pocek-Matic about political-ideological and Marxist education, Mladen Zuvela about the activity of party members in the news media, and Celestin Sardelic about the tasks of the League of Communists in connection with political activities and tendencies in religious events).

Regardless of how it was stated in the two cases, the topic of the two conferences was actually the same: the situation on the ideological front and "what is to be done" this time out of a desire to turn the conversation into an "agreement on restoring the indispensable initiative to the League of Communists so as to overcome the state of malaise, defensiveness and feeling of helplessness" (C. Sardelic). "The purpose of these conversations of ours, of the open examination of the issues, of the conference, as was the case in May, as was the case when we had the discussion about the writing of history, and we will be having many other similar meetings and we will be persistent in pursuing this line, is for our part to contribute to the ideological unity and

combat readiness of the entire League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and not to encourage quarrels and squabbles over peripheral and petty questions," Stipe Suvar said. It might accordingly be said that this last conference was only an extension of the previous one, that it is nothing "else," and that it should serve--at least it might so appear at first--the same purpose. Although it did not involve the calling of the roll, nor were there any serious polemics, nor that harsh, and perhaps even harshly colored "different" time, it is yet to be seen whether it managed to take place without, as Suvar mentioned several times, recalling May, "blind alleys."

By no means does this signify that this time everyone talked about the same thing, which in fact is not possible when the fan of such intriguing topics is spread open. The debate was "panoramic," as someone noted: from talk about "bashful Marxists" to the idea of reviving the party circles, from a recognition that the church is often ahead of us in opening day nurseries and in concern about young people to talk about the Long-Range Economic Stabilization Program. A newsperson is always at a loss when he or she must necessarily single out only a portion from such a multitude of topics and approaches, since in that selection one easily falls into the trap of one-sidedness. That danger was in fact signaled by Suvar when he said that we could "have a case where one person spoke who was out of step with 37 others, when in all 38 people participated, and the impression would be created in the public that what he said was the main thing or the right thing." But since that fate of journalism, which is both its limitation and its good fortune, cannot be avoided, we will attempt to provide only a few of what seem to us rather new accents, which, of course, could make the picture defective.

Dispute the Constitution

In his introductory address Stipe Suvar took as his point of departure the position that today "the main issue in the ideological struggle and, if you like, the ideological disunity in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, both explicit and implicit, and indeed a significant ideological disunity," should be sought in the fact that "we have not yet sufficiently or thoroughly examined and clarified certain laws and patterns in the future development of socialist self-management" (which incidentally had already been noted in the Conclusions of the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee on the Advancement of the Ideological and Theoretical Effort in the League of Communists). Suvar warned that there is now "a strong tendency on the scene, both within the League of Communists and in Yugoslav society at large, to dispute and if possible alter the development strategy which was in essence sketched out both in political and programmatic terms in 1971: by the constitutional amendments in programmatic terms and by the 21st Meeting of the LCY Presidium in political terms."

"The Long-Range Economic Stabilization Program is terminologically based on an oath of allegiance to the constitution and to the Law on Associated Labor, along with the instrumental corrections which were very necessary. And we would be both stupid and reactionary if we were to oppose the instrumental corrections, if we did not in fact demand them. But a current which has imposed itself powerfully both within the party and in the public at large, is obviously aimed at destroying the strategy which the constitution furnished

when it developed the concepts of the association of labor and the basic organization of associated labor at its point of origin," Stipe Suvar said. And he went on:

Allegiance as a Pose

"We have, then, the pose of a vague oath of allegiance to the stabilization program, and anyone who does not say that he supports that program is today cast under suspicion a priori. I would dare say, even though I might personally be subjected to criticism, that mere declaration of allegiance to the stabilization program does not mean much. What are important are the specific issues and the search for solutions to the acute problems, along with a resolution of the conflict of interests in the country, which are objectively given, in a manner that is open and very responsible as for communists it should be. I do not think that the stabilization program has any programmatic-visionary significance, or at least I have not been able to find that in it. This is a program of 'firefighting' measures to get us back on the main course insofar as we are not making progress in pursuing that course or are departing from it. The essential thing is to implement the constitution and the ZUR [Law on Associated Labor] and the LCY Program. Yet some people see the stabilization program as actually an instrument for supplanting the constitution and the ZUR. A battle is being waged over that in Yugoslavia and in the party. Slovenia and Croatia, which account for 57 percent of Yugoslavia's foreign exchange, are being criticized for not allowing the foreign exchange system to be changed, and the other republics are being criticized for not providing raw materials and energy under the present conditions. Vojvodina refuses to furnish its corn and wheat; everyone is either giving or not giving something to everyone else. But the point is that these are real everyday conflicts of interest which can be resolved only if we in the League of Communists are firmly in favor of a course which is not for substitution of the economic stabilization program for the constitution and the ZUR, but that this is a rescue program so that we can proceed consistently in application of the constitution and the ZUR. Allegiance to the constitution and the ZUR is predominant in the verbal sections of the stabilization program. But in practical policy there are significant tendencies to tear them down. And that is something the League of Communists must examine," Suvar said.

If nothing else, it must be acknowledged that that is not the way the Long-Range Stabilization Program has been spoken about from the speaker's platforms in the party.

Suvar says that the dispute is not over greater or lesser respect for market laws, but over "the social context and direction of society's development." In short: do we want to develop as a socialist and self-managed society, do we want to preserve the course of the association of labor, do we want to go forward, or do we want to go back. Suvar added that in the party, in our Centers for Marxism, in our periodicals and in our scientific projects forces have taken on great strength which say that society has collapsed since supposedly it has abandoned economic laws and refuses to reintroduce them, that Yugoslavia is undergoing refeudalization, that the republics and provinces, guided by nationalistic-bureaucratic oligarchies, are bringing Yugoslavia to

ruin. Those are today the principal ideological themes which have all but taken over even in the League of Communists, and the ideological offensive of such assertions is today the most dangerous tendency in our social and political life as a whole. This is a blind alley, and if it is not abandoned throughout the League of Communists, the sobering up may come at a high price.

There was confirmation the very next day that this section of the debate in the Croatian LC Central Committee aroused the greatest interest of the public when Stipe Suvar was invited to comment on a television program about what he actually said and what he meant. At that point Suvar scattered any remaining doubts. He said that his plea had been for us to not touch the essence of social relations which had been anticipated in the constitution and the ZUR, and to pursue the stabilization program in order to correct certain practical solutions so as to extricate ourselves from the difficulties. "Which means that Stipe Suvar is not opposed to the Long-Range Economic Stabilization Program?" the television reporter asked. In answer to that direct question Suvar said in paraphrase that he was against possible abuses whereby the form of consistent application of the Long-Range Stabilization Program would be used to revise the basic course of the socialist revolution.

The Stabilization Screen

At the conference itself these reflections did not meet with any sort of important or explicit response either in the sense of a confirmation and even less in the sense of being contested. Vlado Slijepcevic picked up on them directly by asserting that the debate being conducted about and around the Long-Range Stabilization Program was only a screen for debates about the essence, character and content of our production relations and social relations. It seems to me, Slijepcevic said, that because of the various misunderstandings that exist in this area and because of such frequent appeals to the Long-Range Program ... even in the documents of the LC, we have to state not only what it actually is, but also what in it has the backing of the League of Communists. The Long-Range Program ... provides the basis not only for overcoming the crisis, but also for putting value back into the basic commitments which were simultaneously set forth in the Resolutions of the 10th LCY Congress and in the 1974 Constitution, and somewhat later this was also elaborated in part in the Law on Associated Labor.

The Long-Range Program ... consists of several thick volumes: it has its basic premises, its concluding section, and between them I do not know how many separate documents. The basic premises, which were adopted by the 12th LCY Congress, and the concluding section, which was adopted slightly more than a year ago by the LCY Central Committee, are documents of the League of Communists, but I do not see why or for what reason the League of Communists should stand behind--and I do not think it does--all those separate documents which come between those two parts of the Long-Range Program ..., especially because certain of the separate documents are altogether technical studies of the development of particular activities, branches and groupings, but also because the Long-Range Program ... is not altogether consistent, but rather certain parts of the various separate documents are even contradictory. This has led to differing interpretations of the Long-Range Program ..., all the way to

those extreme interpretations (which it itself, and especially its ideological foundations, provides no support for whatsoever) which hold that its implementation would actually signify a negation of that system which was put in place by the 1974 Constitution and the ZUR. The most frequent interpretations are those which make a fetish of the so-called free market and production of commodities. The weakness of the League of Communists is that it has not drawn the line and has not delimited that market and that commodity production which are advocated by the documents of the League of Communists, that is, the market and commodity production in self-management socialism, from advocacy of a so-called free market, of production of commodities in the interpretations of the Long-Range Program ... which have in essence been taken from the lecture notes of the ideologues of neoliberalism and neoconservatism, which is a part of the conservative wave which is splashing over the world and reaching us.

Opposition in the Bosom of the Party

Gordana Kosanovic, also spoke very briefly, a mere mention, about the Long-Range Stabilization Program, asserting that this program offers its own practical solutions in the battle for self-management and thereby also offers us stabilization, but that it has been left to the arbitrary interpretation of those rare people who have read it and of a majority who make only declarative use of what it says about the level of readiness in society for us to wage that battle immediately and thoroughly. She therefore proposed that the crucial and indisputable points of the program be elaborated more suitably for all workplaces and that agreement be reached as soon as possible about everything that is in dispute. By equipping our broadest communist and socialist base for those unchangeable and crucial directions of the Long-Range Program ..., we will be preparing ourselves in the most effective way for recognizing those who call it into question, G. Kosanovic said.

That gave a new aspect to the debate about the Long-Range Economic Stabilization Program in that conference on ideology. One can expect, however, that there will be more said on this topic in the days to come. While we wait for the debate to resume and perhaps for matters to be cleared up, we should not forget the warning uttered in various ways by several speakers to the effect that in the future everything will take place in the ranks of the League of Communists, which does not tolerate opposition to it in its own bosom. That will not make the job a bit easier, on the contrary. Thus Stipe Suvar said that "it is not a question here only of some confrontation between the League of Communists and opponents outside it. On the contrary, it is more a question of the need to clear things up within the League of Communists itself and in relations within it." Slijepcevic concluded his statement by saying that "not only do we have a concerted opposition outside the League of Communists, but much of that is also alive within it, and aggressive attacks on the very foundations of the system are quite often being launched from within the party itself. That being the case, the question remains of whether at this point we can speak about an ideological front, since who is creating it, with whom and against whom?" "Who is the greatest opponent of the League of Communists?" Vojmir Franicevic wondered. And he immediately responded: "At times it seems that the League of Communists is its own greatest adversary. I say this because spokesmen of different social projects, of different ideologies,

including, that is, both bourgeois and indeed even conservative ones, are gaining legitimacy within it and through it."

We will conclude, then, with the words of Franjo Butorac, who said that often many debates, when they are carried over to the pages of newspapers, evoke in people "a whole series of uncertainties, questions and dilemmas, and this is one of the reasons why to some extent we are seeing a dropping off of confidence in the League of Communists. It is fine for us to debate all those dilemmas, for us to reach agreement, and even to quarrel if necessary, but once the stands have been taken, then we have to behave properly and strictly implement them, respecting the principle of democratic centralism."

7045

CSO: 2800/128

END